{"id":70647,"date":"2009-03-28T14:54:09","date_gmt":"2009-03-28T14:54:09","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2009\/03\/28\/wall-street-proprietaire-de-washington-dc-a-limage-des-monstres-quil-enfante\/"},"modified":"2009-03-28T14:54:09","modified_gmt":"2009-03-28T14:54:09","slug":"wall-street-proprietaire-de-washington-dc-a-limage-des-monstres-quil-enfante","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2009\/03\/28\/wall-street-proprietaire-de-washington-dc-a-limage-des-monstres-quil-enfante\/","title":{"rendered":"Wall Street, propri\u00e9taire de Washington D.C., \u00e0 l&rsquo;image des monstres qu&rsquo;il enfante"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>L&rsquo;Am\u00e9rique des ann\u00e9es 1990 avait entrain\u00e9 le monde sur la voie de la globalisation financi\u00e8re. Ce furent les catastrophes financi\u00e8res,  notamment,  de la Russie d&rsquo;Eltsine et de l&rsquo;Argentine. Desmond Lachman, homme de Wall Street, qui travailla au FMI, qui mena nombre de n\u00e9gociations avec ces pays dans cette situation catastrophique, ne pouvait imaginer, bien entendu, que cette m\u00eame tragique et baroque destin\u00e9e put faire son miel des USA. C&rsquo;est fait.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tDans le Washington <em>Post<\/em>, dat\u00e9 du <a href=\"http:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/wp-dyn\/content\/article\/2009\/03\/25\/AR2009032502226_pf.html\" class=\"gen\">29 mars 2009<\/a>, Lachman nous annonce que plus rien, absolument plus rien ne distingue les USA de la Russie du temps d&rsquo;Eltsine ou de l&rsquo;Argentine de la m\u00eame \u00e9poque<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>Back in the spring of 1998, when Boris Yeltsin was still at Russia&rsquo;s helm, I led a group of global investors to Moscow to find out firsthand where the Russian economy was headed. My long career with the International Monetary Fund and on Wall Street had taken me to emerging markets throughout Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America, and I thought I&rsquo;d seen it all. Yet I still recall the shock I felt at a meeting in Russia&rsquo;s dingy Ministry of Finance, where I finally realized how a handful of young oligarchs were bringing Russia&rsquo;s economy to ruin in the pursuit of their own selfish interests, despite the supposed brilliance of Anatoly Chubais, Russia&rsquo;s economic czar at the time.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>At the time, I could not imagine that anything remotely similar could happen in the United States. Indeed, I shared the American conceit that most emerging-market nations had poorly developed institutions and would do well to emulate Washington and Wall Street. These days, though, I&rsquo;m hardly so confident. Many economists and analysts are worrying that the United States might go the way of Japan, which suffered a lost d\u00e9cade after its own real estate market fell apart in the early 1990s. But I&rsquo;m more concerned that the United States is coming to resemble Argentina, Russia and other so-called emerging markets, both in what led us to the crisis, and in how we&rsquo;re trying to fix it.<\/em> []<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Negotiating with Argentina&rsquo;s top officials during their multiple financial crises in the 1990s was always an ordeal, and sparring with Domingo Cavallo, the country&rsquo;s Harvard-trained finance minister at the time, was particularly trying. One always had the sense that, despite their supreme arrogance, the country&rsquo;s leaders never had a coherent economic strategy and that major decisions were always made on the run. I never thought that was how policy was made in the United States  until, that is, I saw how totally at sea Treasury Secretaries Henry Paulson and Timothy F. Geithner and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke have appeared so many times during our country&rsquo;s ongoing economic and financial storm.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The parallels between U.S. policymaking and what we see in emerging markets are clearest in how we&rsquo;ve mishandled the banking crisis. We delude ourselves that our banks face liquidity problems, rather than deeper solvency problems, and we try to fix it all on the cheap just like any run-of-the-mill emerging market economy would try to do. And after years of lecturing Asian and Latin American leaders about the importance of consistency and transparency in sorting out financial crises, we fail on both counts<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tEt sa conclusion :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>In the twilight of my career, when I am hopefully wiser than before, I have come to regret how the IMF and the U.S. Treasury all too often lectured leaders in emerging markets on how to get their house in order  without the slightest thought that the United States might fare no better when facing a major economic crisis. Now, I fear time is running out for our own policymakers to mend their ways and offer real leadership to extricate the United States from its worst economic calamity since the 1930s. If we insist on improvising and not facing our real problems, we might soon lose our status as a country to be emulated and join the ranks of those nations we have patronized for so long.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tC&rsquo;est \u00e0 l&rsquo;indication de <em>Fabius Maximus<\/em>, qu&rsquo;il nous est d\u00e9j\u00e0 arriv\u00e9 de rencontrer et de <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article-ave_fabius_maximus_what_s_new__25_05_2007.html\" class=\"gen\">citer<\/a>, que nous avons parcouru cet article. Le m\u00eame <em>Fabius Maximus<\/em>, dans un billet du <a href=\"http:\/\/fabiusmaximus.wordpress.com\/2009\/03\/28\/banana\/#more-6722\" class=\"gen\">28 mars 2009<\/a> (joli titre de \u00ab<em>America On Itw Way From Superpower To Banana Republic<\/em>\u00bb), indique un autre article, en fait un tr\u00e8s long essai, qu&rsquo;il faut lire sur le site de <em>The Atlantic<\/em>, dans ses \u00e9ditions pr\u00e9monitoires de <a href=\"http:\/\/www.theatlantic.com\/doc\/200905\/imf-advice\" class=\"gen\">Mai 2009<\/a>, sous le titre de \u00ab<em>The Silent Coup<\/em>\u00bb. L&rsquo;auteur principal, Simon Johnson, \u00e9tait encore \u00e0 un poste de direction du FMI l&rsquo;ann\u00e9e derni\u00e8re; avec cette introduction de l&rsquo;essai, pour en situer l&rsquo;esprit:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>The crash has laid bare many unpleasant truths about the United States. One of the most alarming, says a former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, is that the finance industry has effectively captured our governmenta state of affairs that more typically describes emerging markets, and is at the center of many emerging-market crises. If the IMF&rsquo;s staff could speak freely about the U.S., it would tell us what it tells all countries in this situation: recovery will fail unless we break the financial oligarchy that is blocking essential reform. And if we are to prevent a true depression, we&rsquo;re running out of time.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tOn le comprend, \u00ab<em>The Silent Coup<\/em>\u00bb c&rsquo;est celui de Wall Street prenant possession du gouvernement des Etats-Unis. L&rsquo;on retrouve tous les ingr\u00e9dients, largement d\u00e9velopp\u00e9s et document\u00e9s, qui nous font accepter l&rsquo;hypoth\u00e8se d&rsquo;un BHO se retrouvant <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article-le_tango_d_obama_avec_son_moment_de_verite_28_03_2009.html\" class=\"gen\">prisonnier<\/a> de Wall Street. En attendant, ce que nous disent ces articles, parmi d&rsquo;autres, c&rsquo;est que l&rsquo;attention se tourne de plus en plus de la conjoncture (la crise \u00e9conomique suivant la crise financi\u00e8re) vers la structure (les tares profondes, catastrophiques du syst\u00e8me de l&rsquo;am\u00e9ricanisme et de la soi-disant industrie financi\u00e8re). L&rsquo;affaire des <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article-mccarthy_contre_le_systeme_23_03_2009.html\" class=\"gen\">bonus d&rsquo;AIG<\/a> n&rsquo;aura pas \u00e9t\u00e9 inutile, en soulevant une temp\u00eate, qu&rsquo;on aurait pu croire m\u00e9diatique et d&rsquo;un populisme sollicit\u00e9, qui l&rsquo;\u00e9tait effectivement mais qui for\u00e7a \u00e9galement \u00e0 d\u00e9placer l&rsquo;attention de la crise \u00e9conomique vers la crise de la structure financi\u00e8re; ce faisant, orientant notre attention de ce que la crise \u00e9conomique peut avoir d&rsquo;une fatalit\u00e9 contre laquelle tout le monde doit lutter sans songer \u00e0 autre chose, \u00e0 ce que la crise structurelle peut avoir au contraire d&rsquo;accusateur contre des situation et des comportements de certaines puissances cens\u00e9es participer \u00e0 la lutte g\u00e9n\u00e9rale.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tL&rsquo;article de Lachman nous d\u00e9montre rapidement mais imparablement combien le syst\u00e8me, qu&rsquo;on croyait triomphant pour lui-m\u00eame et pr\u00e9dateur pour les autres lorsqu&rsquo;il engendrait les catastrophes russe et argentine, pour citer les deux exemples retenus, est en fait pr\u00e9dateur pour lui-m\u00eame puisqu&rsquo;il cr\u00e9e aussi bien en lui-m\u00eame le monstre qu&rsquo;il impose aux autres. Les USA deviennent une \u00e9norme Russie-Eltsine et une monstrueuse Argentine, toutes les deux mises \u00e0 mal par les entreprises conqu\u00e9rantes de l&rsquo;am\u00e9ricanisme triomphant. L&rsquo;\u00e9trange vertu de d\u00e9structuration du syst\u00e8me en termine toujours, semble-t-il, par entamer sa propre d\u00e9structuration. La logique court bon train, jusqu&rsquo;\u00e0 l&rsquo;absurde.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 28 mars 2009 \u00e0 14H54<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>L&rsquo;Am\u00e9rique des ann\u00e9es 1990 avait entrain\u00e9 le monde sur la voie de la globalisation financi\u00e8re. Ce furent les catastrophes financi\u00e8res, notamment, de la Russie d&rsquo;Eltsine et de l&rsquo;Argentine. Desmond Lachman, homme de Wall Street, qui travailla au FMI, qui mena nombre de n\u00e9gociations avec ces pays dans cette situation catastrophique, ne pouvait imaginer, bien entendu,&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3253,3261,5604,2866,8214,5605,3906,2730,5018,3372,3132],"class_list":["post-70647","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-americanisme","tag-argentine","tag-fabius","tag-johnson","tag-lachman","tag-maximus","tag-predateur","tag-russie","tag-simon","tag-street","tag-wall"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70647","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70647"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70647\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70647"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70647"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70647"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}