{"id":70534,"date":"2009-02-14T12:14:36","date_gmt":"2009-02-14T12:14:36","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2009\/02\/14\/considerations-sur-un-compromis-a-propos-du-bmde-et-de-liran\/"},"modified":"2009-02-14T12:14:36","modified_gmt":"2009-02-14T12:14:36","slug":"considerations-sur-un-compromis-a-propos-du-bmde-et-de-liran","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2009\/02\/14\/considerations-sur-un-compromis-a-propos-du-bmde-et-de-liran\/","title":{"rendered":"Consid\u00e9rations sur un compromis \u00e0 propos du BMDE et de l&rsquo;Iran"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>On observe les premi\u00e8res d\u00e9clarations pr\u00e9cises, \u00e0 Washington, sur la possibilit\u00e9 d&rsquo;un compromis sur la question du syst\u00e8me BMDE, dans ce cas clairement li\u00e9 \u00e0 la question iranienne. Une d\u00e9p\u00eache Reuters du <a href=\"http:\/\/www.reuters.com\/article\/topNews\/idUSTRE51C66420090214\" class=\"gen\">13 f\u00e9vrier<\/a> rapporte la chose, qui \u00e9tablit un lien direct (<em>linkage<\/em>) entre une \u00e9volution positive (du point de vue de Moscou) de la position US dans la question du BMDE, et une \u00e9volution positive (du point de vue de Washington) de la position russe dans la question iranienne.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>The United States signaled a willingness on Friday to slow plans for a missile defense shield in eastern Europe if Russia agreed to help stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons.<\/em> [&#8230;] <em>If we are able to work together to dissuade Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapons capability, we would be able to moderate the pace of development of missile defenses in Europe, a senior U.S. administration official told Reuters.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>It was the most explicit statement yet by an administration official linking the missile shield to Russia&rsquo;s willingness to help resolve the international stand-off over Iran&rsquo;s nuclear program. He spoke as Undersecretary of State William Burns held talks in Moscow, the most senior U.S. official to do so since U.S. President Barack Obama took office last month.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Burns signaled the United States was ready to look at remodeling its missile defense plans to include Moscow. [Washington is] open to the possibility of cooperation, both with Russia and NATO partners, in relation to a new configuration for missile defense which would use the resources that each of us have, Interfax news agency quoted him as saying. Burns gave no details.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>In another sign that strained relations may be thawing, European Union foreign policy chief Javier Solana said U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton would meet Russia&rsquo;s foreign minister in Geneva next month.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tCes nouvelles interviennent une semaine apr\u00e8s la r\u00e9union de Munich, renfor\u00e7ant ainsi l&rsquo;interpr\u00e9tation <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article-bienfaits_collateraux_de_la_grande_crise_09_02_2009.html\" class=\"gen\">positive<\/a> qu&rsquo;on en a faite. Cette r\u00e9union a donn\u00e9 lieu \u00e0 des interpr\u00e9tations tr\u00e8s divergentes, jusqu&rsquo;\u00e0 celle, extr\u00eame, que la position expos\u00e9e par Biden ne faisait que confirmer la politique agressive de l&rsquo;administration Bush (voir l&rsquo;analyse de George Friedman, de <em>Stratfor.com<\/em>, le <a href=\"http:\/\/www.stratfor.com\/weekly\/20090209_munich_continuity_between_bush_and_obama_foreign_policies\" class=\"gen\">9 janvier<\/a>). Au contraire, nous estimons plus que jamais que la r\u00e9union de Munich a \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9v\u00e9latrice d&rsquo;une r\u00e9elle \u00e9volution US, et cette \u00e9volution tenant sans aucun doute \u00e0 la pression de la situation int\u00e9rieure US, sans rapport avec le moindre projet politique nouveau. Dans ce cas, la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 fait force de loi et donne certainement une plus grande assurance de la solidit\u00e9 de l&rsquo;orientation, tant les seules orientations solides aujourd&rsquo;hui sont celles qu&rsquo;imposent les \u00e9v\u00e9nements.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tCette analyse est \u00e9galement celle d&rsquo;un expert que nous appr\u00e9cions beaucoup, le britannique Anatol Lieven, rapport\u00e9e sur AFP\/<em>RAW Story<\/em> le <a href=\"http:\/\/rawstory.com\/news\/afp\/US_reset_button_with_Russia_not_so__02102009.html\" class=\"gen\">10 f\u00e9vrier<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>Anatol Lieven, an analyst with King&rsquo;s College London, doubted whether the Obama administration could really press on with NATO expansion. For one thing, Lieven said, it would take billions of dollars for the United States to compensate Ukraine for the loss of the subsidized gas it receives from Russia. Expansion could also provoke war with Russia.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>He also questioned whether the new administration could push the plans of the preceding administration of George W. Bush to establish an anti-missile shield in the Czech Republic and Poland  a major sore point for Moscow. There appears to be a new foreign policy approach in Washington, but it may stem not so much from a philosophical change but from the fact that America is clearly a great deal less powerful than it used to be, Lieven said.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLes propositions US se placent effectivement dans la logique de ce qu&rsquo;on per\u00e7oit des divers signes venus de l&rsquo;administration Obama depuis trois mois. Le syst\u00e8me BMDE \u00e9volue d&rsquo;un projet strat\u00e9gique qui pr\u00e9tendait avoir sa sp\u00e9cificit\u00e9 et son utilit\u00e9, m\u00eame s&rsquo;il n&rsquo;avait gu\u00e8re de sens sinon la logique automatiquement d\u00e9stabilisante de l&rsquo;administration GW Bush, suscit\u00e9e par les int\u00e9r\u00eats du complexe militaro-industriel, vers ce que les strat\u00e8ges des n\u00e9gociations strat\u00e9giques nommaient durant la Guerre froide <em>a bargaining ship<\/em>,  syst\u00e8me n&rsquo;\u00e9tant l\u00e0 que pour pouvoir \u00eatre abandonn\u00e9 ou modifi\u00e9 en faisant obtenir pour cette d\u00e9cision le maximum en \u00e9change de la part de l&rsquo;autre n\u00e9gociateur. L&rsquo;aspect iranien entrant dans le jeu n&rsquo;est pas une surprise, tant l&rsquo;administration Obama cherche \u00e0 avancer dans le r\u00e8glement des diverses crises de politique ext\u00e9rieure h\u00e9rit\u00e9es de l&rsquo;\u00e9poque Bush; bien entendu, cet aspect iranien serait le facteur int\u00e9ressant attendu par les USA de cette utilisation du <em>bargaining ship<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tOn r\u00e9p\u00e9tera que ce qui domine, plus que jamais, c&rsquo;est cette volont\u00e9 de d\u00e9sengagement des projets strat\u00e9giques divers, et en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral offensifs et d\u00e9structurants; c&rsquo;est-\u00e0-dire le passage d&rsquo;une posture offensive \u00e0 une posture d\u00e9fensive. Il faut noter que l&rsquo;\u00e9volution du c\u00f4t\u00e9 russe n&rsquo;est certainement pas dissemblable. La Russie conna\u00eet aussi d&rsquo;\u00e9normes probl\u00e8mes int\u00e9rieurs et subit la crise de plein fouet. Elle aussi recherche \u00e0 r\u00e9gler le maximum de probl\u00e8mes ext\u00e9rieurs dans des conditions acceptables. Dans tout cela, on observe que la logique de la crise ne pousse certainement pas les dirigeants vers des affrontements directs, bien au contraire,  ce qui invite \u00e0 manier avec la plus grande pr\u00e9caution, voire avec septicisme, l&rsquo;id\u00e9e que la crise pourrait conduire \u00e0 un conflit majeur. Le poids int\u00e9rieur de la crise est en soi un fardeau bien suffisant; \u00e9ventuellement, c&rsquo;est lui qui pourrait avoir des effets d\u00e9stabilisants, avec des effets indirects d&rsquo;antagonisme Aujourd&rsquo;hui, les crises ext\u00e9rieures pourraient beaucoup plus venir, de mani\u00e8re compl\u00e8tement inattendue et incontr\u00f4l\u00e9e, des effets indirects, des troubles ou des d\u00e9stabilisations internes.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 14 f\u00e9vrier 2009 \u00e0 12H18<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>On observe les premi\u00e8res d\u00e9clarations pr\u00e9cises, \u00e0 Washington, sur la possibilit\u00e9 d&rsquo;un compromis sur la question du syst\u00e8me BMDE, dans ce cas clairement li\u00e9 \u00e0 la question iranienne. Une d\u00e9p\u00eache Reuters du 13 f\u00e9vrier rapporte la chose, qui \u00e9tablit un lien direct (linkage) entre une \u00e9volution positive (du point de vue de Moscou) de la&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[8110,4314,5281,7740,2773,4049,8112,2730,8111],"class_list":["post-70534","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-bargaining","tag-bmde","tag-burns","tag-compromis","tag-iran","tag-lieven","tag-linkage","tag-russie","tag-ship"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70534","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70534"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70534\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70534"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70534"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70534"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}