Il est maintenant couramment admis que l’administration Obama, BHO en t\u00eate, a adopt\u00e9 une strat\u00e9gie compl\u00e8tement acquise \u00e0 Wall Street et aux grands \u00e9tablissements financiers. Tout est fait pour dissimuler leur v\u00e9ritable situation, y compris bien entendu les consid\u00e9rables stess tests<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tSans d\u00e9battre de grande th\u00e9orie \u00e9conomique ou financi\u00e8re \u00e0 ce propos, Robert Kuttner, qui est un des r\u00e9dacteurs en chef de The American Prospect<\/em> fait cette observation de bon sens dans un texte que publie Alternet.org<\/em> (et Huffington.post<\/em>) le 11 mai 2009<\/a>, \u00e0 propos d’une conf\u00e9rence o\u00f9 il intervenait et o\u00f9 le principal intervenant \u00e9tait le pr\u00e9sident de la Federal Reserve Ben Bernanke, tout cela, le jour o\u00f9 furent connus les r\u00e9sultats extr\u00eamement rassurants des stess tests<\/em>:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abAt one point in his remarks, Bernanke, recounting just how rigorous the stress tests were, explained that More than 150 examiners, supervisors, and economists had conducted several weeks of examinations of the banks. That kind of let the cat out of the bag. If you do the arithmetic, that is about seven supervisors per bank, and all of the stress-tested 19 banks were hundred-billion and up outfits. When an ordinary commercial bank, say a $10 billion outfit, undergoes a far less complex routine examination of its commercial loan portfolio, it involves dozens of examiners.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbSo the stress test was not a set of rigorous examinations at all, but a modeling exercise using the banks’ own valuations of their assets. The most serious outside observers think the hole in the banks’ balance sheets is much larger than $75 billion or even the Fed’s worst-case estimate of $599 billion in losses. The International Monetary Fund estimates the hole as more like 2.7 trillion dollars, and informed economists like Nouriel Roubini put the number at as much as 3.6 trillion.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tLa strat\u00e9gie du trio Summers-Geithner-Bernanke, selon Kuttner, est qu’il faut \u00e0 tout prix maintenir les grands \u00e9tablissement financiers \u00e0 flots, au moins pendant les quelques mois qui viennent, pour susciter un red\u00e9marrage de l’\u00e9conomie, lequel, \u00e0 son tour, devrait r\u00e9alimenter les dits-\u00e9tablissements. Cette appr\u00e9ciation explique notamment, dans tous les cas en bonne partie, la colossale op\u00e9ration de relations publiques pour annoncer que la crise a cess\u00e9 de s’aggraver et qu’on se dirige vers la reprise, pour effectivement susciter cette reprise. Kuttner, lui, croit au processus inverse, \u00e0 savoir que les grands \u00e9tablissements bancaires ne se redresseront pas et continueront \u00e0 entra\u00eener l’\u00e9conomie vers le bas: \u00abWhy is the Fed low-balling the problem? The hope is that by keeping the banks afloat for a few more months, and trying to entice private capital back to the table, the recovery in other parts of the economy will spill over onto the banks. But the greater likelihood is that weakened banks will continue dragging down the rest of the economy.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tEn attendant, Kuttner d\u00e9compte les d\u00e9g\u00e2ts caus\u00e9s par cette strat\u00e9gie, notamment dans les banques et \u00e9tablissements bancaires \u00e0 travers le pays (hors-Wall Street), furieux de voir la faveur du gouvernement f\u00e9d\u00e9ral pour les grands de Wall Street alors qu’ils subissent eux-m\u00eames des d\u00e9g\u00e2ts consid\u00e9rables. Quant \u00e0 l’\u00e9conomie elle-m\u00eame, Kuttner ne partage certainement pas l’optimisme officiel et se range dans les cohortes des commentateurs ind\u00e9pendants qui continuent \u00e0 observer les choses avec pessimisme, ou, disons plus simplement, avec r\u00e9alisme. Mais comme il reste plut\u00f4t partisan d’Obama, comme il reste un de ceux qui s’interroge pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment sur le compte du nouveau pr\u00e9sident US, il en vient finalement \u00e0 cette question centrale: que fait BHO dans cette gal\u00e8re? Aussi nous rapporte-t-il la derni\u00e8re th\u00e9orie, ou, plut\u00f4t, la plus \u00e9l\u00e9gante \u00e0 ce propos Il s’agit d’Obama acceptant pour l’instant de jouer le jeu de Wall Street (le jeu d’Obama prisonnier<\/a> de Wall Street), avant d’affronter le syst\u00e8me \u00e0 ce niveau. El\u00e9gante th\u00e9orie, certes, mais pourquoi attendre? Kuttner explique qu’il s’agit de laisser un peu de temps pour que le parti r\u00e9publicain se d\u00e9sint\u00e8gre, et l\u00e0, effectivement, il faut admettre qu’il est en bonne voie. D’autre part, peut-\u00eatre aurons-nous la preuve par l’absurde du caract\u00e8re irr\u00e9cup\u00e9rable du syst\u00e8me avec, finalement, les grands too big to fail<\/em> (to fall<\/em>) de Wall Street s’effondrant effectivement<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tBref, voyons comment l’histoire peut \u00eatre encore \u00e9l\u00e9gante<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abMy guess is that the Obama administration will be back next fall, asking Congress for the money and authority to do the bank rescue right, after the current policy proves inadequate to restore the banking system and the economy to health. That would mean taking the insolvent banks into receivership, deciding how much public capital was required and where to get it, and then returning the banks to private ownership. Better late than never, but it’s a pity to waste six months.<\/em> []<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbWhy had the administration made this perverse alliance with Wall Street, and decided to prop up large zombie banks rather than taking them into receivership and getting on with it? You could blame it on campaign finance, or you could blame it on the quirk of history that Obama, once he became the nominee, decided to hire the Wall Street-oriented Clinton economic team.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe most hopeful and elegant theory I’ve heard is that for now, Obama’s main political project is to let the Republicans self-destruct; co-opting Wall Street (for now) is part of that game plan. He’ll get around to reforming Wall Street next year. Even Roosevelt had to take things one step at a time, as public opinion moved. The Second New Deal was more radical than the first. I’ve often said that Obama is smarter than I am, and if he is politically shrewd enough to have come up with that strategy, hats off to him. I’m also a Red Sox fan, and anything is possible. But for the moment, it looks more like a case of political expediency and even political capture.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 13 mai 2009 \u00e0 13H49<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Il est maintenant couramment admis que l’administration Obama, BHO en t\u00eate, a adopt\u00e9 une strat\u00e9gie compl\u00e8tement acquise \u00e0 Wall Street et aux grands \u00e9tablissements financiers. Tout est fait pour dissimuler leur v\u00e9ritable situation, y compris bien entendu les consid\u00e9rables stess tests. Sans d\u00e9battre de grande th\u00e9orie \u00e9conomique ou financi\u00e8re \u00e0 ce propos, Robert Kuttner, qui… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[8002,3482,3526,6208,3372,8320,3132],"class_list":["post-70755","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-bho","tag-chute","tag-kuttner","tag-obama","tag-street","tag-theorie","tag-wall"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70755","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70755"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70755\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70755"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70755"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70755"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}