25 avril 2009 — Depuis le d\u00e9but de l’ann\u00e9e a \u00e9t\u00e9 lanc\u00e9e, sans v\u00e9ritable fracas au milieu d’une \u00e9poque qui en est pleine mais avec ent\u00eatement comme il sied \u00e0 un Polonais de cette envergure, l’id\u00e9e du \u00ab\u00a0G2\u00a0\u00bb de Zbigniew Brzezinski. (Am\u00e9ricain d’origine polonaise et am\u00e9ricaniste, pour dire plus juste.) La chose a \u00e9t\u00e9 pr\u00e9sent\u00e9e en d\u00e9tails succincts par le m\u00eame Brzezinski, dans un court article publi\u00e9 le 13 janvier 2009<\/a>, dans le Financial Times<\/em>. Le principe du G2 est assez simple, qui recouvre essentiellement l’id\u00e9e d’un \u00ab\u00a0partenariat\u00a0\u00bb USA-Chine, ou d’un \u00ab\u00a0partage du monde\u00a0\u00bb en bonne entente et juste coop\u00e9ration entre les USA et la Chine. Cela permettra, selon Zbig et plus modestement que l’id\u00e9e de \u00ab\u00a0sauver le monde\u00a0\u00bb qui nous vient \u00e0 l’esprit, de \u00ab\u00a0changer le monde\u00a0\u00bb («The Group of Two that could change the world<\/em>»).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Conclusion de l’article de Brzezinski, qui r\u00e9sume sa th\u00e8se:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n «We need to develop a shared view on how to cope with the global risks posed by climate change. We should explore the possibility of creating a larger standby UN peacekeeping force for deployment in failed states. We should discuss how an international initiative towards a global adoption of the zero-nuclear weapons option might be helpful in stemming wider nuclear weapons proliferation. We certainly need to collaborate closely in expanding the current Group of Eight leading industrial nations to a G14 or G16, in order to widen the global circle of decision-makers and to develop a more inclusive response to the economic crisis.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n »But to promote all that we need an informal G2. The relationship between the US and China has to be a comprehensive partnership, paralleling our relations with Europe and Japan. Our top leaders should therefore meet informally on a regular schedule for personal in-depth discussions not just about our bilateral relations but about the world in general.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n »All this points in a politically as well as philosophically ambitious direction. The Chinese emphasis on \u00ab\u00a0harmony\u00a0\u00bb can serve as a useful point of departure for the US-Chinese summits. In an era in which the risks of a massively destructive \u00ab\u00a0clash of civilisations\u00a0\u00bb are rising, the deliberate promotion of a genuine conciliation of civilisations is urgently needed. It is a task that President-elect Barack Obama – who is a conciliator at heart – should find congenial, and which President Hu Jintao – who devised the concept of \u00ab\u00a0a harmonious world\u00a0\u00bb – should welcome. It is a mission worthy of the two countries with the most extraordinary potential for shaping our collective future.<\/em>»<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Le 22 avril 2009<\/a>, Henry C K Liu, qui dirige un groupe d’investissement \u00e0 New York et qui s’est signal\u00e9 comme un excellent commentateur de la situation \u00e9conomique, publiait un long article, au cœur d’une s\u00e9rie de cinq, sur Atimes.com<\/em>, dont il est un collaborateur r\u00e9gulier. Il s’agit d’une approche critique de la th\u00e8se de Brzezinski («Obama, Change and Chine, – Brzezinski’s G-2 grand strategy<\/em>»).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n L’article est tr\u00e8s long, tr\u00e8s d\u00e9taill\u00e9, tr\u00e8s construit selon une vision \u00e9conomique et g\u00e9opolitique d’un homme qui a par ses origines une tr\u00e8s bonne exp\u00e9rience de la Chine, et par son exp\u00e9rience courante, une tr\u00e8s bonne connaissance des USA. Henry C K Liu ne dissimule pas une seconde ce qu’on est n\u00e9cessairement conduit \u00e0 penser d’une telle initiative de Brzezinski, qui parle \u00e9videmment au nom d’une fraction r\u00e9aliste \u00e0 Washington, alors que les USA sont dans un processus de perte acc\u00e9l\u00e9r\u00e9e d’influence; il ne dissimule pas que le G2 n’est rien qu’un faux masque pos\u00e9 sur une manœuvre destin\u00e9 \u00e0 pr\u00e9server, ou plut\u00f4t \u00e0 retenir autant que faire se peut une partie de l’influence que les USA sont en train de perdre. («Brzezinski’s statement aims at preserving US dominance in an existing world order that is facing fast and fundamental changes by drawing China into regions previously beyond a weak modern China’s sphere of influence…<\/em>»)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n »Brzezinski is acknowledged as a key adviser to President Obama on foreign policy during and since the presidential election, while he acted as foreign policy advisor to Hillary Clinton during the primaries. Many analysts consider Brzezinski as the spokesman for previously anti-Soviet, now anti-Russia hawk faction in the US foreign policy establishment. His speech in Beijing was addressed to Washington through talking to Beijing. The message is for the US not to waste financial, political and military resources confronting a China destined to process enormous and rising economic, political and military strength and potentials that will surge further over time unstoppable.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n »US national interests globally would be better served by a strategy of making friends with China by sharing power globally because eventually the US will need the support of the world’s most populous country to preserve and shore up its own global dominance. By contrast, conflicts with China will drain US capacity to maintain its global dominance.<\/em>»<\/p>\n<\/p>\n • Liu observe que l’id\u00e9e de Brzezinski est loin de faire l’unanimit\u00e9 de l’establishment<\/em> washingtonien. On s’en doute, bien entendu, et ce rappel est bienvenu et n\u00e9cessaire dans la mesure où il soul\u00e8ve la question de savoir dans quelle mesure les USA seraient capables<\/strong> de tenir de tels engagements.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n «Brzezinski’s vision of harmony with China is not shared by all in the US. Within days after Hillary Clinton’s maiden foreign visit to Beijing as secretary of state, during which she declared US-China cooperation as imperative for enhancing the national interests of both countries and for pulling the world from the current financial crisis, the US Navy staged a provocative intrusion into Chinese territorial waters by a US low-frequency sonar surveillance ship near China’s submarine base on Hainan Island in the South China Sea, mapping deep-sea routes for submarines leaving and entering their base. China claimed that the USNS Impeccable had sailed into the country’s 200-kilometer economic exclusion zone.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n »Press reports are suddenly appearing on computer hackers allegedly associated with the governments of Russia and China having embedded software in the US electricity grid and other infrastructure that could potentially disrupt service or damage equipment, even though such concerns have been simmering for years within government security establishment. Obama reportedly has started a 60-day review of all the nation’s efforts at cyber security that was expected to be completed by April 17.<\/em> […]<\/p>\n<\/p>\n »For the idea of G-2 to work, the US has to adjust fundamentally foreign policy it has followed since the end of Word War II, away from neo-imperialism toward Wilsonian\/FDR liberalism, and give up its aim of peaceful evolution of Chinese society towards market capitalism. A G-2 would have to be a leading force in building a new world order of social justice and economic equity.<\/em>»<\/p>\n<\/p>\n • Toujours sur ce m\u00eame sujet de la politique US vis-\u00e0-vis de la Chine, Liu identifie les comportements psychologiques des USA vis-\u00e0-vis des alliances, et comment, en toute probabilit\u00e9, ces comportements conduiraient celle qui est propos\u00e9e \u00e0 la Chine si la Chine l’accepte.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n «The celebration of the 30th anniversary of US-China diplomatic relations was held only in Beijing. In the US, no one cared. Obama’s inauguration speech is indicative of deep-rooted US national psyche in which he sees the US as a holy defender of the world against fascism and communism, as if the two were one equal evil. China needs to be prepared for the penchant on the part of US Democrats for tough China-bashing policies in trade and human rights.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n »Early indications suggest that the Obama team will likely not be able to revive the US economy within the four years of its first term and China may become the convenient scapegoat for US policy failure. Chinese policymakers will be disappointed if they are not realistic about deep-rooted US hostility toward China. China must avoid open conflict with the US, but Chinese policymakers must understand that the US will never be China’s friend as long as the communist party is in control of China.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n »Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s overture of peace and cooperation to China is merely an emergency measure in response to a collapsed economy and exhaustion from undeclared foreign wars. China should welcome this pragmatic gesture of realpolitik friendship from the US but not be lured into geopolitical complacency about a fundamental change in US foreign policy.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n »Just as China had been lured into market capitalism at a time when market capitalism was rushing towards its final phase of self destruction, China now needs to carefully consider any disingenuous invitation to join and save the precarious US-constructed and dominated world system at a time when conditions around the world are making the prospect of a new, just world order on the horizon a welcome possibility.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n »It is true that the current financial\/economic crisis is a global problem and can only be solved with global cooperation. It is also true that the crisis was created by the US. It is however, far from clear that the solution can come from discredited US leadership to restore a broken world order to its pre-crisis ways.<\/em>»<\/p>\n<\/p>\n • La question essentielle («the big question<\/em>») est de savoir si la Chine est int\u00e9ress\u00e9e \u00e0 jouer le jeu que lui propose Brzezinski. Liu ne le pense pas et, plus encore, il le d\u00e9conseille tr\u00e8s fortement. L’int\u00e9r\u00eat de ses observations est d’aller, justement, au-del\u00e0 du seul raisonnement de l’int\u00e9r\u00eat (celui des deux puissances en jeu). De m\u00eame qu’il a observ\u00e9 d’un œil critique les conceptions US des relations internationales pour conclure qu’elles ne pourraient certainement pas s’accorder \u00e0 une politique de coop\u00e9ration comme celle que propose Brzezinski, de m\u00eame observe-t-il que les conceptions de la Chine ne peuvent s’arranger d’une \u00ab\u00a0coop\u00e9ration\u00a0\u00bb avec les USA. Les diff\u00e9rences \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard sont trop consid\u00e9rables.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n «The big question is whether China will play Brzezinski’s geopolitical chess game. There is a sizable pro-US faction in China’s foreign policy establishment who would welcome Brzezinski’s proposal. Formal US recognition of great power status for China would strengthen the influence of this pro-US faction in internal Chinese politics and policy deliberation. Yet, not withstanding Brzezinski’s assertion, China is not a \u00ab\u00a0revisionist\u00a0\u00bb power, but a non-expansionist revolutionary state aiming at restoring its natural historical status as it was before the arrival of Western imperialism in Asia. China is not interested in bringing back a pre-World War II world order of imperialist exploitative expansion. China is not Japan, which as a defeated nation has been willing to play the role of a submissive ally with a benevolent victor.<\/em> […]<\/p>\n<\/p>\n »The foreign policy of the People’s Republic since its founding in 1949 has a long legacy of nonalignment. Mao Zedong had made repeated overtures to Washington for peaceful and friendly relations with the new socialist China but such overtures were categorically rejected by a US caught up in anti-communist phobia during the Cold War.<\/em> […]<\/p>\n<\/p>\n »President Richard Nixon’s opening to the China in 1972 was partly driven by US perception of China’s concern at an imminent threat from Soviet imperialism. Specifically, Nixon’s opening to China was aimed more at forcing the USSR into the US strategy of detente. In fact, China would have accepted Nixon’s overture even without a Soviet threat, as evidenced by the fact the Chinese attitude towards the US remained positive even after the collapse of the Soviet Union. China was not naive enough to think the US would risk a nuclear exchange with the USSR merely to save China from a nuclear attack by the USSR. Mao’s vision of US-China relations transcends fleeting geopolitical tactics of balance of power, towards a long-range peaceful coexistence of two of the world’s largest nations.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n »China views itself is a natural member of what during the Cold War was called the Third World, now generally known as developing countries, in the struggle against Western imperialism, now known as neo-liberalism, but does not see itself as the group’s leader either by design or by default, as each country must seek its own way of struggle according to its historical conditions.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n »Nor does China maintain a foreign policy of exporting revolution to other countries that do not want a revolutionary path. China has formally declared its determination never to seek hegemony and has openly declared a policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons. Brzezinski’s G2 strategy runs counter to Deng Xiaoping’s strategy of \u00ab\u00a0hide capacity, bide time\u00a0\u00bb (tao guang yang hui), also translated as \u00ab\u00a0hide brightness, nourish obscurity\u00a0\u00bb – a strategy of keeping a low profile to avoid attracting unnecessary hostility in a period when the world’s sole remaining superpower was intoxicated with imposing its will on other countries by its overwhelming military power.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n »A G-2 regime would inflict on China the side-effects of rising anti-US sentiments from around the world at a time when US power is declining from self-inflicted wounds…<\/em>»<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Le d\u00e9bat est \u00e0 la fois conjoncturel, li\u00e9 \u00e0 une situation extr\u00eamement pr\u00e9cise et extraordinaire de crise g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, et notamment de crise fondamentale de l’h\u00e9g\u00e9monie US, et \u00e0 la fois structurel, portant in fine<\/em> sur deux conceptions des relations internationales, voire deux conceptions du monde. Le premier aspect est assez \u00e9vident et l’on comprend bien que c’est \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard que joue l’argument des int\u00e9r\u00eats des deux puissances. Le point d’une Am\u00e9rique cherchant \u00e0 amadouer la Chine pour sauver ce qui peut l’\u00eatre de sa puissance en cours de dissolution, voire pour se r\u00e9tablir, aux d\u00e9pens de la Chine dans ce cas, ce point nous semble \u00e9vident. L’exp\u00e9rience historique des Chinois aura t\u00f4t fait de l’appr\u00e9hender, si ce n’est fait.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Le second aspect est \u00e9videmment d’un plus grand int\u00e9r\u00eat, \u00e0 observer et \u00e0 commenter, et, surtout, \u00e0 \u00e9largir \u00e0 une probl\u00e9matique qui d\u00e9passe les USA et la Chine. Au travers des diverses observations de Liu, ce sont deux conceptions des relations internationales qui s’affirment, effectivement antagonistes et irr\u00e9conciliables. A partir de l\u00e0, on peut envisager une \u00e9volution th\u00e9orique des relations entre la Chine et les USA.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n La Chine apparaît comme un pays de taille et de structure imp\u00e9riale mais de conception continentale et historique, adoss\u00e9 \u00e0 une identit\u00e9 d\u00e9finie autant dans l’histoire que dans l’espace, c’est-\u00e0-dire d’une structure apparent\u00e9e \u00e0 l’id\u00e9e historique et au concept spirituel de nation. Son but est effectivement de \u00ab\u00a0restaurer\u00a0\u00bb une situation l\u00e9gitim\u00e9e par l’histoire («China is not a \u00ab\u00a0revisionist\u00a0\u00bb power, but a non-expansionist revolutionary state aiming at restoring its natural historical status<\/em>»). Sa conception des relations internationales n’est pas pour l’essentiel de type concurrentiel, puisque la Chine se d\u00e9finit par rapport \u00e0 elle-m\u00eame (par rapport \u00e0 son histoire), et elle est fondamentalement structurante puisqu’elle s’appuie sur des r\u00e9f\u00e9rences objectives constantes.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Les USA pr\u00e9sentent la vision compl\u00e8tement inverse, tr\u00e8s insulaire et tr\u00e8s anglo-saxonne, et, surtout, affect\u00e9e par une absence d’identit\u00e9 historique (l\u00e9gitim\u00e9e par l’histoire) et, par cons\u00e9quent, par un constant et tr\u00e8s grand d\u00e9s\u00e9quilibre des facteurs de la dynamique collective (faible identit\u00e9, tr\u00e8s grande puissance, impliquant effectivement cette \u00ab\u00a0fuite en avant\u00a0\u00bb, vers l’ext\u00e9rieur, pour rechercher cette identit\u00e9 inconnue). La l\u00e9gitimation des USA ne peut se faire que par rapport \u00e0 l’Autre, au-del\u00e0 de l’espace soi disant \u00ab\u00a0national\u00a0\u00bb, selon une dynamique de concurrence et d’expansionnisme profond\u00e9ment d\u00e9structurante des relations internationales. La dynamique contraire pour cette entit\u00e9, comme on la per\u00e7oit traditionnellement, serait un retour \u00e0 l’isolationnisme; c’est une option qui a assur\u00e9 et pourrait assurer en principe une protection g\u00e9opolitique artificielle contre la faiblesse de l’absence d’identit\u00e9; mais c’est une option qui tend aujourd’hui vers l’impossibilit\u00e9 \u00e0 cause de la situation g\u00e9n\u00e9rale d’interd\u00e9pendance cr\u00e9\u00e9e par les USA eux-m\u00eames. (L’interd\u00e9pendance n’est pas un probl\u00e8me insurmontable pour les nations \u00e0 forte identit\u00e9, qui peuvent maintenir leurs structures malgr\u00e9 la pression des liens ext\u00e9rieurs; elle repr\u00e9sente par contre un d\u00e9fi permanent pour les entit\u00e9s \u00e0 identit\u00e9 faible, qui cherchent \u00e0 affirmer leur h\u00e9g\u00e9monie plut\u00f4t qu’accepter l’interd\u00e9pendance, de crainte d’\u00eatre phagocyt\u00e9es par un partenaire \u00e0 l’identit\u00e9 plus marqu\u00e9e.) Les USA peuvent entamer un mouvement de repli, – d’ailleurs ils y sont en plein aujourd’hui, – mais l’effet sera d\u00e9sormais l’\u00e9clatement de l’Union plut\u00f4t que l’isolationnisme d’une Union maintenue.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Les relations entre la Chine et les USA ne peuvent \u00e9videmment \u00eatre \u00e9tablies comme Brzezinski les envisage. L’id\u00e9e de Brzezinski est compl\u00e8tement celle d’un strat\u00e8ge, c’est-\u00e0-dire d’un guerrier qui ne se r\u00e9f\u00e8re qu’\u00e0 la puissance et \u00e0 la mystique de la force baptis\u00e9e du faux masque de \u00ab\u00a0r\u00e9alisme\u00a0\u00bb, fabriqu\u00e9e \u00e0 partir de la g\u00e9opolitique, et non d’un historien ou d’un philosophe de l’histoire pr\u00e9occup\u00e9 des r\u00e9f\u00e9rences fondatrices et structurantes (identit\u00e9, l\u00e9gitimit\u00e9, etc.). Son G2 est \u00e9videmment un march\u00e9 d’\u00e9picier (et de dupes pour les Chinois), con\u00e7u pour s’accrocher \u00e0 la bou\u00e9e chinoise pour ne pas couler, pour ensuite se d\u00e9barrasser de la bou\u00e9e lorsque le nageur aurait repris des forces. Cette conception uniquement quantitative et fond\u00e9e sur la seule force n’a aucune chance d’aboutir, m\u00eame en ne s’en tenant qu’aux USA eux-m\u00eames; aucune chance d’aboutir lorsqu’on consid\u00e8re l’\u00e9tat d\u00e9sesp\u00e9r\u00e9e de la coh\u00e9sion US, l’\u00e9tat justement nomm\u00e9 de \u00ab\u00a0s\u00e9cession spirituelle\u00a0\u00bb<\/a> du pays, qui est en \u00e9tat d’\u00e9clatement psychologique et, par cons\u00e9quent, effectivement d’\u00e9clatement \u00ab\u00a0spirituel\u00a0\u00bb.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Il n’y a aucune chance que les Chinois puissent entamer une coop\u00e9ration exclusive, type-\u00ab\u00a0partage du monde\u00a0\u00bb (G2) avec les USA, non seulement par refus, mais \u00e9videmment par pure incapacit\u00e9 de coop\u00e9rer. Les conceptions du monde sont non seulement diff\u00e9rentes et divergentes, elles sont de substances diff\u00e9rentes parce qu’elles portent sur des univers, des milieux diff\u00e9rents; ainsi ne peut-on faire \u00ab\u00a0coop\u00e9rer\u00a0\u00bb l’eau et le feu. Mais les Chinois ne peuvent \u00e9chapper \u00e0 un r\u00f4le majeur dans les relations internationales, dans les ann\u00e9es \u00e0 venir. Ce r\u00f4le ne sera ni de coop\u00e9ration, qu’ils ne peuvent faire, ni de confrontation, qu’ils ne veulent pas, avec les USA; le seul r\u00f4le qu’ils peuvent tenir est celui, naturel, de la pression de leur puissance pour concourir \u00e0 la d\u00e9structuration des USA. De ce point de vue, la Chine agirait dans un \u00ab\u00a0concert de nations\u00a0\u00bb, m\u00eame si la musique ex\u00e9cut\u00e9e est souvent cacophonique, dont l’effet fondamental tendrait \u00e0 la d\u00e9structuration \u00ab\u00a0d\u00e9fensive\u00a0\u00bb du principal agent jusqu’ici de d\u00e9structuration des relations internationales que sont les USA.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Ces observations ne prennent \u00e9videmment pas en compte des accidents majeurs, comme une aggravation, par ailleurs tr\u00e8s probable, des diverses crises. Mais m\u00eame dans ce cas, et malgr\u00e9 l’apparence de gravit\u00e9 des \u00e9v\u00e9nements qui pourrait \u00eatre bien plus grande en Chine (troubles civils, notamment) qu’aux USA, la fragilit\u00e9 reste tr\u00e8s largement et de fa\u00e7on d\u00e9cisive du c\u00f4t\u00e9 des USA parce qu’elle affecte la structure m\u00eame. Les nations, qu’elles se nomment \u00ab\u00a0empires\u00a0\u00bb ou de quelque autre nom que ce soit, qui connaissent de nombreux troubles et revers dans l’histoire (la Chine, la France, la Russie) sont aussi celles qui durent; celles qui n’ont pas de troubles ni de revers, effectivement, ont disparu de l’histoire ou ont disparu tout court, ce qui est le meilleur moyen d’\u00e9viter les troubles et les revers apr\u00e8s en avoir p\u00e9ri.<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Sauver le monde ou sauver les meubles? 25 avril 2009 — Depuis le d\u00e9but de l’ann\u00e9e a \u00e9t\u00e9 lanc\u00e9e, sans v\u00e9ritable fracas au milieu d’une \u00e9poque qui en est pleine mais avec ent\u00eatement comme il sied \u00e0 un Polonais de cette envergure, l’id\u00e9e du \u00ab\u00a0G2\u00a0\u00bb de Zbigniew Brzezinski. (Am\u00e9ricain d’origine polonaise et am\u00e9ricaniste, pour dire… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[1006,3977,8279,4169,8280,4194,2804],"class_list":["post-70712","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-brzezinski","tag-chine","tag-g2","tag-identite","tag-liu","tag-nation","tag-usa"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70712","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70712"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70712\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70712"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70712"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70712"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}Deux conceptions du monde<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n