{"id":70536,"date":"2009-02-16T05:40:10","date_gmt":"2009-02-16T05:40:10","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2009\/02\/16\/la-cooperation-usa-russie-ou-le-changement-de-ton-comme-facon-detre\/"},"modified":"2009-02-16T05:40:10","modified_gmt":"2009-02-16T05:40:10","slug":"la-cooperation-usa-russie-ou-le-changement-de-ton-comme-facon-detre","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2009\/02\/16\/la-cooperation-usa-russie-ou-le-changement-de-ton-comme-facon-detre\/","title":{"rendered":"La coop\u00e9ration USA-Russie, ou le \u201cchangement de ton\u201d comme fa\u00e7on d’\u00eatre"},"content":{"rendered":"

Il est entendu qu’on peut toujours soup\u00e7onner les mots et les d\u00e9clarations de desseins cach\u00e9s et d’intentions vicieuses. Le discours de Biden \u00e0 Munich fut ainsi diversement interpr\u00e9t\u00e9, selon l’humeur des uns et des autres. L’interview que donne William Burns, sous-secr\u00e9taire d’Etat aux affaires politiques, \u00e0 l’agence Interfax<\/em>, le 14 f\u00e9vrier<\/a>, au terme de sa visite \u00e0 Moscou, constitue un pas notable dans le sens de la conciliation (des USA avec la Russie). Le ton g\u00e9n\u00e9ral est plus qu’arrangeant, il est syst\u00e9matiquement et absolument arrangeant. S’il y a des restrictions consid\u00e9rables concernant les positions US sur les divers sujets qu’aborde Burns, il est manifeste qu’elles sont dues \u00e0 leur absence de finalisation, \u00e0 la pr\u00e9paration d’une position arr\u00eat\u00e9e sur les divers sujets \u00e9voqu\u00e9es; l’exclusivit\u00e9 de leur annonce sera \u00e9videmment r\u00e9serv\u00e9es \u00e0 des dirigeants de haut niveau, notamment la secr\u00e9taire d’Etat Clinton; l’on en saura sans doute plus lors de la prochaine rencontre Clinton-Lavrov, d\u00e9but mars. Les termes de William Burns sont choisis par lui avec la plus grande prudence, ce qui donne d’autant plus de poids \u00e0 l’intention g\u00e9n\u00e9rale d’arrangement qui est affich\u00e9e.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tManifestement, Burns avait pour mission, \u00e0 Moscou et aussi bien dans cette interview, de pr\u00e9parer le terrain en exposant une tr\u00e8s forte volont\u00e9 US d’arrangement, beaucoup plus clairement exprim\u00e9e que par Biden. Par ailleurs, certains points sont d’ores et d\u00e9j\u00e0 affirm\u00e9s. Voici quelques passages significatifs.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Sur les intentions g\u00e9n\u00e9rales de l’administration Obama. \u00abWe do believe, as President Obama has emphasized, that we have before us an important opportunity to reset our relations on a more productive plane. In recent years, quite often our mutual frustrations have tended to obscure our mutual interests. And we believe it’s time to look ahead. That doesn’t mean that we won’t have differences or disagreements from time to time. But what it means is that we are committed to be trying to take advantage of this moment of opportunity and of the common interest between us.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbAnd what we need to do now together is to try to translate those good intentions and that positive rhetoric into practical progress<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Burns confirme l’intention des USA de lancer des n\u00e9gociations avec la Russie pour un nouvel accord START (l’actuel vient \u00e0 \u00e9ch\u00e9ance \u00e0 la fin 2009) comportant des r\u00e9ductions importantes de l’arsenal nucl\u00e9aire des deux puissances. Il ne confirme pas le chiffre consid\u00e9rable de 80% de r\u00e9duction lanc\u00e9 par le Times<\/em> de Londres, mais ne le d\u00e9ment pas non plus. Il reste dans le vague d’une position US non encore fix\u00e9e (avec des d\u00e9bats en cours et sans doute des pressions du Pentagone pour ne pas r\u00e9duire trop fortement) mais apporte la pr\u00e9cision qu’Obama est personnellement engag\u00e9 dans cette voie: \u00abThis is an issue arms control issues, further reductions and control of the nonproliferation of nuclear materials that President Obama takes very seriously. The president, when he was Senator Obama, visited Russia in 2005 when I was ambassador, precisely because of his very strong interest in these issues and his recognition that U.S.-Russian leadership is essential in the whole range of these issues.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Sur la d\u00e9fense anti-missiles en Europe (BMDE), Burns d\u00e9roule les habituels arguments et ouvertures envisag\u00e9es par l’administration Obama. Il est dit successivement que le d\u00e9ploiement doit continuer en fonction de son bon fonctionnement technique, de son co\u00fbt productif et d’une \u00e9valuation de la menace cens\u00e9e le justifier, ce qui implique de tr\u00e8s nombreuses restrictions; tous les pays concern\u00e9s seront consult\u00e9s, y compris la Russie; des options nouvelles seront envisag\u00e9es, y compris une \u00e9ventuelle coop\u00e9ration avec la Russie de fa\u00e7on \u00e0 ce que le syst\u00e8me, s’il est construit, nous prot\u00e8ge tous (y compris la Russie).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abWell, as Secretary Clinton said earlier this week, when she met with the Czech foreign minister, we continue to consult closely with our partners in the Czech Republic and Poland. We certainly have heard Russia’s concerns about missile defense. We hope also that Russians understand that no U.S. president can afford a situation in which the United States is vulnerable to potential nuclear weapons on missiles from countries like North Korea or Iran.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbAnd as we pursue the issue of missile defense, we obviously have to take into account a number of factors whether the system works and whether it’s cost-effective, and what’s the nature of the threat. If through strong diplomacy with Russia and our other partners we can reduce or eliminate that threat, it obviously shapes the way at which we look at missile defense. And we are also open to the possibility of cooperation with Russia, with our NATO partners on new missile defense configurations which can take advantage of assets that each of us has.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbWe want to consult with our NATO partners, with Russia to see if we can develop a cooperative approach to missile defense that would protect all of us.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Sur l’extension de l’OTAN, Burns prend tous les am\u00e9nagements d’usage, les consultations n\u00e9cessaires, les droits des uns et des autres, pour conclure par ces deux phrases qui semblent clore pour un temps assez cons\u00e9quent la question de l’entr\u00e9e de la G\u00e9orgie et de l’Ukraine dans l’OTAN: \u00abAnd it means that any country that wishes to be a member of NATO has to meet the requirements for membership. Today, Ukraine and Georgia are not ready for membership in NATO. Membership is a complicated and time-consuming process that deserves to be handled carefully.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t La question de la base de Manas, au Kyrgyzstan, que les USA vont devoir \u00e9vacuer, et dont le cas a \u00e9t\u00e9 pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 par certains comme un argument central contre une \u00e9volution positive des rapports entre les USA et la Russie. (Voir l’analyse de George Friedman, de Stratfor.com<\/em>, du 9 f\u00e9vrier<\/a>.) Burns noie cette question dans diverses consid\u00e9rations arrangeantes et termine en revenant aux perspectives concr\u00e8tes de coop\u00e9ration USA-Russie sur l’Afghanistan, en mentionnant le d\u00e9marrage dans la semaine \u00e9coul\u00e9e des n\u00e9gociations pour \u00e9tablir une voie de passage US en Russie, pour le ravitaillement des forces US en Afghanistan.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abAs Secretary of Defense Gates said earlier this week Manas is important for our collective efforts to bring stability to Afghanistan but it’s not irreplaceable. We continue to engage the Kyrgyz leadership on this issue. But we are also looking at alternatives. And what we have discussed during our visit to Moscow, what will remain an important subject of conversation between the United States and Russia is our overall cooperation on Afghanistan. And I do believe that there is more we can do together to promote our common interest and stability in Afghanistan.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbAnd we’ve had a team of experts here earlier this week to talk about further cooperation, including how best to take advantage together of Russia’s offer of transit of equipment and materials to Afghanistan.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Egalement significatif, le passage, en r\u00e9ponse \u00e0 une question sur d’\u00e9ventuelles bases russes en Abkhazie, et des rumeurs de bases US en G\u00e9orgie. L\u00e0 aussi, les choses sont remises dans une perspective du meilleur arrangement possible, sans paroles abruptes, comme dans le cas de Biden, sur le refus de reconnaissance de l’ind\u00e9pendance des deux provinces s\u00e9cessionnistes de G\u00e9orgie. Les consid\u00e9rations critiques de la position russe dans l’affaire g\u00e9orgienne rel\u00e8ve, du point de vue de la politique US du domaine, du minimum syndical<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abFirst, the United States has no plans for military bases in Georgia. Second, I don’t know the details of the reports that you mentioned about possible Russian bases. But if there were true, they would be inconsistent with the agreements that Russia signed last September with the French President. Most of the international community disagrees with Russia on the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. But we believe it’s important to have a peaceful resolution of differences. The Geneva process is a mechanism that all of us are engaged in. And we continue to support it. And we want to work with Russia and the others involved in that process to try to bring greater stability to the area.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Quelques mots tranchants sur l’adh\u00e9sion de la Russie \u00e0 l’OMC, dont certains (dont John McCain) voulaient faire de son refus une punition de la Russie suite \u00e0 l’affaire g\u00e9orgienne: \u00abWe support it. This is also in our interests.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Enfin, pour terminer, il faut noter la derni\u00e8re question portant sur la guerre du gaz du d\u00e9but de l’ann\u00e9e entre Russie et Ukraine, type de crise qui, normalement, d\u00e9cha\u00eene un torrent de critiques anti-russe sur la manipulation de l’\u00e9nergie transform\u00e9e en arme g\u00e9opolitique. Burns botte en touche avec un sourire des plus amicaux, avec cette r\u00e9ponse directe \u00e0 propos de la guerre du gaz , bien loin des chicaneries id\u00e9ologiques de l’\u00e9poque Bush \u00abThe reality is that today Russia is the world’s largest producer of oil and gas. The United States today is the world’s largest consumer. So it’s obvious that we should have a serious and sustained dialog on energy issues. It seems to me that this dialog ought to be based on the same principles that we all agreed to at the St. Petersburg G8 summit in summer 2006..<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tOn sort de la lecture de cette interview persuad\u00e9 que la crise \u00e9conomique et financi\u00e8re aux USA p\u00e8se de tout son poids sur les \u00e9paules des nouveaux dirigeants, et influence toutes les orientations de politique ext\u00e9rieure. Avec la Russie, c’est l’\u00e9vidence: tout faire pour pavenir \u00e0 des arrangements entre connaisseurs, c’est-\u00e0-dire des arrangements o\u00f9 personne n’aurait \u00e0 perdre la face.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 16 f\u00e9vrier 2009 \u00e0 05H39<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Il est entendu qu’on peut toujours soup\u00e7onner les mots et les d\u00e9clarations de desseins cach\u00e9s et d’intentions vicieuses. Le discours de Biden \u00e0 Munich fut ainsi diversement interpr\u00e9t\u00e9, selon l’humeur des uns et des autres. L’interview que donne William Burns, sous-secr\u00e9taire d’Etat aux affaires politiques, \u00e0 l’agence Interfax, le 14 f\u00e9vrier, au terme de sa… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[5891,8113,4314,5281,4967,5519,8114,2730],"class_list":["post-70536","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-afhanistan","tag-arrangement","tag-bmde","tag-burns","tag-gaz","tag-georgie","tag-interfax","tag-russie"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70536","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70536"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70536\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70536"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70536"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70536"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}