Tout le monde attend la pr\u00e9sidence de l’UE de la Su\u00e8de (effective le 1er juillet) comme une sorte de pochette-surprise qui serait sans surprise. La Su\u00e8de n’est ni trop petite pour \u00eatre irresponsable (comme la Tch\u00e9quie), ni trop grande pour \u00eatre ambitieuse (comme la France); sa r\u00e9putation (la vertu nordique) est impeccable. Les Su\u00e9dois ont conscience qu’on attend d’eux une pr\u00e9sidence exemplaire.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tLe mot d’ordre officiel, venu des Su\u00e9dois eux-m\u00eames, est que ce sera une pr\u00e9sidence tr\u00e8s difficile. L’explication officieuse-officielle (disons, celle qu’on donne d’une fa\u00e7on officieuse mais qui convient aux autorit\u00e9s officielles) concerne la situation institutionnelle. La voici, selon EUObserver<\/em> du 27 juin 2009<\/a>:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abStockholm has already indicated it expects a difficult six-month term, notably due to institutional uncertainties in the EU.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe newly elected European Parliament is still taking shape, while it is not yet clear whether it will vote later in July to support Jose Manuel Barroso as European Commission president for a second time. Sweden would prefer to see Mr Barroso re-appointed so that it has a clear and strong working partner in the commission from mid-July, rather than having to wait until some time in the autumn. But disagreements among political parties in the parliament make it unclear whether the issue will be put to vote in mid-July. Talks with the Swedish presidency on this are to continue on 6 July.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbAdding to the institutional imbroglio is the question mark still hanging over the EU’s Lisbon Treaty with four member states not having completed ratification of the document yet. Ireland is to vote for a second time, probably on 2 October.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t Pr\u00e9sidence tr\u00e8s difficile selon les Su\u00e9dois, effectivement, mais pas pour les raisons officieuses-officielles avanc\u00e9es, selon nos sources. Effectivement, les Su\u00e9dois ne cessent d’envoyer des notes d’avertissement aux divers services europ\u00e9ens marquant la plus grande inqui\u00e9tude pour la situation financi\u00e8re et \u00e9conomique. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abIl est manifeste, <\/em>disent nos sources, que les Su\u00e9dois craignent un nouveau choc majeur aux niveaux financier et \u00e9conomique et ils s’inqui\u00e8tent \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard de la situation europ\u00e9enne. Ils estiment que tout ce qui pouvait \u00eatre fait en mati\u00e8re de plans de relance, d’interventions publiques, a \u00e9t\u00e9 fait, que le niveau d’endettement public est absolument \u00e0 la limite.<\/em>\u00bb Nos sources observent que la Su\u00e8de est parmi les pays europ\u00e9ens qui sont plut\u00f4t en mauvaise posture \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard, ce qui rend leur position encore plus difficile en cas de situation d’urgence. Dans cette perspective, ils craignent \u00e9galement, d’un point de vue politique, pour leur pr\u00e9sidence. En cas de choc et de crise, ils craignent de se trouver face \u00e0 des interventions imp\u00e9ratives de grands pays, comme ce fut le cas pour la pr\u00e9sidence des Tch\u00e8ques jusqu’au G20. Ainsi ont-ils per\u00e7u les exigences<\/a> Sarko-Merkel pour un renouvellement de la pr\u00e9sidence Barroso comme un signe annonciateur de cet activisme en cas de crise des deux pays dont ils craignent qu’il marginalise leur pr\u00e9sidence<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 27 juin 2009 \u00e0 17H12<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Tout le monde attend la pr\u00e9sidence de l’UE de la Su\u00e8de (effective le 1er juillet) comme une sorte de pochette-surprise qui serait sans surprise. La Su\u00e8de n’est ni trop petite pour \u00eatre irresponsable (comme la Tch\u00e9quie), ni trop grande pour \u00eatre ambitieuse (comme la France); sa r\u00e9putation (la vertu nordique) est impeccable. Les Su\u00e9dois ont… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[4335,3228,4633,4617,4590,4282,2609],"class_list":["post-70866","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-barroso","tag-crise","tag-merkel","tag-presidence","tag-sarkozy","tag-suede","tag-ue"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70866","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70866"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70866\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70866"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70866"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70866"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}