La visite du Premier Ministre britannique \u00e0 Washington a permis d’avoir une meilleure id\u00e9e de ce qu’il faut attendre du G20 et de l’humeur des uns et des autres. Elle a permis de resserrer le d\u00e9bat en cours autour du cas \u00e0 la fois concr\u00e8tement important et symboliquement embl\u00e9matique du protectionnisme pour caract\u00e9riser les positions des uns et des autres. La chronique du 8 mars<\/a>, dans le Sunday Times<\/em>, de Irwin Stelzer (dont a d\u00e9j\u00e0<\/a> dit la position d’influence), renforce la perception qu’on a de la position d’Obama (soutenu dans ce cas par une fraction grandissante de l’establishment<\/em> US), notamment avec cette phrase mise en exergue: \u00abWashington has more in common with French president Nicolas Sarkozy than with Brown when it comes to trade.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tStelzer d\u00e9marre sa r\u00e9flexion en reprenant l’analogie que Brown lui-m\u00eame offrit \u00e0 Washington, devant le Congr\u00e8s, lorsqu’il \u00e9voqua la conf\u00e9rence internationale convoqu\u00e9e par le PM britannique MacDonald, le 6 juillet 1933, pour obtenir un accord international contre le protectionnisme. Roosevelt torpilla la conf\u00e9rence en n’y venant pas. Tout se passe comme si le G20 \u00e9tait une reprise de cette conf\u00e9rence du 6 juillet 1933, \u00e9galement avec la question du protectionnisme en son cur. Pour Stelzer, si BHO y est pr\u00e9sent contrairement \u00e0 FDR en 1933, l’issue n’en sera gu\u00e8re diff\u00e9rente.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abGordon Brown is less concerned about maintaining the value of his currency than that old dissimulator FDR professed to be. He needs a successful, or at least big and glitzy international conference for other reasons, not least for the political uplift that a sprinkle of Obama stardust might provide. But enough cynicism. Equally important is the prime minister’s belief in the need for international co-ordination and a strong stand against protectionism.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbSo he is relieved to have avoided MacDonald’s fate: the American president will attend the April 2 London conference of the G20 nations. The important question is whether the conference can achieve its goal of a co-ordinated response to the world recession. There are reasons to doubt it.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abThe first is that Brown’s plea to a joint session of Congress to avoid a protectionism that . . . in the end protects no one fell on deaf ears. The White House and the Congress have assured their trade-union funders that Doha is dead, and there will be no more trade-opening measures. Indeed, existing agreements are to be tightened. Washington has more in common with French president Nicolas Sarkozy than with Brown when it comes to trade.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe second obstacle to close co-operation was made clear by the president in a press conference with the prime minister. Brown talked of grand bargains, a global new deal. Obama spoke vaguely of better co-ordination of financial regulation, and expressed no enthusiasm for co-ordinating American recovery efforts with those of the EU, except to call on Britain and Europe to do more. The president faces a bailout-weary Congress, and one that wants any additional borrow-and-spend directed at the plight of America’s homeowners. Indeed, even when it comes to regulation, the White House and key congressional figures let it be known that America has no intention of ceding any of its powers to an international body.<\/em> []<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe third obstacle in the path of a Brown triumph at the conference is money. The prime minister wants a larger role to be assigned to international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. But that would mean a larger contribution from cash-strapped Obama, which is not on the cards, especially since America is already under-represented at the IMF and the administration is taken with the scathing criticism of the IMF from economists it respects, such as Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tEffectivement, le G20 ressemble, par certains de ses aspects, \u00e0 une tentative britannique, faite au nom du syst\u00e8me, de r\u00e9affirmer<\/a> les termes fondamentaux du syst\u00e8me lib\u00e9ral et de l’id\u00e9ologie libre-\u00e9changiste; c’est-\u00e0-dire, r\u00e9affirmer, pour nous sortir de la catastrophe, les termes fondamentaux du syst\u00e8me qui nous a conduit \u00e0 la catastrophe; c’est-\u00e0-dire sauver le syst\u00e8me plut\u00f4t que sauver le monde. Au moins, c’est un bel ent\u00eatement de croyant. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tL’appr\u00e9ciation de Stelzer confirme<\/a> les impressions de plus en plus fermes que l’on peut avoir concernant la position d’Obama sur le libre-\u00e9change et sur le protectionnisme. Effectivement<\/a>, sur cette question, comme sur d’autres du domaine, et selon le jugement fameux, \u00abBarack Obama sounds more like the president of France every day.<\/em>\u00bb.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n