{"id":70539,"date":"2009-02-16T15:42:47","date_gmt":"2009-02-16T15:42:47","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2009\/02\/16\/125-milliards-escroques-stuff-happens\/"},"modified":"2009-02-16T15:42:47","modified_gmt":"2009-02-16T15:42:47","slug":"125-milliards-escroques-stuff-happens","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2009\/02\/16\/125-milliards-escroques-stuff-happens\/","title":{"rendered":"$125 milliards escroqu\u00e9s? \u00abStuff happens\u2026<\/em>\u00bb"},"content":{"rendered":"

Est-ce une nouvelle tentative s\u00e9rieuse de record du monde postmoderne de l’escroquerie dans les conditions courantes de notre-d\u00e9mocratie? Les g\u00e9n\u00e9raux US sont-ils meilleurs que Madoff? Les vrais pilleurs de l’Irak sont-ils les autorit\u00e9s \u00e9toil\u00e9es et lib\u00e9ratrices plut\u00f4t que les pilleurs de Bagdad? Qui s’en \u00e9tonnerait? Les lecteurs am\u00e9ricains liront-ils ce type d’article?, se demande un lecteur am\u00e9ricain du site de The Independent<\/em>, en commentaire de l’article mis en ligne ce 16 f\u00e9vrier<\/a>, de Patrick Cockburn qui se trouve en Irak.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tL’affaire se r\u00e9sumerait joliment en ceci que des chefs militaires US, travaillant en pleine et loyale coop\u00e9ration avec des contractants priv\u00e9s, sans doute aussi avec des officiels irakiens, auraient siphonn\u00e9 jusqu’\u00e0 $125 milliards d’aide destin\u00e9s \u00e0 l’Irak nouvelle-et-d\u00e9mocratique des n\u00e9o-conservateurs, de Cheney et de GW. \u00abStuff happens<\/em>\u00bb, comme disait le philosophe Rumsfeld, commentant po\u00e9tiquement les pillages des mus\u00e9es arch\u00e9ologiques de Bagdad, sous l’il impavide et n\u00e9anmoins civilisateurs (to win minds and hearts<\/em>) des G.I.’s victorieux. Cockburn, excellent enqu\u00eateur g\u00e9n\u00e9ralement fort bien renseign\u00e9, nous r\u00e9v\u00e8le qu’une enqu\u00eate est lanc\u00e9e par les services d’inspection des services de la reconstruction de l’Irak.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abIn what could turn out to be the greatest fraud in US history, American authorities have started to investigate the alleged role of senior military officers in the misuse of $125bn (\u00a388bn) in a US -directed effort to reconstruct Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein. The exact sum missing may never be clear, but a report by the US Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) suggests it may exceed $50bn, making it an even bigger theft than Bernard Madoff’s notorious Ponzi scheme. I believe the real looting of Iraq after the invasion was by US officials and contractors, and not by people from the slums of Baghdad, said one US businessman active in Iraq since 2003.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbIn one case, auditors working for SIGIR discovered that $57.8m was sent in pallet upon pallet of hundred-dollar bills to the US comptroller for south-central Iraq, Robert J Stein Jr, who had himself photographed standing with the mound of money. He is among the few US officials who were in Iraq to be convicted of fraud and money-laundering.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbDespite the vast sums expended on rebuilding by the US since 2003, there have been no cranes visible on the Baghdad skyline except those at work building a new US embassy and others rusting beside a half-built giant mosque that Saddam was constructing when he was overthrown. One of the few visible signs of government work on Baghdad’s infrastructure is a tireless attention to planting palm trees and flowers in the centre strip between main roads. Those are then dug up and replanted a few months later.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIl semblerait que des Irakiens officiels aient \u00e9t\u00e9 impliqu\u00e9s, ou aient pris connaissance de divers aspects de l’une ou l’autre affaire. L’impression que nous aurions, par rapport \u00e0 la r\u00e9putation qu’on fait \u00e0 cette sorte d’acteurs (les Irakiens officiels, d’abord collaborateurs des autorit\u00e9s occupantes avant de s’\u00e9manciper), est qu’ils n’ont jamais figur\u00e9 que comme des amateurs \u00e0 c\u00f4t\u00e9 des acteurs US, qu’ils semblent avoir \u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e9poustoufl\u00e9s par les capacit\u00e9s escroqueuses des cadres de l’arm\u00e9e et des contractants civils. En un mot, le souk<\/em>, le bazar que les l\u00e9gions am\u00e9ricanistes allaient \u00e9duquer en mode d\u00e9mocratique majeur, ce sont ces m\u00eames l\u00e9gions qui les ont import\u00e9s en Irak. Ce n’est pas vraiment une surprise.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abIraqi leaders are convinced that the theft or waste of huge sums of US and Iraqi government money could have happened only if senior US officials were themselves involved in the corruption. In 2004-05, the entire Iraq military procurement budget of $1.3bn was siphoned off from the Iraqi Defence Ministry in return for 28-year-old Soviet helicopters too obsolete to fly and armoured cars easily penetrated by rifle bullets. Iraqi officials were blamed for the theft, but US military officials were largely in control of the Defence Ministry at the time and must have been either highly negligent or participants in the fraud.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCet immense bordel import\u00e9 et install\u00e9 par un syst\u00e8me qu’on charge par ailleurs, assez \u00e9trangement, de formidables vertus comploteuses et conqu\u00e9rantes, coordonatrices et organisatrices des plus grandes et habiles fourberies, se r\u00e9percute dans tous les domaines de l’arm\u00e9e. La militarisation forcen\u00e9e de l’am\u00e9ricanisme par les g\u00e9nies r\u00e9v\u00e9l\u00e9s par 9\/11, de Cheney \u00e0 Wolfowitz, a plong\u00e9 l’arm\u00e9e US dans un trou noir de d\u00e9sordre et de malaise, que ce soit dans l’univers de la comptabilit\u00e9 ou dans celui de la psychologie.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Quelle psychologie? Celle d’une arm\u00e9e qui ne sait plus ce qu’elle est ni ce qu’elle fait, une arm\u00e9e lanc\u00e9e dans des campagnes incertaines et qui semblent infinies, pour on ne sait quel but, selon on ne sait quelle strat\u00e9gie. Une arm\u00e9e qui bat des records de suicides chaque mois, qui ram\u00e8ne aux USA des foules d’hommes et de femmes marqu\u00e9s dans leur psychologie par une exp\u00e9rience cruelle et incompr\u00e9hensible. C’est le th\u00e8me de la chronique du 16 f\u00e9vrier<\/a>, sur TomDispatch.com<\/em>, sur l’arm\u00e9e des Etats-Unis devenue une sorte de L\u00e9gion Etrang\u00e8re am\u00e9ricaniste, et, en v\u00e9rit\u00e9, sans gu\u00e8re de rapport avec le corps fran\u00e7ais du m\u00eame nom malgr\u00e9 l’argument \u00e9voqu\u00e9 dans la deuxi\u00e8me partie du texte cit\u00e9. Tom Engelhardt conclut son propre commentaire, \u00e9videmment, par l’\u00e9vidence : il faut cesser, partir, rentrer chez soi<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abWhile the Army struggles, not particularly effectively, to deal with its suicide problem, political and military leaders struggle no less unimpressively to deal with the larger problems of military stress. Their unanimous solution to the global policy version of post-traumatic stress disorder: Cut down on those tours of duty and repair the military by significantly expanding U.S. forces. The obvious response, the one that could bring the military back to a state of health, is of course roundly ignored: Downsize the global mission. Bring American troops home.<\/em>\u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Voici aussi Alan Bock, commentateur conservateur mod\u00e9r\u00e9 qui publie notamment sur le site Antiwar.com<\/em>, publiant ce 16 f\u00e9vrier<\/a> un article o\u00f9 il revient sur la responsabilit\u00e9 \u00e9norme des guerres bushistes dans l’actuelle r\u00e9cession, occurrence qui, soit dit en passant, diff\u00e9rencie<\/a> d\u00e9cisivement cette crise de la Grande D\u00e9pression, puisque la sortie de crise de la Grande D\u00e9pression fut la guerre et qu’aujourd’hui, c’est la guerre qui est en bonne partie cause de la crise. La conclusion de Bock, devant le spectacle de cette arm\u00e9e paralys\u00e9e, compl\u00e8tement plong\u00e9e dans l’anarchie du gaspillage et de la corruption, paralys\u00e9e par sa puissance st\u00e9rile, c’est, bien s\u00fbr, le repli, la retraite, le retour chez soi<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abIn short, the United States may not be able to afford the empire it has built over the years, or indeed to redeem the numerous promises the government has made to Americans that they will be supported comfortably in their old age. The possibility that somebody in a garage is developing a technology as revolutionary in its efficiency-boosting implications as the computer has been cannot be discounted, but it cannot be guaranteed either. Hard choices are ahead in a society that may well be significantly less entrepreneurial than it has been in the past.<\/em> []<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abIf it turns out, however, that we can afford neither humanitarian nor ostensibly geopolitically advantageous military interventions because they keep us from meeting needs at home (whether these should be done through free markets or government activity will still be tussled over), however, we might just decide to let Afghans, Pakistanis, Indians, Estonians, Lithuanians, Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, and so many more not to mention Russia, China, Japan, south Asia, and a Middle East we have never mastered decide for themselves how to live. We might maintain the illusion that we could reduce the amount of suffering and bloodshed if only we had the resources to intervene, but we don’t.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tL’horrible spectacle qu’offre l’\u00e9norme puissance en d\u00e9composition qu’est l’outil militaire US est sans doute l’\u00e9preuve la plus rude impos\u00e9e \u00e0 la psychologie am\u00e9ricaine, celle qui est bien oblig\u00e9e de vivre dans le syst\u00e8me am\u00e9ricaniste mais qui s’en d\u00e9fie de plus en plus comme d’un poison mortel. L’\u00e8re Obama devrait ouvrir de plus en plus grande les portes au ressentiment et au d\u00e9go\u00fbt populaires, non plus contre la guerre elle-m\u00eame, mais contre l’implantation ext\u00e9rieure de l’appareil militaire sous quelque forme que ce soit; voire, plus encore, contre les structures militaires en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral et sous toutes les formes possibles. Le syst\u00e8me am\u00e9ricaniste a pris un risque consid\u00e9rable en affichant de fa\u00e7on aussi voyante sa collusion totale avec l’appareil militaire, car il va en subir les cons\u00e9quences au niveau du rejet de la population; bient\u00f4t, c’est le gouvernement central lui-m\u00eame qui subira cette d\u00e9saffection qui pourrait se transformer en hostilit\u00e9 agressive, et constituer un formidable ferment centrifuge aux USA.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 16 f\u00e9vrier 2009 \u00e0 15H44<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Est-ce une nouvelle tentative s\u00e9rieuse de record du monde postmoderne de l’escroquerie dans les conditions courantes de notre-d\u00e9mocratie? Les g\u00e9n\u00e9raux US sont-ils meilleurs que Madoff? Les vrais pilleurs de l’Irak sont-ils les autorit\u00e9s \u00e9toil\u00e9es et lib\u00e9ratrices plut\u00f4t que les pilleurs de Bagdad? Qui s’en \u00e9tonnerait? Les lecteurs am\u00e9ricains liront-ils ce type d’article?, se demande un… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[1377,1135,3858,3083,1381,857,5492],"class_list":["post-70539","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-bock","tag-cockburn","tag-corruption","tag-depression","tag-engelhardt","tag-irak","tag-suicides"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70539","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70539"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70539\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70539"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70539"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70539"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}