19 mai 2009<\/a>) des informations compl\u00e8tes sur ce rapport et les diverses conclusions qu’il pr\u00e9sente.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00abThe report acknowledges dramatic technological gains by Iran, and it predicts that the country could probably build a simple nuclear device in one to three years, if it kicked out U.N. inspectors and retooled its uranium-processing plants to make weapons-grade enriched uranium. Another five years would be needed to build a warhead that would fit on one of Iran’s missiles, the panel says. U.S. intelligence agencies have made similar predictions; Israel maintains that Iran could build a bomb in as little as eight months.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThe U.S.-Russian experts say Iran faces limits in developing ballistic missiles that could someday carry nuclear warheads. Its current arsenal is derived from relatively unsophisticated North Korean missiles, which in turn are modified versions of a Russian submarine-launched missile that dates from the 1950s. We believe that these components were likely transferred to North Korea illegally in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when Russia was experiencing major political and economic chaos, one of the U.S. team members said in a separate commentary. As a result, the missiles have inherent weaknesses stemming from such aged technology, despite some improvements in their range, the report states. Moreover, the country lacks the infrastructure of research institutions, industrial plants, or the scientists and engineers that are needed to make substantial improvements.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThey conclude that it would take Iran at least another six to eight years to produce a missile with enough range to reach Southern Europe and that only illicit foreign assistance or a concerted and highly visible, decade-long effort might produce the breakthroughs needed for a nuclear-tipped missile to threaten the United States.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbMoreover, if Iran were to build a nuclear-capable missile that could strike Europe, the defense shield proposed by the United States could not engage that missile, the report says. The missile interceptors could also be easily fooled by decoys and other simple countermeasures, the report concludes.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tCe rapport peut s’av\u00e9rer d’une importance d\u00e9cisive parce que, \u00e9videmment, il supprime d’une fa\u00e7on exp\u00e9ditive et qui en dit long sur l’alarmisme des rapports qui ont pr\u00e9c\u00e9d\u00e9, l’argument-bidon avanc\u00e9 pour le BMDE (la menace des missiles iraniens). Dans ce cas, un argument-bidon doit n’avoir de bidon que le sujet qu’il aborde mais il doit tenir la route pour ses fondements. Ici, les fondements sont pulv\u00e9ris\u00e9s. Pire encore et supr\u00eame affront fait au Pentagone, au complexe militaro-industriel et aux combattants de la libert\u00e9 d’Europe de l’Est, l’efficacit\u00e9 du syst\u00e8me BMDE est gravement mise en cause.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tLe cr\u00e9dit du rapport semble affirm\u00e9, et l’accueil officiel qui en est fait semble le montrer, notamment sa remise simultan\u00e9e aux gouvernements russe et US au moment o\u00f9 s’ouvrent les n\u00e9gociations START \u00e0 Moscou entre les deux pays. Perry a une r\u00e9putation d’enfer, tant pour sa probit\u00e9 intellectuelle et son absence de d\u00e9formation id\u00e9ologique, choses rares \u00e0 Washington, que pour son expertise dans ces questions de missiles strat\u00e9giques et anti-missiles. La coordination de toute cette affaire nourrit l’hypoth\u00e8se que ce rapport pourrait bien \u00eatre le r\u00e9sultat d’une manuvre politique commune russo-am\u00e9ricaine pour obtenir un blanc-seing dans l’exploration de solutions nouvelles, dont l’une pourrait \u00eatre l’enterrement \u00e0 terme du BMDE.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tA noter que le rapport peut \u00e9galement \u00eatre tenu comme une sorte de feuille de route pour la philosophie de la conduite \u00e0 tenir vis-\u00e0-vis de T\u00e9h\u00e9ran. L’important, dit-il, n’est pas de d\u00e9ployer des anti-missiles \u00abThe much more urgent problem is to seek a resolution of the Iranian nuclear crisis. That is a project on which the United States and Russia need to cooperate more closely.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 20 mai 2009 \u00e0 11H52<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Les rapports techniques et strat\u00e9giques produits par la communaut\u00e9 strat\u00e9gique abondent et, en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, r\u00e9pondent au conformisme r\u00e9gnant; leur effet est \u00e0 mesure, un peu d’excitation m\u00e9diatique puis l’oubli. Celui que doit publier aujourd’hui l’Institut Est-Ouest, think tank ind\u00e9pendant autant pr\u00e9sent \u00e0 New York, Bruxelles et Moscou, pourrait \u00eatre diff\u00e9rent. Il analyse la question du… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3453,4314,8338,583,2830,4087,5295],"class_list":["post-70771","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-anti-missiles","tag-bmde","tag-est-ouest","tag-jones","tag-lavrov","tag-perry","tag-rapport"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70771","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70771"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70771\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70771"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70771"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70771"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}