{"id":70505,"date":"2009-02-04T07:13:06","date_gmt":"2009-02-04T07:13:06","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2009\/02\/04\/petraeus-versus-obama\/"},"modified":"2009-02-04T07:13:06","modified_gmt":"2009-02-04T07:13:06","slug":"petraeus-versus-obama","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2009\/02\/04\/petraeus-versus-obama\/","title":{"rendered":"Petraeus versus<\/em> Obama"},"content":{"rendered":"

Apr\u00e8s les premiers jours de l’installation dynamique de l’administration Obama commencent \u00e0 appara\u00eetre les premi\u00e8res rumeurs concernant des batailles internes. On fait grand cas de l’article de Gareth Porter, publi\u00e9 sur le site CounterPunch<\/em> le 2 f\u00e9vrier 2009<\/a>, qui expose les d\u00e9tails d’un affrontement feutr\u00e9 entre le nouveau pr\u00e9sident et le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Petraeus, l’homme du surge<\/em>, ancien commandant en Irak et chef aujourd’hui du grand commandement Central Command. Porther est un enqu\u00eateur r\u00e9put\u00e9, avec d’excellentes sources chez les militaires, qui lui ont permis notamment de d\u00e9tailler<\/a>, il y a deux ans, l’affrontement autour d’une possible attaque contre l’Iran.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tPorther explique comment Petraeus a re\u00e7u, avec d’autres chefs, instruction d’Obama, le 21 janvier, de pr\u00e9senter un plan de retrait des forces US d’Iran en 16 mois; comment il avait pr\u00e9sent\u00e9, \u00e0 cette r\u00e9union du 21 janvier, un plan diff\u00e9rent, envisageant un d\u00e9lai plus long et des dispositions diff\u00e9rentes, et faisant cela avec une certaine maladresse, croyant sans doute que GW Bush \u00e9tait toujours \u00e0 la Maison Blanche (\u00abPetraeus made the mistake of thinking he was still dealing with George Bush instead of with Barack Obama<\/em>\u00bb); comment Obama a repouss\u00e9 ce plan alternatif de Petraeus et confirm\u00e9 sa volont\u00e9 d’un retrait en 16 mois; comment, depuis, Petraeus pr\u00e9pare une contre-offensive pour faire pression sur Obama et obtenir d’autres dispositions. Petraeus s’appuie notamment sur le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Odierno, son successeur \u00e0 la t\u00eate du th\u00e9\u00e2tre d’op\u00e9rations en Irak, et sur divers g\u00e9n\u00e9raux \u00e0 la retraite, tr\u00e8s actifs dans les diff\u00e9rents r\u00e9seaux d’information US.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abThe opening argument by the Petraeus-Odierno faction against Obama’s withdrawal policy was revealed the evening of the Jan. 21 meeting when retired Army Gen. Jack Keane, one of the authors of the Bush troop surge policy and a close political ally and mentor of Gen. Petraeus, appeared on the Lehrer News Hour to comment on Obama’s pledge on Iraq combat troop withdrawal.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbKeane, who had certainly been briefed by Petraeus on the outcome of the Oval Office meeting, argued that implementing such a withdrawal of combat troops would increase the risk rather dramatically over the 16 months. He asserted that it would jeopardise the stable political situation in Iraq and called that risk not acceptable.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe assertion that Obama’s withdrawal policy threatens the gains allegedly won by the Bush surge and Petraeus’s strategy in Iraq will apparently be the theme of the campaign that military opponents are now planning.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbKeane, the Army Vice-Chief of Staff from 1999 to 2003, has ties to a network of active and retired four-star Army generals, and since Obama’s Jan. 21 order on the 16-month withdrawal plan, some of the retired four-star generals in that network have begun discussing a campaign to blame Obama’s troop withdrawal from Iraq for the ultimate collapse of the political \u00ab\u00a0stability\u00a0\u00bb that they expect to follow U.S. withdrawal, according to a military source familiar with the network’s plans.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe source says the network, which includes senior active duty officers in the Pentagon, will begin making the argument to journalists covering the Pentagon that Obama’s withdrawal policy risks an eventual collapse in Iraq. That would raise the political cost to Obama of sticking to his withdrawal policy. If Obama does not change the policy, according to the source, they hope to have planted the seeds of a future political narrative blaming his withdrawal policy for the collapse they expect in an Iraq without U.S. troops.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCette affaire Petraeus-Obama est le premier signe des conditions int\u00e9rieures agit\u00e9es que va conna\u00eetre l’administration Obama, face \u00e0 la situation washingtonienne faite de multiples centres de pouvoir, d’influence et d’int\u00e9r\u00eat, install\u00e9e durant l’administration Bush. On ne peut parler pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment de lignes politiques qui s’affrontent (par exemple, ce cas o\u00f9 Petraeus para\u00eet du c\u00f4t\u00e9 des durs n’emp\u00eache pas Petraeus d’avoir \u00e9t\u00e9 l’un des premiers, au d\u00e9but janvier, \u00e0 sugg\u00e9rer qu’il pourrait y avoir une coop\u00e9ration entre les USA et l’Iran dans la guerre en Afghanistan). Il s’agit v\u00e9ritablement de politiques personnelles qui sont en jeu, d’affrontements d’influence, etc. Il s’agit donc du pur jeu politicien et bureaucratique, dont Washington est un centre actif, o\u00f9 le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Petraeus s’est d\u00e9j\u00e0 montr\u00e9 extr\u00eamement habile.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tPour Obama, c’est de loin le danger le plus grave, si l’on accepte l’hypoth\u00e8se que le nouveau pr\u00e9sident a des intentions r\u00e9formistes, ou de changement selon le mot d’ordre de sa campagne. Ce type d’affrontements et de tensions est g\u00e9n\u00e9rateur d’enlisement, de batailles de retardement, de paralysie g\u00e9n\u00e9rale avec les tensions bureaucratiques et politiciennes. Dans le cas pr\u00e9cis de Petraeus, il s’agit d’un g\u00e9n\u00e9ral politique aux ambitions effectivement politiques non dissimul\u00e9es, dont on a dit d\u00e9j\u00e0 qu’il avait des ambitions politiques pour les pr\u00e9sidentielles de 2012, notamment si Obama rencontre des difficult\u00e9s \u00e0 \u00e9tablir son programme pendant son premier mandat (Petraeus pouvant alors appara\u00eetre comme le leader<\/em> naturel d’un parti r\u00e9publicain \u00e0 la reconqu\u00eate du pouvoir). Dans de telles conditions, Petraeus pourrait juger effectivement habile de se construire une r\u00e9putation d’opposant feutr\u00e9 \u00e0 un pr\u00e9sident Obama qui serait d\u00e9nonc\u00e9 comme trop conciliant dans les affaires ext\u00e9rieures, trop colombe dans les affaires de d\u00e9fense et ainsi de suite. Manuvres politiciennes classiques, certes, o\u00f9 la question irakienne est surtout l\u00e0 comme faire-valoir. Dans tous les cas, une bonne mesure des prodigieuses difficult\u00e9s qui attendent Obama dans l’exercice de ses fonctions, \u00e9ventuellement dans la r\u00e9alisation de ses ambitions.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 4 f\u00e9vrier 2009 \u00e0 07H14<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Apr\u00e8s les premiers jours de l’installation dynamique de l’administration Obama commencent \u00e0 appara\u00eetre les premi\u00e8res rumeurs concernant des batailles internes. On fait grand cas de l’article de Gareth Porter, publi\u00e9 sur le site CounterPunch le 2 f\u00e9vrier 2009, qui expose les d\u00e9tails d’un affrontement feutr\u00e9 entre le nouveau pr\u00e9sident et le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Petraeus, l’homme du… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[7928,857,6264,7463],"class_list":["post-70505","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-7928","tag-irak","tag-petraeus","tag-porther"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70505","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70505"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70505\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70505"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70505"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70505"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}