{"id":70753,"date":"2009-05-12T14:53:38","date_gmt":"2009-05-12T14:53:38","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2009\/05\/12\/de-ladmirable-et-sophistiquee-reinvention-du-fil-a-couper-le-beurre\/"},"modified":"2009-05-12T14:53:38","modified_gmt":"2009-05-12T14:53:38","slug":"de-ladmirable-et-sophistiquee-reinvention-du-fil-a-couper-le-beurre","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2009\/05\/12\/de-ladmirable-et-sophistiquee-reinvention-du-fil-a-couper-le-beurre\/","title":{"rendered":"De l’admirable et sophistiqu\u00e9e r\u00e9invention du fil \u00e0 couper le beurre"},"content":{"rendered":"

Nous, nous avons notre interpr\u00e9tation Le d\u00e9part abrupt du g\u00e9n\u00e9ral David McKiernan, qui commande les forces US et de l’OTAN en Afghanistan, ressemble fort, en plus de la version officielle qui a aussi sa valeur, \u00e0 un limogeage suite \u00e0 l’attaque<\/a> de l’USAF qui a massacr\u00e9 un nombre assez \u00e9lev\u00e9 de civils afghans. La version officielle est que David McKiernan s’en va, apr\u00e8s seulement onze mois de commandement (au lieu de 24 ou 36 mois), parce qu’on a besoin, selon Gates, d’une fresch thinking<\/em>, pour appliquer la nouvelle strat\u00e9gie (ce qui semble signifier qu’il y en avait une, d\u00e9sormais ancienne, ce qui est une agr\u00e9able surprise et une nouvelle int\u00e9ressante). En fait, les deux explications se compl\u00e8tent, le dernier massacre en date ayant montr\u00e9 qu’on a vraiment besoin d’une fresch thinking<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tVoici comment le Times<\/em> de Londres, de ce 12 mai 2009<\/a>, annonce la nouvelle:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abThe top US military commander in Afghanistan was sacked yesterday after both the Pentagon and the White House decided that fresh thinking was needed to win the war.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbGeneral David McKiernan, who has spent just 11 months in charge of Nato forces in Afghanistan, will be replaced by Lieutenant-General Stanley McChrystal who previously led the special operations command and is credited with killing the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Lieutenant-General David Rodriguez will be handed a new position of deputy commander of US forces in Afghanistan.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbRobert Gates, Defence Secretary, told a Pentagon press conference that, after consultation with military chiefs and with the approval of the President, I have asked for the resignation of General David McKiernan. He added: This is the right time to make the change, at a time when we are at the beginning of the implementation of a new strategy. The focus here is simply on getting fresh thinking, fresh eyes on the problem, and in how we implement the strategy and the mission going forward.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tL\u00e0-dessus, le m\u00eame journal, ce m\u00eame 12 mai 2009<\/a>, nous annonce que des troupes US suppl\u00e9mentaires arrivent en Afghanistan, avec leur formidable puissance de feu. Autre agr\u00e9able surprise, ce n’est pas pour d\u00e9truire les talibans, c’est pour assurer la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 des zones ainsi investies et se transformer en soldat-laboureur pour reconstruire le pays.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abThe sheer scale of the American firepower now being drafted into southern Afghanistan to take on the Taleban who generally fight in flip-flops with a Kalashnikov in their hand might convince some people that this enemy is going to be defeated by superior weaponry and ground manoeuvre warfare.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbBut it has not worked yet, not in the eight years the US-dominated forces have had to try to rid Afghanistan of the Taleban threat. Now, however, under a troop-reinforcement programme started by George Bush and expanded significantly by Barack Obama, the plan is to flood key parts of the south, where the Taleban have greatest influence and control, with thousands of US Marines and other American combat units. After seizing the territory they would hold it with the help of the burgeoning Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and coalition troops, such as the British, who have already been in the south for three years.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe difference between the Americans and the Russians who deployed more than 100,000 troops to Afghanistan and killed thousands of civilians with bombs and helicopter gunships fighting the Mujahidin in the 1980s – is that the US and the rest of the coalition are determined to use their superior firepower and ground manoeuvre tactics to create safe, Taleban-free zones of population. In those areas rapid construction projects – roads, government buildings, improved electricity – and agricultural programmes can be introduced to change the lives of the Afghan people for ever. Such zones already exist but they are now to be expanded into new areas.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tTout cela se pr\u00e9sente sous des auspices idylliques. On liquide le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral qui n’est capable de penser qu’en tonnes d’explosifs balanc\u00e9s sur les civils afghans, on le remplace par un qui est suppos\u00e9 \u00eatre plus nuanc\u00e9, et l’on envoie des forces bourr\u00e9es de puissance de feu en annon\u00e7ant que c’est pour s’en servir le moins possible.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLa chose r\u00e9ussira-t-elle? Faisons quelques remarques.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t La premi\u00e8re est que la guerre en Afghanistan a commenc\u00e9 en octobre 2001 et qu’il faudrait attendre mai 2009 pour d\u00e9couvrir qu’il vaudrait mieux aider les paysans \u00e0 construire leurs maisons que les d\u00e9molir \u00e0 coup de missiles tir\u00e9s par l’USAF.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t La seconde est que, au fait, cette disposition d’esprit de faire la guerre en s’adaptant aux conditions, aux habitants, etc., existait d\u00e8s l’origine. Rumsfeld avait proclam\u00e9 la chose en novembre 2001 en montrant cette photo d’un soldat des forces sp\u00e9ciales US sur un cheval afghan, avec d’autres cavaliers afghans. Force est d’observer que, chaque fois, la chose a bascul\u00e9 dans les vieilles habitudes am\u00e9ricanistes de toujours pr\u00e9f\u00e9rer \u00e9craser un probl\u00e8me plut\u00f4t que le r\u00e9soudre.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t La troisi\u00e8me est qu’il est toujours stup\u00e9fiant de constater que la strat\u00e9gie d’une guerre comme celle de l’Afghanistan puisse encore donner lieu \u00e0 un d\u00e9bat, comme s’il y avait \u00e0 d\u00e9battre \u00e0 ce propos, comme s’il n’\u00e9tait pas \u00e9vident que cette guerre est, bien s\u00fbr, ce qu’on d\u00e9couvre aujourd’hui pour la ni\u00e8me fois qu’elle est, une guerre de gu\u00e9rilla o\u00f9 les grosses pointures de l’USAF ne font qu’aggraver les choses. Et pourtant, oui, l’on d\u00e9bat, et l’on arrive \u00e0 la conclusion qui est la r\u00e9invention tonitruante du fil \u00e0 couper le beurre.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 12 mai 2009 \u00e0 14H58<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Nous, nous avons notre interpr\u00e9tation Le d\u00e9part abrupt du g\u00e9n\u00e9ral David McKiernan, qui commande les forces US et de l’OTAN en Afghanistan, ressemble fort, en plus de la version officielle qui a aussi sa valeur, \u00e0 un limogeage suite \u00e0 l’attaque de l’USAF qui a massacr\u00e9 un nombre assez \u00e9lev\u00e9 de civils afghans. La version… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3236,2631,5786,8317,3984,4218,2645,8318,2779,3440,4143],"class_list":["post-70753","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-afghanistan","tag-de","tag-feu","tag-fresh","tag-gates","tag-guerilla","tag-guerre","tag-mckiernan","tag-puissance","tag-strategie","tag-thinking"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70753","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70753"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70753\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70753"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70753"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70753"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}