Des pr\u00e9cisions continuent \u00e0 \u00eatre donn\u00e9es sur les d\u00e9cisions en cours d’\u00e9laboration par l’administration Obama pour l’\u00e9volution du budget de la d\u00e9fense. On voit se confirmer de plus en plus nettement la perspective de r\u00e9ductions significatives dans les programmes de d\u00e9fense, essentiellement les programmes de modernisation pour des conflits conventionnels de haut niveau de cette sorte jug\u00e9e aujourd’hui improbable. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tDefense News<\/em> rapporte, le 12 f\u00e9vrier<\/a>, que des d\u00e9clarations du sous-secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense pour les op\u00e9rations sp\u00e9ciales, Michael Vickers, justement charg\u00e9 au Pentagone des syst\u00e8mes et des forces adapt\u00e9s aux guerres actuelles, type G4G, par opposition aux guerres conventionnelles de haut niveau. (Il faut avoir \u00e0 l’esprit que les id\u00e9es d\u00e9velopp\u00e9es ci-apr\u00e8s ont elles-m\u00eames le soutien de Robert Gates, qui plaide depuis pr\u00e8s d’un an pour une concentration des \u00e9quipements du Pentagone pour les guerres en cours, type G4G.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abThe Obama administration’s plan to \u00ab\u00a0rebalance\u00a0\u00bb the U.S. military will include a hard look at several major acquisition programs, a top Pentagon official said Feb. 12.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbMichael Vickers, undersecretary of defense for special operations, low-intensity conflict and interdependent capabilities, became the latest senior defense official to warn that the Bush-era build-up is ending. Defense Secretary Robert Gates late last month told lawmakers nothing is off the table in terms of cuts, not even the services’ favorite acquisition projects.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbVickers told an industry audience in Washington that to rebalance the force, we’re going to look hard at several modernization programs. Such program reviews, he said, will be a part of a 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review project that will be geared toward further adapting the department to an era of persistent conflict.<\/em> [] <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abVickers said the review will closely examine the proper balance the Pentagon should be pursuing between conventional forces and irregular warfare investments. The quadrennial review, Vickers said, must examine several capability gaps for irregular warfare, including: ISR platforms, rotary-wing lift, civil affairs and military police.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tLe m\u00eame texte rapporte l’analyse d’un excellent expert des questions budg\u00e9taires du Pentagone, Andrew Krepinevich, qui confirme sans h\u00e9sitation la tendance actuelle d’une attaque s\u00e9rieuse contre les grands programmes de modernisation. Krepinevitch cite Gates comme partisan convaincu des r\u00e9ductions budg\u00e9taires<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abAndrew Krepinevich of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments told reporters Pentagon watchers should take to the bank recent statements by Gates that the Bush-era spigot of federal dollars for defense is being turned off. With the economy struggling and Washington allocating billions of dollars in bank bailouts and economic stimulus legislation, Krepinevich said it is unlikely the Pentagon budget will be spared. If people are still losing their jobs I don’t see any way DoD avoids the knife, the CSBA president said during the think tank’s annual defense budget preview.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe fate of several major programs that had been expected to replace existing systems is unclear because of their skyrocketing costs. And that has industry officials, Krepinevich said, wondering whether the Pentagon may fall back on legacy systems to replace aging and war-weary platforms.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tCes diverses d\u00e9clarations vont dans le sens de ce que nous avons publi\u00e9 jusqu’ici, depuis la mi-janvier, sur cette question. Il est \u00e0 noter que les indications pr\u00e9cises sur les r\u00e9ductions budg\u00e9taires, donn\u00e9es r\u00e9cemment par Tony Capaccio, de Bloomberg.News<\/em>, que nous avons r\u00e9percut\u00e9es le 7 janvier<\/a>, sont indirectement confirm\u00e9es, ou, disons, tr\u00e8s fortement renforc\u00e9es par une appr\u00e9ciation de Loren B. Thompson, qui fait un billet repris le 11 f\u00e9vrier<\/a> par Spacewar.com<\/em>: \u00abLast week two of the best-sourced reporters on the defense beat wrote stories indicating the U.S. Department of Defense may be getting an early start on cutting weapons programs.<\/em> [] On Feb. 6 Tony Capaccio of Bloomberg Business News reported the contents of what appears to be one such list.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tThompson, le docte Loren B., reconna\u00eet effectivement qu’il est tr\u00e8s possible, sinon tr\u00e8s probable, qu’il y ait de s\u00e9rieuses r\u00e9ductions de programme au Pentagone, et que ces r\u00e9ductions sont plus rapides que pr\u00e9vu (ceci, avec le soulign\u00e9 en gras de notre fait: \u00abthe U.S. Department of Defense may be getting an<\/em> early<\/em><\/strong> start on cutting weapons programs<\/em>\u00bb). Bon petit soldat, Loren B. s’en d\u00e9sole pour l’un ou l’autre programme-Frankenstein, et notamment notre fameux JSF qui tend \u00e0 devenir de plus en plus la star<\/em> de toutes nos pr\u00e9occupations:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abAccording to Capaccio, the hit list does not envision terminating the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, but it does raise the possibility of reducing funding to save money.That would be a false economy, because the tightly wound F-35 business plan requires timely execution and efficient production rates to hold down the cost of each plane. Tinkering with the plan now would greatly increase long-term program costs for three U.S. services and at least nine overseas allies, potentially impairing the whole effort. The loss of manufacturing jobs in Texas, Connecticut and elsewhere could number in the tens of thousands.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tMais la machine semble \u00eatre en marche et le JSF\/F-35, surtout depuis qu’il est proclam\u00e9 comme ill\u00e9gal<\/a> dans le syst\u00e8me, est l’objet de critiques de plus en plus structurelles, de plus en plus fondamentales. C’est le cas lors d’une audition de Stephen Dagget, du Congressional Research Service, la semaine derni\u00e8re, dont des \u00e9l\u00e9ments sont mentionn\u00e9s dans un autre texte repris sous le m\u00eame lien<\/a> qui nous conduit \u00e0 Loren B. Dagget met en \u00e9vidence certains maux du Pentagone, notamment le fait assez simple que les augmentations budg\u00e9taires successives qui ont gratifi\u00e9 le d\u00e9partement n’arrivent plus \u00e0 tenir le rythme de l’accroissement des co\u00fbts, conduisant au spectacle baroque d’un budget en augmentation s\u00e9rieuse et constante vers une situation de faillite: \u00abQuite bluntly, the cost of everything we have been doing in defense has been accelerating upward too fast even for growing budgets to keep up.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tPuis, son exemple du JSF, qui semble d\u00e9sormais \u00eatre la r\u00e9f\u00e9rence du mod\u00e8le de l’augmentation budg\u00e9taire vers la faillite; l’on y trouve une tentative d’explication du chaos:\u00ab Daggett cited the comparative costs of the F-35, which the Air Force considers its low end fighter, and the F-16 it will replace. The F-35 is now projected to have a flyaway cost of $83 million each, compared with the inflation-adjusted cost in today’s dollars of $30 million for the F-16 when it was developed in 1985.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbLook at any part of the civilian sector,\u00a0\u00bb he told lawmakers, according to a transcript of the hearing, \u00ab\u00a0not just electronics, but automobiles or aircraft<\/em> [\u00bb the<\/em> [cost<\/em>] trends are not as good in<\/em> [the Department of Defense<\/em>] and sometimes they’re going in the opposite direction<\/em> [] from what’s going on in the civilian sector. Daggett said the reasons for this were a matter far beyond the scope of this brief survey\u00a0\u00bb but did proffer some thoughts, including that developers often sought the highest possible performance what Gates has referred to as the 99 percent solution, vs. a much more affordable 75 percent solution. The bottom line on it is seeking performance, Daggett said. What drives it here is when you’re developing a weapons system, what are you looking for? You’re looking for performance, and you’re trying to push the envelope in a lot of cases.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tL’explication n’est pas nouvelle et toujours aussi valable aujourd’hui qu’il y a trente ans, en pire \u00e9videmment, et l’on ne voit pas la solution, ni la gu\u00e9rison. Ce qui est nouveau, par contre, c’est l’attention qu’on dit \u00eatre port\u00e9e au Congr\u00e8s, et dans l’administration Obama, \u00e0 des experts du CRS ou du CBO (Congressional Budget Office), dont l’un, J. Michael Gilmore, t\u00e9moignait en m\u00eame temps que Daggett. Ces experts sont notablement plus durs pour le Pentagone que les cohortes qui sont habituellement entendues sur le th\u00e8me. L’id\u00e9e est renforc\u00e9e que le CBO (avec son institut, le CRS), et sans doute le GAO avec lui, pourrait avoir son mot \u00e0 dire dans l’action lanc\u00e9e au Pentagone, ou lanc\u00e9e contre le Pentagone dans ce cas.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n `<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 13 f\u00e9vrier 2009 \u00e0 11H49<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Des pr\u00e9cisions continuent \u00e0 \u00eatre donn\u00e9es sur les d\u00e9cisions en cours d’\u00e9laboration par l’administration Obama pour l’\u00e9volution du budget de la d\u00e9fense. On voit se confirmer de plus en plus nettement la perspective de r\u00e9ductions significatives dans les programmes de d\u00e9fense, essentiellement les programmes de modernisation pour des conflits conventionnels de haut niveau de cette… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[8104,8105,7168,6827,8107,2969,4248,3984,8106,250,4421,3194,7421,3474],"class_list":["post-70531","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-budgetaires","tag-capaccio","tag-cbo","tag-crs","tag-daggett","tag-f-35","tag-gao","tag-gates","tag-gilmore","tag-jsf","tag-krepinevich","tag-pentagone","tag-reductions","tag-thompson"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70531","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70531"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70531\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70531"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70531"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70531"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}