{"id":70606,"date":"2009-03-14T12:52:23","date_gmt":"2009-03-14T12:52:23","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2009\/03\/14\/revoila-le-kc-45\/"},"modified":"2009-03-14T12:52:23","modified_gmt":"2009-03-14T12:52:23","slug":"revoila-le-kc-45","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2009\/03\/14\/revoila-le-kc-45\/","title":{"rendered":"Revoil\u00e0 le KC-45"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>L&rsquo;atmosph\u00e8re devient \u00e9lectrique \u00e0 Washington \u00e0 propos du Pentagone-qu&rsquo;il-faut-r\u00e9former. Tout le monde est d&rsquo;accord sur la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 d&rsquo;une r\u00e9forme et chacun a son id\u00e9e, ses pr\u00e9rogatives, ses pr\u00e9tentions, son exp\u00e9rience, son influence, etc. La partie est notamment rude avec (ou entre?) l&rsquo;administration Obama et le Congr\u00e8s, ce dernier qui entend jouer un r\u00f4le pr\u00e9pond\u00e9rant dans les voies et moyens de la r\u00e9forme, notamment en ayant son mot consid\u00e9rable \u00e0 dire sur les choix \u00e0 faire des programmes \u00e0 r\u00e9duire, \u00e0 supprimer, \u00e0 renforcer, etc.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t&#8230;Et c&rsquo;est dans ces conditions temp\u00e9tueuses que le programme KC-45 revient au premier plan, apr\u00e8s avoir agit\u00e9 la chronique l&rsquo;ann\u00e9e derni\u00e8re, entre <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article-_tremblement_de_terre_au_pentagone_et_alentour_01_03_2008.html\" class=\"gen\">fin f\u00e9vrier<\/a> et <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article-le_pentagone_adrift__12_07_2008.html\" class=\"gen\">juillet<\/a>, avant d&rsquo;\u00eatre mis <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article-le_pentagone_en_panne_seche_au_c_ur_du_cyclone_11_09_2008.html\" class=\"gen\">au frigidaire<\/a> en attendant des jours meilleurs. Il semble que nous soyons arriv\u00e9s \u00e0 ces jours meilleurs,  sans rire<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tAinsi avons-nous eu, successivement:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t Le 9 mars, diverses affirmations imprim\u00e9es ou susurr\u00e9es selon lesquelles l&rsquo;administration Obama repousserait de cinq ans ce programme de ravitailleur en vol (le KC-X, donnant le KC-45) dont la premi\u00e8re tranche (179 avions) approche les $40 milliards. Retarder de 5 ans un programme qui doit remplacer des avions vieux d&rsquo;un demi-si\u00e8cle dont on craint \u00e0 chaque instant qu&rsquo;ils soient clou\u00e9s au sol pour obsolescence irr\u00e9parable, qui effectuent pourtant une mission strat\u00e9gique vitale pour les forces US? A premi\u00e8re vue, \u00e9trange id\u00e9e.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t Le 10 mars, la Maison-Blanche fait savoir qu&rsquo;on n&rsquo;a rien d\u00e9cid\u00e9 du tout concernant le programme KC-X.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t Le 12 mars, le d\u00e9put\u00e9 John Murtha, tout-puissant \u00e0 la Chambre  pour les forces arm\u00e9es et les programmes militaires, annonce qu&rsquo;il met au point, avec sa commission et diverses sous-commissions de la Chambre, un plan de lancement imm\u00e9diat du programme KC-X, avec contrat partag\u00e9 entre les deux concurrents (Boeing et Northrop-Grumman\/EADS).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t Le 13 mars, Gates fait savoir qu&rsquo;il est absolument contre la proposition de Murtha: pas question de deux avions pour KC-X,  et, au fait, rien n&rsquo;est d\u00e9cid\u00e9, contrairement \u00e0 ce que semble penser Murtha,  Gates semble vouloir l&rsquo;affirmer d&rsquo;autant mieux que c&rsquo;est lui et personne d&rsquo;autre qui d\u00e9cide (\u00ab[Defense] <em>Secretary<\/em> [Robert] <em>Gates&rsquo; position on a split buy is clear to all involved. He thinks it is impractical and inefficient and he is adamantly opposed to it<\/em>\u00bb, selon le porte-parole du DoD Geoff.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tColin Clark, sur <em>DodBuzz.com<\/em>, le <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dodbuzz.com\/2009\/03\/12\/hill-to-spend-and-rebuild-dod-murtha\/\" class=\"gen\">12 mars<\/a>, nous donne une bonne description de la passe d&rsquo;armes, sauf pour l&rsquo;intervention de Gates.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>On the KC-X program, Murtha said we got to build them and we better build them fast. Awarding both industry teams a slice of the contract because it is the only way to avoid further contract protests and delays. We believe we should build two tankers a month instead of one, because they&rsquo;re so old and it would take so long to get the (old tankers) replaced, Murtha said. The proposal for a new tanker contract would be included in the 2009 supplemental.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The tanker contest would still be competitive, he said. The<\/em> [<em>company team<\/em>] <em>that has the best proposal would get the most airplanes per month. The other one would get less. He said the details of the proposed contract award have yet to be worked out, but he thinks he can sell the idea to the rest of Congress. If<\/em> [<em>the new tanker contract is<\/em>] <em>contested you&rsquo;re not going to get a new tanker for another two or three years. He said he was unsure whether he could convince DoD to go along with the plan.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Meanwhile, the White House proved that when budget deliberations are under way, no niggle can be too small. Case in point: White House spokesman Ken Baer&rsquo;s statement that OMB has not directed the Defense Department to either delay production of the new tanker or cancel the new bombers.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>OK. The White House has not directed the department to do anything, yet. But these are possibilities being considered by the people who have the final say on what goes in the budget. So it&rsquo;s pretty big news when those folks even consider a substantial delay to a program worth $35 billion or so, not to mention one that is the Air Force&rsquo;s top priority.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The fact that the White House spoke publicly about these budget deliberations, after requiring senior DoD officials sign a pledge not to reveal any details, shows just how hot the budget battles have already become.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tCette affaire du programme KC-X (KC-45) est surtout int\u00e9ressante, pour l&rsquo;instant et dans les conditions o\u00f9 elle est d\u00e9crite, parce qu&rsquo;elle rend effectivement bien compte de la bataille en cours autour du budget de la d\u00e9fense. Toute l&rsquo;administration y est impliqu\u00e9e, avec ses diff\u00e9rentes tendances. (C&rsquo;est le budget, l&rsquo;OMB, qui, au d\u00e9part, a mentionn\u00e9 le possible retardement de 5 ans du programme KC-X. La nouvelle a filtr\u00e9 mais, semble-t-il, sans tous les d\u00e9tails, notamment la condition de proposition de l&rsquo;id\u00e9e du retardement et rien d&rsquo;autre.) Le Congr\u00e8s a un r\u00f4le puissant \u00e0 jouer, qu&rsquo;il n&rsquo;entend laisser \u00e0 personne d&rsquo;autre, et, \u00e0 l&rsquo;int\u00e9rieur du Congr\u00e8s, les deux chambres suivant des voies diff\u00e9rentes. Il semble que l&rsquo;administration Obama ait privil\u00e9gi\u00e9 de rechercher l&rsquo;alliance du S\u00e9nat, en soutenant la paire Levin-McCain (les deux membres dirigeants de la commission des forces arm\u00e9es). La Chambre riposte avec Murtha (derri\u00e8re lui, divers pr\u00e9sidents de commissions et sous-commissions) rappelant qu&rsquo;il a son mot \u00e0 dire et qu&rsquo;il a un poids consid\u00e9rable,  et qu&rsquo;il a son propre programme de r\u00e9forme.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tIl faut noter que tout cela se passe dans un cas o\u00f9 tout le monde est d&rsquo;accord: il-faut-r\u00e9former-le-Pentagone. Les divisions et les concurrences \u00e0 l&rsquo;int\u00e9rieur de ce camp, o\u00f9, pourtant, tous les acteurs devront \u00eatre r\u00e9unis en un accord commun, mesurent les difficult\u00e9s qui attendent l&rsquo;administration Obama; d&rsquo;ailleurs, nous observons les premi\u00e8res de ces difficult\u00e9s. A c\u00f4t\u00e9 d&rsquo;une affirmation <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article-foch_plutot_que_lincoln_09_03_2009.html\" class=\"gen\">p\u00e9remptoire<\/a> (d&rsquo;Obama) de la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 d&rsquo;intervenir dans le sens de la r\u00e9forme, voil\u00e0 l&rsquo;administration entr\u00e9e dans les d\u00e9tails de la chose,  et, comme l&rsquo;on sait bien, le Bon Dieu est dans les d\u00e9tails,  ou, encore, <em>the devil&rsquo;s in the details<\/em>. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 14 mars 2009 \u00e0 12H55<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>L&rsquo;atmosph\u00e8re devient \u00e9lectrique \u00e0 Washington \u00e0 propos du Pentagone-qu&rsquo;il-faut-r\u00e9former. Tout le monde est d&rsquo;accord sur la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 d&rsquo;une r\u00e9forme et chacun a son id\u00e9e, ses pr\u00e9rogatives, ses pr\u00e9tentions, son exp\u00e9rience, son influence, etc. La partie est notamment rude avec (ou entre?) l&rsquo;administration Obama et le Congr\u00e8s, ce dernier qui entend jouer un r\u00f4le pr\u00e9pond\u00e9rant dans&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3192,4215,3984,4581,4376,3194,3320],"class_list":["post-70606","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-boeing","tag-eads","tag-gates","tag-kc-45","tag-murtha","tag-pentagone","tag-reforme"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70606","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70606"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70606\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70606"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70606"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70606"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}