L’excellent commentateur, l’ancien diplomate indien M K Bhadrakumar, s’int\u00e9resse \u00e0 la sortie de crise de la crise iranienne. Il juge qu’elle sera rude pour les Occidentaux, et particuli\u00e8rement pour l’administration Obama. Dans son analyse du 1er juillet 2009<\/a>, sur le site Atimes.com<\/em>, M K Bhadrakumar constate d’abord que le r\u00e9gime iranien resserre les rangs pour assurer sa survie, et il estime que cela conduira \u00e0 un certain durcissement vis-\u00e0-vis de l’ext\u00e9rieur, particuli\u00e8rement les Anglo-Saxons, \u00e0 qui ce r\u00e9gime reproche avec v\u00e9h\u00e9mence d’avoir jou\u00e9 un r\u00f4le dans l’exacerbation de la contestation, sinon dans sa pr\u00e9paration.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tLes Britanniques, d’abord, sont concern\u00e9s:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abAt any rate, Tehran is going after Britain the most treacherous of foreign powers, to use Khamenei’s words. Marching orders have been given to two British diplomats posted in Tehran, and four local employees working in the British Embassy remain under detention for questioning. This is despite robust gesticulations by London that it is not stepping anything up on Tehran’s streets. A Foreign Office statement in London pleaded that it is Iran’s nuclear program that is driving Prime Minister Gordon Brown, and not outrage over civil rights or the death of innocents.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbLondon is manifestly anxious to vacate the scene as quickly as possible, and hopes it can be business as usual with Iran<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tL’autre puissance anglo-saxons, c’est bien entendu les USA, et son pr\u00e9sident dont on conna\u00eet les ambitions: \u00abBut Obama faces a much more complex challenge. He cannot emulate Brown. He needs to get engaged with Iran. The challenge facing Obama is that not only has the Iranian regime not cracked, it has shown incredible resilience.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tVoici le commentaire que fait M K Bhadrakumar de la situation de l’administration Obama.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abThe Obama administration has some hard choices to make. It was sustained criticism and pressure mounted by networks of anti-Iranian groups and powerful lobbies ensconced within the US Congress and the political class apart from quarters within the security establishment which have an old score to settle with Tehran but have an abominable record of misreading the vicissitudes of Iranian politics that forced Obama to harden his stance.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbSoftening the hard stance will be a difficult and politically embarrassing process. Much statesmanship is also needed. The best outcome is that Washington can take a pause and resume its efforts to engage Iran after a decent interval.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbA meaningful dialogue in the coming weeks seems improbable. Meanwhile, nitpickings such as the denial of visa for the Iranian Vice President Parviz Davoudi to visit New York to attend the United Nations conference on the world economic crisis do not help. (Davoudi is an advocate of liberal economic perspectives.) Nor will the US’s likely decision to pursue the sanctions route towards Iran at the forthcoming Group of Eight summit meeting in Trieste, Italy, on July 8-10. (In May, Iran surpassed Saudi Arabia as the top oil exporter from the Persian Gulf to China.)<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbIn sum, the Obama administration badly fumbled after a magnificent start in addressing the situation around Iran. As the distinguished policymaker and commentator Leslie H Gelb argues in his new book Power Rules: How Common Sense Can Rescue American Foreign Policy, Obama had an option to use the Libyan model, whereby Washington and Tripoli put all cards on the table and traded them most satisfactorily.<\/em> []<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbAll things taken into account, therefore, there has been a policy crisis in Washington. The paradox is that the Obama administration will now deal with a Khamenei who is at the peak of his political power in all his past two decades as supreme leader. As for Ahmadinejad, he will now negotiate from a position of unprecedented strength. Arguably, it helps when your adversary is strong so that he can take tough decisions, but in this case the analogy doesn’t hold.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbAhmadinejad left hardly anything to interpretation when he stated in Tehran on Saturday, Without doubt, Iran’s new government will have a more decisive and firmer approach towards the West. This time the Iranian nation’s reply will be harsh and more d\u00e9cisive and will aim at making the West regret its meddlesome stance. Most certainly, Tehran will not be replying through the Twitter.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tNous partageons sans aucun doute cette analyse de la position actuelle de l’administration Obama, qui se trouve prise dans le pi\u00e8ge de son \u00e9volution dans la phase active de la crise (et aussi, justesse de l’analyse de la position iranienne face aux USA). Obama se trouve dans le pi\u00e8ge du terme de l’application de sa m\u00e9thode, parce qu’il n’a pas pu ou parce qu’il n’a pas voulu maintenir jusqu’au terme sa position ferme du d\u00e9part de refus d’ing\u00e9rence dans les affaires iraniennes; nous vous faisions part de cette analyse le 25 juin 2009<\/a>. L\u00e0 o\u00f9 nous tendrions \u00e0 diverger par rapport \u00e0 M K Bhadrakumar, c’est sur la sortie \u00e9ventuelle d’Obama de ce pi\u00e8ge, si sortie il y a, pour tenter de relancer le dialogue avec l’Iran.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t L’id\u00e9e que sugg\u00e8re M K Bhadrakumar d’un decent interval<\/em> \u00e0 observer avant de tenter de reprendre le dialogue est assez logique, sans nul doute. Le probl\u00e8me, \u00e0 notre sens, est que cela suppose qu’on pourrait laisser s’\u00e9couler ce d\u00e9cent interval<\/em> dans le calme et l’apaisement n\u00e9cessaires pour pr\u00e9parer le retour du dialogue. Notre appr\u00e9ciation est que cela ne pourra se faire dans ces conditions, qu’il y a assez de tensions diverses, notamment relanc\u00e9es par l’\u00e9nervement extr\u00eame de l’application de notre subtile et occidentaliste rh\u00e9torique droits de l’homme-d\u00e9mocratie, pour empoisonner ce decent interval<\/em> et rendre encore plus ardue toute reprise de dialogue. Tout le monde s’y mettra, \u00e0 commencer par le s\u00e9millant commandatore<\/em> Silvio Berlusconi, qui r\u00e9unit son G8 dans quelques jours et entend installer comme premier point de la r\u00e9union la d\u00e9cision de nouvelles sanctions contre l’Iran. Il est \u00e9vident que cette affaire de sanctions appara\u00eet aujourd’hui, notamment dans le chef d’un Premier ministre aussi entreprenant, comme la question, voire la crise la plus importante; cette analyse grotesque semble partag\u00e9e par nombre d’autres dirigeants, ce qui ne peut surprendre. D’autre par, les Iraniens eux-m\u00eames, qui se sont durcis \u00e0 l’\u00e9gard d’Obama, ne faciliteront pas non plus l’apaisement pendant ce decent interval<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n