Un grand cas a \u00e9t\u00e9 fait de l’annonce, il y a deux jours par Barack Obama, qu’il serait \u00e9ventuellement possible de parler avec des talibans mod\u00e9r\u00e9s pour tenter d’arriver \u00e0 des arrangements partiels en Afghanistan, permettant d’\u00e9voluer vers une situation de d\u00e9sengagement. Il ne fait plus aucun doute d\u00e9sormais, comme nous-m\u00eames l’observons<\/a> depuis quelques temps pour les mati\u00e8res de politique ext\u00e9rieure US, que cette sorte d’approche est fortement, voire exclusivement suscit\u00e9e par la crise, et cela d’une fa\u00e7on tr\u00e8s urgente. La chose est encore mise en \u00e9vidence, effectivement \u00e0 propos de l’Afghanistan, par Arnaud de Borchgrave pour UPI, (via Spacewar.com<\/em>), le 9 mars<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abCNN is watched the world over, and fear and worst-case scenarios are contagious. Fareed Zakaria’s Sunday talk show \u00ab\u00a0GPS\u00a0\u00bb was doom and gloom on a global scale. Globalization is in retreat; capital flows are shrinking; a massive financial crisis, the likes of which have not been seen since the 1930s, is on its way; Asian exports are down 30 percent to 40 percent; Eastern European states, the former Soviet satellites, are in economic meltdown; the European Union solidarity collapses as nation-states nibble back once sovereign bits and pieces; 44 percent of this year’s U.S. budget is deficit spending, but China no longer can be counted on to fund Washington’s profligate ways; the United States then will have to begin borrowing from itself, which will trigger inflation; with Iraq still a costly military commitment, the United States no longer has the means of fighting an open-ended war in Afghanistan; class anger the rich betrayed us is bubbling to the surface in the United States, Europe and Asia.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbIt was hardly surprising that President Obama, in a 35-minute interview with The New York Times aboard Air Force One, pondered outreach to Taliban insurgents, if indeed moderate Taliban can be found. Obama knows that Afghanistan is now his war and that we are losing it. He also knows that appeals to our NATO allies to supply more troops have fallen on deaf ears.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tSuivent diverses consid\u00e9rations sur la difficult\u00e9, voire l’impossibilit\u00e9 selon Borchgrave, de parvenir \u00e0 une situation qui pourrait sembler \u00eatre une sorte de simili r\u00e8glement honorable en Afghanistan, permettant d’envisager un retrait. Pour lui, les talibans mod\u00e9r\u00e9s ou pr\u00e9sent\u00e9s comme tels sont destin\u00e9s \u00e0 se radicaliser, ou \u00e0 \u00eatre absorb\u00e9s par les plus radicalis\u00e9s, et ils le seront d’autant plus s’ils \u00e9tablissent des contacts avec les USA. Il semble que cette appr\u00e9ciation soit partag\u00e9e par diverses autorit\u00e9s US.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abGen. David Petraeus, the new CENTCOM commander, now responsible for both the Iraqi and Afghan theaters, does not believe negotiations are possible with moderate Taliban, as this is a contradiction in terms. He dismisses the talks about talks that went nowhere, initiated by Saudi King Abdullah in Mecca last Sept. 27-28, when he invited to dinner former Taliban Foreign Minister Mohammad Wakil Mutawakil and Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s brother Mahmoud.<\/em> []<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbPicking out moderate Taliban with credibility and the willingness to talk is one thing. Weaning them away from the insurgent extremists to make a deal is another. And making such a deal stick strikes most observers as mission impossible. Between 1964 and 1968, Vietnam doves thought a separate deal could be negotiated to end the war with the Vietcong, the communist insurgency in South Vietnam. The Vietcong, it was claimed in those days, was autonomous of, and even hostile to, Hanoi. There was a famous Madame Nguyen Thi Binh, the charming Vietcong foreign minister and a favorite on Western TV programs, who expertly cultivated the notion of independence. It wasn’t until after the Paris peace accords of January 1973 that the truth came out. The Vietcong, or the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, was created by order of the North Vietnamese Communist Central Committee in 1959 long before President Kennedy changed U.S. military advisers into fighting units.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbMuch as he would like to extricate the United States from the Afghan quagmire, Obama knows anything perceived as a U.S. defeat would be widely interpreted as a victory for al-Qaida and a defeat for the United States and NATO. Conversely, no peace treaty would mean much if neighboring states were not involved, including Iran. Hence, the U.S. idea of a U.N.-sponsored conference on Afghanistan March 31 with key regional and strategic countries, as well as NATO members.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tEffectivement, la direction que vont emprunter les USA sera sans aucun doute d’aller chercher de l’aide dans les pays proches o\u00f9 ils peuvent en trouver, et l’on parle d\u00e9sormais beaucoup moins en termes militaires qu’en termes d’influence de diverses fa\u00e7ons. Il s’agit principalement de la Russie et de l’Iran. Tout le reste, de plus en plus, va passer au second plan. Il est assez probable que l’approche politique US de ces deux pays sera celle du compromis \u00e0 tout prix pour obtenir leur aide et leur soutien dans l’affaire afghane. Pour la Russie, cela est d\u00e9j\u00e0 en cours<\/a>, pour l’Iran la chose s’amorce, comme on a pu le voir avec l’invitation faite \u00e0 ce pays de participer \u00e0 la conf\u00e9rence du 31 mars sur l’Afghanistan, avec en plus le renforcement du r\u00f4le de l’ONU, aux d\u00e9pens de celui de l’OTAN.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tTout cela renfor\u00e7ant \u00e9videmment l’\u00e9volution en cours de la politique ext\u00e9rieure US, comme on en rencontre de nombreux signes en ce moment. A l’image de la situation \u00e9conomique, on peut parler d’une contraction de cette politique ext\u00e9rieure, cette image convenant mieux que le mot repli qui implique trop une strat\u00e9gie d\u00e9lib\u00e9r\u00e9e. La contraction se fait sous la pression des \u00e9v\u00e9nements en cours et contredit brutalement le mouvement d’extension de cette politique (\u00e9galement \u00e0 l’image de l’\u00e9conomie US vers la globalisation) qui a commenc\u00e9 en 1995-1996 (intervention en ex-Yougoslavie), avec l’acc\u00e9l\u00e9ration de 9\/11 bien entendu.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 10 mars 2009 \u00e0 09H22<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Un grand cas a \u00e9t\u00e9 fait de l’annonce, il y a deux jours par Barack Obama, qu’il serait \u00e9ventuellement possible de parler avec des talibans mod\u00e9r\u00e9s pour tenter d’arriver \u00e0 des arrangements partiels en Afghanistan, permettant d’\u00e9voluer vers une situation de d\u00e9sengagement. Il ne fait plus aucun doute d\u00e9sormais, comme nous-m\u00eames l’observons depuis quelques temps… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3236,1257,7740,8172,6379,2773,4607,2730,4146],"class_list":["post-70594","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-afghanistan","tag-borchgrave","tag-compromis","tag-contraction","tag-exterieure","tag-iran","tag-politique","tag-russie","tag-talibans"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70594","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70594"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70594\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70594"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70594"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70594"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}