{"id":70518,"date":"2009-02-09T06:32:38","date_gmt":"2009-02-09T06:32:38","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2009\/02\/09\/holbrooke-face-a-lafghanistan-un-accablement-significatif\/"},"modified":"2009-02-09T06:32:38","modified_gmt":"2009-02-09T06:32:38","slug":"holbrooke-face-a-lafghanistan-un-accablement-significatif","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2009\/02\/09\/holbrooke-face-a-lafghanistan-un-accablement-significatif\/","title":{"rendered":"Holbrooke face \u00e0 l’Afghanistan: un accablement significatif"},"content":{"rendered":"

Ceci repr\u00e9sente sans doute une certaine surprise. La prestation de Richard Holbrooke \u00e0 la Wehrkunde<\/em> de Munich ce week-end, a \u00e9t\u00e9, d’un certain point de vue, assez inattendue. Le ton employ\u00e9 par l’envoy\u00e9 sp\u00e9cial de l’administration Obama au Pakistan et en Afghanistan a \u00e9t\u00e9 assez diff\u00e9rent de ce qu’on pouvait attendre d’un homme r\u00e9put\u00e9 pour sa brutalit\u00e9 et sa propension \u00e0 bousculer les autres, sp\u00e9cialement ses alli\u00e9s. Au lieu d’employer une rh\u00e9torique volontariste destiner \u00e0 fustiger les alli\u00e9s pour leur manque de coop\u00e9ration, Holbrooke s’est montr\u00e9 plut\u00f4t avec une certaine r\u00e9serve de ce point de vue, s’employant surtout \u00e0 des lamentations sur la situation en Afghanistan, en en rejetant implicitement la faute sur l’administration pr\u00e9c\u00e9dente et sur le comportement \u00e0 l’int\u00e9rieur de l’OTAN en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral. (\u00abWhat is required in my view is new ideas, better coordination within the US government, better coordination with our NATO allies and other concerned countries, and the time to get it right.<\/em>\u00bb)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tUn rapide compte-rendu de BBC.News, le 8 f\u00e9vrier<\/a>, en t\u00e9moigne.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abPresident Obama’s envoy to Afghanistan has said winning the conflict there will be much tougher than in Iraq. Richard Holbrooke told a conference in Munich: I have never seen anything like the mess we have inherited.<\/em> [] The envoy, who is to embark on a tour of the region soon, also said: It is like no other problem we have confronted, and in my view it’s going to be much tougher than Iraq. It is going to be a long, difficult struggle.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Petraeus, commandant Central Command, \u00e9galement \u00e0 Munich, a adapt\u00e9 la rh\u00e9torique de la lutte contre la crise \u00e9conomique \u00e0 l’Afghanistan: \u00abAfghanistan<\/em> [is] likely to get harder before things improved<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCes prises de position qui sont marqu\u00e9es par tout ce qu’on veut sauf une position triomphale et volontariste sont un peu l’\u00e9cho d’indications diverses, notamment venues de Washington, selon lesquelles, finalement, Obama n’aurait encore rien d\u00e9cid\u00e9 concernant l’Afghanistan. Selon le Sunday Times<\/em>, hier<\/a>, Obama voudrait se faire sa religion avant d’ordonner le renforcement annonc\u00e9 de 30.000 hommes, ce qui indique un changement par rapport aux certitudes annonc\u00e9es, \u00e0 savoir, qu’il ne s’est pas fait sa religion sur ce renforcement, justement: \u00abThere is concern among senior Democrats that the military is preparing to send up to 30,000 extra troops without a coherent plan or exit strategy.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe Pentagon was set to announce the deployment of 17,000 extra soldiers and marines last week but Robert Gates, the defence secretary, postponed the decision after questions from Obama. The president was concerned by a lack of strategy at his first meeting with Gates and the US joint chiefs of staff last month in the tank, the secure conference room in the Pentagon. He asked: What’s the endgame? and did not receive a convincing answer.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAlors, vient la question: que va faire Obama si les militaires ne peuvent r\u00e9pondre \u00e0 sa question What’s the endgame?<\/em>, ce qui nous semble assez probable? C’est le probl\u00e8me fondamental de l’Afghanistan depuis quelques ann\u00e9es: \u00e0 quoi sert cette guerre? Y a-t-il une strat\u00e9gie et, notamment, selon le terme affectionn\u00e9e par les strat\u00e8ges, une strat\u00e9gie de sortie? Au lieu de montrer, comme elle l’avait annonc\u00e9, une d\u00e9termination \u00e0 poursuivre la guerre en en faisant le front central de la guerre contre la terreur (concept qui fait partie de the mess we have inherited<\/em>, comme dit Holbrooke), l’administration Obama laisse voir des incertitudes notables et un accablement sous le poids de ce fardeau sans beaucoup de sens qu’est la guerre en Afghanistan. Cette situation semble laisser la porte ouverte \u00e0 des changements de cap, par rapport \u00e0 la d\u00e9termination initiale d’Obama d’accentuer le rythme de la guerre.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 9 f\u00e9vrier 2009 \u00e0 06H36<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Ceci repr\u00e9sente sans doute une certaine surprise. La prestation de Richard Holbrooke \u00e0 la Wehrkunde de Munich ce week-end, a \u00e9t\u00e9, d’un certain point de vue, assez inattendue. Le ton employ\u00e9 par l’envoy\u00e9 sp\u00e9cial de l’administration Obama au Pakistan et en Afghanistan a \u00e9t\u00e9 assez diff\u00e9rent de ce qu’on pouvait attendre d’un homme r\u00e9put\u00e9 pour… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3236,4300,6264,3229],"class_list":["post-70518","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-afghanistan","tag-holbrooke","tag-petraeus","tag-wehrkunde"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70518","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70518"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70518\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70518"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70518"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70518"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}