{"id":70610,"date":"2009-03-16T08:40:03","date_gmt":"2009-03-16T08:40:03","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2009\/03\/16\/usa-puis-dod-le-crash-apres-le-crash\/"},"modified":"2009-03-16T08:40:03","modified_gmt":"2009-03-16T08:40:03","slug":"usa-puis-dod-le-crash-apres-le-crash","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2009\/03\/16\/usa-puis-dod-le-crash-apres-le-crash\/","title":{"rendered":"USA, puis DoD, le crash<\/em> apr\u00e8s le crash<\/em>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Parmi les plus pessimistes \u00e0 propos d’une r\u00e9forme du Pentagone, on trouve sans surprise excessive William S. Lind, le th\u00e9oricien de la G4G qui est aussi un r\u00e9formiste radical, tr\u00e8s critique de la bureaucratie du Pentagone et de la direction politique washingtonienne. Lind examine les chances d’une \u00e9ventuelle r\u00e9forme du Pentagone par l’administration Obama et l’exp\u00e9die prestement dans un article pour UPI (Spacewar.com<\/em>), publi\u00e9 en deux parties, les 12 mars<\/a> et 13 mars<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abU.S. President Barack Obama recently announced a bold new initiative to save up to $40 billion per year by reforming defense procurement. Like the Pentagon, I greeted his proclamation with a yawn.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb If there is one game the Pentagon knows how to play, it is reforming defense procurement. It has gone through the drill more times than it or I can remember. The script is always the same. A reform program is announced with great fanfare. Experts are convened all from or on their way to the defense industry commissions and panels meet, reports are issued and recommendations are offered. Then it all peters out, and nothing changes. The whole game is just another form of rounding up the usual suspects.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tQuelles sont les id\u00e9es de Lind pour une r\u00e9forme? Elles naviguent entre l’\u00e9vidence, le bon sens et la d\u00e9rision en apparence sans gu\u00e8re d’espoir. Pour Lind, il faut laisser toute esp\u00e9rance d’une r\u00e9forme sophistiqu\u00e9e, calibr\u00e9e sur la complexit\u00e9 inextricable et kafka\u00efesque du Pentagone, pour l’\u00e9vidente raison qu’on se trouverait aussit\u00f4t aspir\u00e9e, happ\u00e9e, mang\u00e9e et dig\u00e9r\u00e9e par le monstre (par Moby Dick<\/em>). D’o\u00f9 quelques recettes qui feraient bondir un expert normal, asserment\u00e9, affichant son conformisme de jugement comme s’il s’agissait de l’audace m\u00eame de la pens\u00e9e.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abBased on marketplace prices for similar systems and components, we would determine what a given system should cost. Bids would not only be compared with each other but with the should cost figure. If all the bids were over the should cost figure, we would rebid or decide to do without the system. Prices would soon come down, especially if at the same time we made it easier for companies that now do no defense work to get into the business.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbAnother simple procurement reform that would turn from state capitalism to the free market is buying off the shelf. When a service identifies a need, it would look around the world to see what is available to fill that need. Then we would build it here, under license if it were a foreign design.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tMais tout cela, certes, n’a gu\u00e8re de chance d’\u00eatre seulement consid\u00e9r\u00e9, si tant est que cela puisse jamais venir \u00e0 l’esprit des bureaucrates du Pentagone. Lind est de toutes les fa\u00e7ons d’un pessimisme inalt\u00e9rable. Il consid\u00e8re que tous les gens de l’\u00e9quipe Obama au Pentagone sont eux-m\u00eames issus du s\u00e9rail, donc d\u00e9j\u00e0 corrompus psychologiquement par les proc\u00e9dures et les modes de pens\u00e9e de la bureaucratie. Une seule personne \u00e9chappe \u00e0 son jugement radical et certainement fond\u00e9 en bonne partie (Lind a \u00e9norm\u00e9ment de connexion avec les milieux de la d\u00e9fense), le secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense Robert Gates, \u00abwho seems to have some inclinations toward genuine reform…<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAlors, que faire? Prier pour le pire, nous indique Lind. C’est-\u00e0-dire un effondrement des structures financi\u00e8res nationales (US), entrainant une incapacit\u00e9 de fournir au Pentagone son budget. A ce moment, estime Lind, il s’agirait d’annoncer que l’on cherche \u00e0 conserver toutes les unit\u00e9s de combat et que l’on liquide le reste, notamment et pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment les acquisitions.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abThe one wild card that could change everything is the growing probability of national financial collapse. If that happens or perhaps when it happens defense procurement will be on the chopping block along with everything else. At that point, reformers’ slogan should be, Keep the combat units; cut everything else.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbIf the American people have a secretary of defense strong enough to do that even though the bureaucracy will want to do the opposite they will find that almost everything above the battalion level was waste, fraud and abuse of one sort or another.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCe que nous dit Lind, derri\u00e8re un commentaire qui a l’air marqu\u00e9 d’un sarcasme sans beaucoup d’espoir, ce qui serait le cas pour une situation normale, c’est que la r\u00e9forme du Pentagone ne peut passer que par une op\u00e9ration pr\u00e9liminaire de tabula rasa<\/em>. Il faut tout casser des structures en place et reconstruire des processus compl\u00e8tement diff\u00e9rents, dont la principale caract\u00e9ristique serait qu’ils pourraient et devraient \u00eatre conserv\u00e9s sous le contr\u00f4le du pouvoir politique. Notre premi\u00e8re r\u00e9action doit \u00eatre in\u00e9vitablement: bien s\u00fbr, Lind n’a aucun espoir et il jette une proposition dont il sait bien qu’elle est une plaisanterie am\u00e8re.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCe n’est pas assur\u00e9 \u00e0 100%. Il y a une conviction assez remarquable chez Lind que les USA vont effectivement vers un effondrement financier, que ce n’est plus une question de si mais une question de quand: \u00abthe<\/em> growing<\/em><\/strong> probability of national financial collapse. If that happens or perhaps<\/em> when<\/em><\/strong> it happens<\/em>\u00bb. Il est manifeste par ailleurs que Lind exprime une opinion qui, pour radicale qu’elle soit, n’en refl\u00e8te pas moins un sentiment g\u00e9n\u00e9ral chez les r\u00e9formateurs du Pentagone, qui sont de plus en plus influents, qui sont bien inform\u00e9s, qui ont des jugements r\u00e9alistes. La nouveaut\u00e9 qu’il apporte dans sa r\u00e9flexion, c’est l’id\u00e9e de la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 d’un crash<\/em> pour ouvrir la voie \u00e0 une r\u00e9forme, et l’opinion que ce crash<\/em> est d\u00e9sormais possible, et qu’il se situerait aussi bien au niveau national (financier) qu’au niveau du Pentagone.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 16 mars 2009 \u00e0 08H45<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Parmi les plus pessimistes \u00e0 propos d’une r\u00e9forme du Pentagone, on trouve sans surprise excessive William S. Lind, le th\u00e9oricien de la G4G qui est aussi un r\u00e9formiste radical, tr\u00e8s critique de la bureaucratie du Pentagone et de la direction politique washingtonienne. Lind examine les chances d’une \u00e9ventuelle r\u00e9forme du Pentagone par l’administration Obama et… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[5118,1012,3194,3320],"class_list":["post-70610","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-crash","tag-lind","tag-pentagone","tag-reforme"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70610","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70610"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70610\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70610"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70610"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70610"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}