{"id":70857,"date":"2009-06-24T17:27:56","date_gmt":"2009-06-24T17:27:56","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2009\/06\/24\/mousavi-le-candidat-de-loccident-liberal-alias-le-boucher-de-beyrouth\/"},"modified":"2009-06-24T17:27:56","modified_gmt":"2009-06-24T17:27:56","slug":"mousavi-le-candidat-de-loccident-liberal-alias-le-boucher-de-beyrouth","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2009\/06\/24\/mousavi-le-candidat-de-loccident-liberal-alias-le-boucher-de-beyrouth\/","title":{"rendered":"Mousavi le candidat de l’Occident lib\u00e9ral, alias<\/em> \u201cle boucher de Beyrouth\u201d"},"content":{"rendered":"

Nul ne doute que Mousavi, le candidat \u00e0 l’\u00e9lection pr\u00e9sidentielle iranienne, a un pass\u00e9 charg\u00e9 comme dignitaire du r\u00e9gime iranien. La chose est document\u00e9e. Plus int\u00e9ressante est la pr\u00e9cision, donn\u00e9e par un ancien amiral de l’U.S. Navy et un ancien officier de la CIA qui fut en charge des affaires de terrorisme au Moyen-Orient, sur le r\u00f4le pr\u00e9cis de Mousavi dans l’attentat de Beyrouth de 1983, contre un camp de Marines US, qui fit 352 morts et conduisit au retrait imm\u00e9diat des forces US du Liban. L’amiral Lyons donne des pr\u00e9cisions sur le r\u00f4le de supervision de Mousavi, comme Premier ministre iranien de l’\u00e9poque, dans l’attentat de Beyrouth. L’ancien officier de la CIA Robert Baer, lui, apporte des pr\u00e9cisions qui donnent \u00e0 Mousavi un r\u00f4le encore plus pr\u00e9cis dans cette affaire.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tC’est notamment le site de CQ Politics<\/em>, le 22 juin 2009<\/a>, qui donne ces pr\u00e9cisions, sous le titre quelque peu embarrassant de \u00abMousavi, Celebrated in Iranian Protests, Was the Butcher of Beirut.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t L’amiral James Ace<\/em> Lyons, alors adjoint au chef des op\u00e9rations navales de l’U.S. Navy, qui fut impliqu\u00e9 dans ces op\u00e9rations, donnent diverses pr\u00e9cisions.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abMousavi, prime minister for most of the 1980s, personally selected his point man for the Beirut terror campaign, Ali Akbar Mohtashemi-pur, and dispatched him to Damascus as Iran’s ambassador<\/em> [] The ambassador in turn hosted several meetings of the cell that would carry out the Beirut attacks, which were overheard by the National Security Agency. We had a tap on the Iranian ambassador to Lebanon, retired Navy Admiral James Ace’ Lyons related by telephone Monday. In 1983 Lyons was deputy chief of Naval Operations, and deeply involved in the events in Lebanon.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe Iranian ambassador received instructions from the foreign minister to have various groups target U.S. personnel in Lebanon, but in particular to carry out a spectacular action’ against the Marines, said Lyons. He was prime minister, Lyons said of Mousavi, so he didn’t get down to the details at the lowest levels. But he was in a principal position and had to be aware of what was going on.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Robert Baer qui, \u00e0 cause de sa position dans la CIA, supervisa directement ces \u00e9v\u00e9nements, fait de Mousavi un acteur beaucoup plus impliqu\u00e9 dans cette affaire que n’en fait Lyons.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab[Baer] places Mousavi even closer to the Beirut bombings. He dealt directly with Imad Mughniyah, who ran the Beirut terrorist campaign and was the man largely held responsible for both attacks,\u00a0\u00bb Baer wrote in TIME over the weekend. When Mousavi was Prime Minister, he oversaw an office that ran operatives abroad, from Lebanon to Kuwait to Iraq, Baer continued.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThis was the heyday of<\/em> [Ayatollah] Khomeini’s theocratic vision, when Iran thought it really could export its revolution across the Middle East, providing money and arms to anyone who claimed he could upend the old order. Baer added: Mousavi was not only swept up into this delusion but also actively pursued it.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAssez curieusement, Lyons ajoute qu’il aurait pu ordonner une attaque qui aurait permis, selon lui, d’annihiler les terroristes (avant ou apr\u00e8s l’attaque? Pas de pr\u00e9cision). C’est l’intervention du secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense Caspar Weinberger qui emp\u00eacha cette action, l\u00e0 aussi sans que Lyons \u00e9labore sur cette attitude (\u00abI was going to take them apart but the secretary of defense, Caspar Weinberger, sabotaged it<\/em>\u00bb) Weinberger avait-il devin\u00e9 que Mousavi serait finalement le porteur des valeurs lib\u00e9rales occidentales dans l’Iran soulev\u00e9 contre le pouvoir iranien? Qui sait? (On sait par ailleurs que c’\u00e9tait le temps b\u00e9ni o\u00f9 le Pentagone freinait des quatre fers pour tout engagement op\u00e9rationnel risqu\u00e9, hors des zones classiques de confrontation potentielle avec les communistes (Europe, Cor\u00e9e du Sud, Japon), o\u00f9 il n’y avait que des d\u00e9ploiements op\u00e9rationnels maintenant l’\u00e9quilibre avec l’URSS. Le retrait pr\u00e9cipit\u00e9, en forme de d\u00e9route, du contingent US de Beyrouth apr\u00e8s l’attentat contre les Marines montre le sentiment d’alors du Pentagone sur cette forme d’engagement.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tEnfin, observons que l’essentiel n’est pas d’alimenter un jugement ou l’autre sur Mousavi, son pass\u00e9 et ses uvres, mais d’observer plut\u00f4t la constante approximation des narratives<\/em> occidentales qui servent pourtant d’arguments principaux pour nos grands \u00e9lans de cur et nos jugements p\u00e9remptoires de grande politique. Bien entendu, le fait important ici est que ces informations soient diffus\u00e9es aux USA, par deux sources reconnues et honorables de la communaut\u00e9 de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale, et jettent un peu plus de confusion encore sur toute l’affaire iranienne telle qu’elle ait per\u00e7ue, telle qu’elle \u00e9volue, telle qu’elle appara\u00eet dans la r\u00e9alit\u00e9. Bref, l’Iran est compliqu\u00e9 \u00e0 sa fa\u00e7on et notre vision de ce pays, comme d’autres, r\u00e9pond beaucoup plus \u00e0 nos propres interpr\u00e9tations qu’\u00e0 cette r\u00e9alit\u00e9. Il se confirme bien que nos positions dans cette crise, nous parlons de nos positions humanitaires, ont surtout pour but de nous rassurer<\/a> sur nous-m\u00eames et nos propres vertus; l\u00e0-dedans, Masouvi nouvelle version fait un peu d\u00e9sordre.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 24 juin 2009 \u00e0 17H31<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Nul ne doute que Mousavi, le candidat \u00e0 l’\u00e9lection pr\u00e9sidentielle iranienne, a un pass\u00e9 charg\u00e9 comme dignitaire du r\u00e9gime iranien. La chose est document\u00e9e. Plus int\u00e9ressante est la pr\u00e9cision, donn\u00e9e par un ancien amiral de l’U.S. Navy et un ancien officier de la CIA qui fut en charge des affaires de terrorisme au Moyen-Orient, sur… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[8421,3525,3985,4471,8420,3895,8419],"class_list":["post-70857","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-8421","tag-attentat","tag-baer","tag-beyrouth","tag-lyons","tag-marines","tag-masouvi"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70857","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70857"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70857\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70857"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70857"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70857"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}