La d\u00e9signation de Benjamin Netanyahou comme Premier ministre isra\u00e9lien, dans la perspective d’un gouvernement tr\u00e8s outrageusement \u00e0 droite, avec l’Iran en ligne de mire, tout cela n’augure rien de formidable pour les relations entre Isra\u00ebl ert les USA. On a d\u00e9j\u00e0 eu quelques<\/a> \u00e9chos<\/a> \u00e0 propos d’une soudaine tension souterraine, dans ce cas \u00e0 l’occasion de la crise de Gaza, entre Isra\u00ebl et les USA. On trouverait aujourd’hui une confirmation indirecte de la chose, Netanyahou \u00e9tant vu comme un continuateur, en plus aggrav\u00e9 et plus brutal, de la politique de force du gouvernement Olmert. Cette fois, le contexte strat\u00e9gique est beaucoup plus large que la seule crise de Gaza. C’est Jim Lobe qui, \n<\/p>\n \tAtimes.com\u00a0\u00bb class=\u00a0\u00bbgen\u00a0\u00bb>ce matin<\/a>, nous entretient de la mauvaise humeur washingtonienne.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tLobe expose l’intention de l’administration Obama, d’une part d’exercer la plus grande pression possible, \u00e9ventuellement avec le plan arabe de 2002 r\u00e9g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9, pour obtenir un accord de paix au Moyen-Orient. L’\u00e9quipe isra\u00e9lienne, l’\u00e9quipe Netanyahou dans ce cas, devra suivre ou bien il risque d’y avoir des frictions.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abIf all goes well on that front, the Arab League, fortified by a developing rapprochement between Syria and Saudi Arabia, could announce the latest version of its 2002 peace plan at next month’s summit in Doha, according to Marc Lynch, a George Washington University specialist on Arab politics. Such a move could galvanize the situation and put the onus on whatever Israeli government emerges to respond positively, he wrote on his widely read blog on the Foreign Policy website this week.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbIf you have a unified Palestinian government and a unified Arab move for peace, added Daniel Levy, a former Israeli peace negotiator, then it’s much more likely that Obama will step up his own efforts ideally, working with an Israeli government that’s ready to go along with a serious peace process, but, if not, being willing to make his disagreement<\/em> [with that government] known. The result could be a serious test between the next Israeli government and its influential US advocates. The Obama administration clearly believes that real progress toward resolving the 60-year-old conflict is critical both to restoring Washington’s credibility among the Arab states and curbing the further radicalization of the region’s population particularly in the wake of Israel’s recent military offensive in Gaza.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tD’autre part, il y a l’Iran. Netanyahou a \u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e9lu sur son hostilit\u00e9 av\u00e9r\u00e9e et mena\u00e7ante contre l’Iran; l’administration Obama ne cesse d’avancer ses pions pour \u00e9tablir un dialogue avec l’Iran. Observons, au cas o\u00f9 l’on ne l’aurait pas not\u00e9, qu’il s’agit l\u00e0 d’un s\u00e9v\u00e8re antagonisme de deux politiques habitu\u00e9es depuis huit ans \u00e0 se c\u00f4toyer jusqu’\u00e0 l’identit\u00e9. L’ancien ambassadeur US \u00e0 Tel Aviv, Samuel Lewis, a d\u00e9clar\u00e9 apr\u00e8s les \u00e9lections isra\u00e9lienne : \u00abIt’s very important to realize that Iran is going to be the most likely issue on which Israel and the United States will have a serious difference of opinion, if not a confrontation, in the next year.<\/em>\u00bb. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tIl y a la question nucl\u00e9aire, certes, mais, de plus en plus, il y a la question de l’aide \u00e9ventuelle que l’Iran pourrait apporter aux USA dans l’affaire afghane. Il semble que toute la strat\u00e9gie US se concentre sur l’Afghanistan selon une approche telle que l’Iran a un r\u00f4le \u00e0 jouer; dans ce cas, l’Iran devient plus important qu’Isra\u00ebl.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abEven more important, however, is the new administration’s conviction that Afghanistan and Pakistan which, like Iraq, also border Iran constitute the true central front in the war on terror. This assessment was backed up by Obama’s announcement this week that he will deploy 17,000 more US troops to Afghanistan over the next few months, bringing the total US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) troop strength there to some 80,000. Top US civilian and military officials dealing with \u00ab\u00a0AfPak\u00a0\u00bb, as the new administration has dubbed the two countries, have made clear that they hope to enlist Iran, with which Washington cooperated in ousting the Taliban in 2001, in helping to stabilize Afghanistan. <\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbIt is absolutely clear that Iran plays an important role in Afghanistan, Obama’s Special Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke, said in Kabul earlier this week in an interview during which he pointedly declined to repeat Bush administration charges that Tehran was aiding the Taliban.<\/em> \u00ab[Iran has] a legitimate role to play in this region, as do all of Afghanistan’s neighbors, he insisted.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbMost regional specialists, including Bruce Riedel, who co-chairs the White House’s AfPak policy review, and John Brennan, Obama’s top counter-terrorism adviser, have long argued that Iran’s cooperation would make Washington’s effort to stabilize the region and ultimately defeat al-Qaeda markedly easier while, conversely, its active opposition, as in Iraq, is likely to make the task considerably more difficult.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThat assessment has, if anything, gained strength in just the past few weeks as Washington has scrambled to secure new supply lines into land-locked Afghanistan after a key bridge in Pakistan’s Khyber Pass was destroyed by Taliban militants there and Kyrgyzstan threatened to end Washington’s access to its Manas air base.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbWhile US efforts to compensate have focused so far on the overland route through Russia and the Central Asian \u00ab\u00a0Stans\u00a0\u00bb, a growing number of voices have noted that a much less costly and more efficient alternative route would run from Iran’s southern ports into western Afghanistan.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbAlthough Tehran would no doubt be very reluctant to permit the US military to use its territory at this point, NATO’s supreme commander, US General John Craddock, said earlier this month that he had no objection if other NATO members could negotiate an access agreement with Iran.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tCe sh\u00e9ma g\u00e9n\u00e9ral s’inscrit \u00e9videmment dans le constat \u00e9crasant qui caract\u00e9rise la situation actuelle des USA et la politique fondamentale d’Obama, la crise, certes. Ces diverses hypoth\u00e8ses, qui peuvent \u00eatre vues du point de vue du d\u00e9veloppement de la politique expansionniste bushiste (dans la mesure o\u00f9 il y a un renforcement de la guerre en Afghanistan), peuvent \u00e9galement \u00eatre appr\u00e9ci\u00e9es, avec tout autant si pas plus de logique, du point de vue contraire. L’interpr\u00e9tation devient alors qu’il faut tout faire du point de vue diplomatique pour stabiliser le plus vite possible la situation au Moyen-Orient et lancer un effort strat\u00e9gique majeur pour tenter de parvenir \u00e0 la stabilisation de la situation en Afghanistan. Dans ce cadre de r\u00e9flexion, certes, l’Iran acquiert une importance fondamentale, une place centrale, et l’importance d’Isra\u00ebl est r\u00e9duite \u00e0 mesure. Si Netanyahou applique effectivement sa politique maximaliste, il facilite en un sens la t\u00e2che d’Obama en justifiant un net distanciation des USA d’Isra\u00ebl, et en facilitant par cons\u00e9quent la coop\u00e9ration des pays arabes (y compris les anciens pestif\u00e9r\u00e9s, Syrie en t\u00eate). <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tLa question centrale est donc de d\u00e9terminer l’importance qu’on accorde \u00e0 la pression de la grande crise syst\u00e9mique qui secoue les USA. On sait que nous lui accordons une place centrale, fondamentale, capable de g\u00e9n\u00e9rer des effets absolument impensables il y a six mois, notamment du point de vue de la politique ext\u00e9rieure. Ainsi consid\u00e9r\u00e9e, la chronique de Jim Lobe prend tout son sens, d’autant qu’elle est adoss\u00e9e \u00e0 des faits autant qu’\u00e0 des sp\u00e9culations, notamment les d\u00e9clarations d’Holbrooke, homme habitu\u00e9 \u00e0 peser ses mots et qui n’a certainement pas parl\u00e9 sans un accord pr\u00e9cis et circonstanci\u00e9 de toute la direction de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale d’Obama, et d’Obama lui-m\u00eame certes.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tEncore une fois, point de vains calculs ni d’ang\u00e9lisme, ni de montages complexes et machiav\u00e9liques, de tromperie d\u00e9lib\u00e9r\u00e9e, encore moins de consid\u00e9rations sur un \u00e9ventuel grand changement politique des USA, calcul\u00e9 et pr\u00e9par\u00e9 de main de ma\u00eetre. Seule une n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 vitale peut faire bouger l’\u00e9norme machinerie de la politique US et faire envisager une r\u00e9volution comme une mise en cause de l’alignement USA-Isra\u00ebl. Cette n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 vitale existe: la crise-qui-bouleverse-tout.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 21 f\u00e9vrier 2009 \u00e0 111H27<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" La d\u00e9signation de Benjamin Netanyahou comme Premier ministre isra\u00e9lien, dans la perspective d’un gouvernement tr\u00e8s outrageusement \u00e0 droite, avec l’Iran en ligne de mire, tout cela n’augure rien de formidable pour les relations entre Isra\u00ebl ert les USA. On a d\u00e9j\u00e0 eu quelques \u00e9chos \u00e0 propos d’une soudaine tension souterraine, dans ce cas \u00e0 l’occasion… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3236,8133,4300,2773,2790,6208],"class_list":["post-70553","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-afghanistan","tag-afpak","tag-holbrooke","tag-iran","tag-netanyahou","tag-obama"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70553","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70553"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70553\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70553"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70553"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70553"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}