{"id":70777,"date":"2009-05-23T15:17:39","date_gmt":"2009-05-23T15:17:39","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2009\/05\/23\/le-gao-devient-il-le-chien-de-garde-du-programme-jsf\/"},"modified":"2009-05-23T15:17:39","modified_gmt":"2009-05-23T15:17:39","slug":"le-gao-devient-il-le-chien-de-garde-du-programme-jsf","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2009\/05\/23\/le-gao-devient-il-le-chien-de-garde-du-programme-jsf\/","title":{"rendered":"Le GAO devient-il le \u201cchien de garde\u201d du programme JSF?"},"content":{"rendered":"

Le Government Accounting Office (Cour des Comptes US) a publi\u00e9 un nouveau rapport sur le JSF, le 21 mai 2009<\/a>, deux mois seulement apr\u00e8s ce qu’on pensait \u00eatre son rapport annuel sur le JSF. Il ne s’agissait donc pas du rapport annuel stricto sensu<\/em> puisqu’il s’av\u00e8re que les rapports sur le JSF se suivent d\u00e9sormais \u00e0 une cadence beaucoup acc\u00e9l\u00e9r\u00e9e qu’annuelle. Le titre est particuli\u00e8rement r\u00e9v\u00e9lateur des pr\u00e9occupations du GAO: \u00abStrong Risk Management Essential as Program Enters Most Challenging Phase.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tNous citons deux textes qui pr\u00e9sentent deux aspects du rapport du GAO.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Un texte de Defense & Aerospace.com<\/em> du 21 mai 2009<\/a> pr\u00e9sente divers passages du rapport. Il publie notamment des extraites s\u00e9lectionn\u00e9s qui mentionnent divers aspects o\u00f9 le programme enregistre des \u00e9volutions pr\u00e9occupantes.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab Total development costs are projected to increase between $2.4 billion and $7.4 billion and the schedule for completing system development to be extended from 1 to 3 years, according to estimates made in late 2008one by the JSF Program Office and one by a joint team of Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Air Force, and Navy officials.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The new defense budget just submitted requests for $3.6 billion for fiscal year 2010 JSF development costs. This is about $200 million more than the program office estimated for 2010 and about $700 million less than the joint team’s estimate.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The new fiscal year 2010 procurement budget requests funding of $6.8 billion for 30 JSF aircraft, a unit cost of $227 million. This budget is substantially lower than both the program office’s and the joint team’s estimates for 2010, in terms of unit costs and overall procurement funding.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The total projected labor hours to manufacture test aircraft increased by 40 percent just in the past year.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Performance data for two major cost areaswing assembly and mate and deliveryindicate even more substantial growth<\/em> [] As of June 2008, the planned hours for these two major stations increased by about 90 percent over the June 2007 schedule, which itself had shown an increase from the 2006 schedule.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb In 2009 and early fiscal year 2010, the program plans to begin flight testing 6 development test aircraft, including the first 2 aircraft dedicated to mission system testing. A fully integrated, mission-capable aircraft is not expected to enter flight testing until 2012.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Un autre texte, de Eric Palmer, le 23 mai 2009<\/a>, confronte les r\u00e9sultats du rapport du GAO avec les auditions r\u00e9centes, au Congr\u00e8s, de la direction de l’USAF (ministre et chef d’\u00e9tat-major). Le GAO recommande implicitement plus de prudence, plus de minutie, plus de lenteur dans le d\u00e9veloppement et les tests de l’avion, \u00e0 cause des risques \u00e9normes qui sont li\u00e9s \u00e0 ce programme. Le GAO met en \u00e9vidence l’immaturit\u00e9 du programme \u00e0 tous les niveaux et dans tous les domaines, et, par cons\u00e9quent, les risques pris par son d\u00e9veloppement au stade actuel. La direction de l’USAF annonce au contraire l’acc\u00e9l\u00e9ration du programme, dans son d\u00e9veloppement vers le stade op\u00e9rationnel, par cons\u00e9quent encore des risques suppl\u00e9mentaires.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abThe U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO) has just released another report on the F-35 program. What is interesting is that it pulls the rug out from top leaders of the U.S. military including the heads of the USAF General Schartz and Secretary of the Air Force Michael Donely who state that the U.S. must commit to increasing production of the aircraft, even using the words accelerate which given the available evidence is unrealistic. This from the report.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe contractor has not yet demonstrated mature manufacturing processes, or an ability to produce at currently planned rates. It has taken steps to improve manufacturing; however, given the manufacturing challenges, DOD’s plan to increase procurement in the near term adds considerable risk and will be difficult to achieve.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbGeneral Schwartz and Mr. Donely don’t have a shred of proof that the program can increase let alone maintain to the current production plan. If anything, the future holds cost rise and delay.<\/em> []<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb How many more years and how much more money will this program take? We, as the people that are paying for all this, are told that the program is making excellent progress, that the costs are being contained, that the schedule is doing well. We are not being told the truth. Not only by industry, but by the uniformed leaders and service secretaries of the U.S. Military. It is time for the U.S. Congress to get a handle on this problem before we waste any more billions on this sham, this boondoggle, this lie, this F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tPas vraiment de surprises dans ce rapport, dirions-nous avec une ironie fatigu\u00e9e. La d\u00e9gradation du programme JSF se produit \u00e0 un rythme qu’on pourrait presque qualifier de pr\u00e9vu, tant les avatars semblent \u00eatre devenus le lot quotidien de la chose. Plus surprenant est ce rapport, en lui-m\u00eame, si rapproch\u00e9 du pr\u00e9c\u00e9dent. La seule justification qui en est donn\u00e9e dans la pr\u00e9sentation est d’ordre pratique, simplement un rapport qui r\u00e9pond \u00e0 de nouvelles donn\u00e9es et \u00e0 de nouvelles conditions: \u00abThis statement draws from GAO’s March 2009 report, updated to the extent possible with new budget data and a recently revised procurement profile directed by the Secretary of Defense.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLa question et celle qui encha\u00eene sont int\u00e9ressantes, pourquoi un rapport si rapproch\u00e9, et peut-on estimer que les rapports du GAO sur le JSF vont s’encha\u00eener \u00e0 ce rythme, ou, dans tous les cas, au rythme de plusieurs par an? Selon nous, ce serait sans aucun doute une hypoth\u00e8se \u00e0 consid\u00e9rer, d’autant que la p\u00e9riode est cruciale (\u00abEnters Most Challenging Phase<\/em>\u00bb, dit le titre). Il est possible que le Congr\u00e8s, qui se montre en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral assez inquiet de l’enthousiasme mis par l’USAF pour acc\u00e9l\u00e9rer le programme, ait demand\u00e9 une surveillance constante au GAO, avec publication de rapports plusieurs fois l’an, selon les nouvelles appr\u00e9ciations dont cet organisme dispose. Le GAO pourrait devenir le chien de garde du JSF, pr\u00eat \u00e0 sonner l’alarme si le programme approchait d’un point de rupture d’une fa\u00e7on ou l’autre. Il ne serait pas \u00e9tonnant que Gates ne voit pas cette initiative d’un mauvais il. Il s’agirait en fait de tenter de forcer la muraille jusqu’ici infranchissable que le JSF Program Office (JPO) et Lockheed Martin (LM) ont \u00e9rig\u00e9e autour du programme, particuli\u00e8rement au niveau de l’information.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 23 mai 2009 \u00e0 15H20<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Le Government Accounting Office (Cour des Comptes US) a publi\u00e9 un nouveau rapport sur le JSF, le 21 mai 2009, deux mois seulement apr\u00e8s ce qu’on pensait \u00eatre son rapport annuel sur le JSF. Il ne s’agissait donc pas du rapport annuel stricto sensu puisqu’il s’av\u00e8re que les rapports sur le JSF se suivent d\u00e9sormais… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[5596,8344,3285,2631,4248,2936,250,8336,5295],"class_list":["post-70777","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-brigandi","tag-chien","tag-congres","tag-de","tag-gao","tag-garde","tag-jsf","tag-palmer","tag-rapport"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70777","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70777"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70777\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70777"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70777"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70777"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}