{"id":70890,"date":"2009-07-07T10:08:07","date_gmt":"2009-07-07T10:08:07","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2009\/07\/07\/ouverture-pianissimo\/"},"modified":"2009-07-07T10:08:07","modified_gmt":"2009-07-07T10:08:07","slug":"ouverture-pianissimo","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2009\/07\/07\/ouverture-pianissimo\/","title":{"rendered":"Ouverture pianissimo<\/em>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Ouverture pianissimo<\/em><\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

\t7 juillet 2009 Les Russes ne sont pas m\u00e9contents. Dans le d\u00e9sordre d\u00e9structurant qu’est la politique du monde, ils voient leur go\u00fbt pour les accords formels qui structurent les relations notablement renforc\u00e9. Sur la question des anti-missiles, c’est-\u00e0-dire de l’affaire BMDE (anti-missiles en Europe), ils estiment avoir cet accord formel. Pour eux, il est d\u00e9sormais act\u00e9 dans les documents (mutual understanding<\/em>) sign\u00e9s au sommet BHO-Medvedev qu’il existe une situation dite de linkage<\/em> (lien) entre missiles offensifs et missiles anti-missiles offensifs. D’une certaine fa\u00e7on, c’est-\u00e0-dire selon l’id\u00e9e d’un gouvernement de la raison que semble affectionner Obama, c’est acter l’\u00e9vidence; d’une fa\u00e7on plus g\u00e9n\u00e9rale qui prend en compte le d\u00e9sordre<\/a> install\u00e9 par le gouvernement de l’id\u00e9ologie et de l’instinct affectionn\u00e9 par l’Ouest depuis plusieurs ann\u00e9es, c’est une avanc\u00e9e qu’on ne peut contester, mais qu’on contestera simplement en la passant sous silence. Cela conduit le BMDE \u00e0 r\u00e9int\u00e9grer un cadre structurant formel et, par cons\u00e9quent, cela met le BMDE dans la situation de devoir se soumettre \u00e0 ses r\u00e8gles (s’il ne le fait pas, il y aura des cons\u00e9quences). Les Russes ne sont pas m\u00e9contents.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCe passage de l’intervention de Medvedev sur la question concernant le probl\u00e8me BMDE, lors de la conf\u00e9rence de presse commune (avec Obama) d’hier \u00e0 Moscou, dit cette satisfaction:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abBut I would like to draw your attention to what President Obama said, and I would like to point it out myself. In our mutual understanding that has just been signed, we talk about the linkage between offensive and defensive weapons, and this already constitutes a step forward. Some time ago, on this question, we had all only differences. Now this linkage is being stated and this opens up the opportunity of bringing positions closer to each other.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tA la m\u00eame question (du correspondant Reuters), la troisi\u00e8me de la conf\u00e9rence de presse, imm\u00e9diatement apr\u00e8s une question portant sur l’\u00e9tat g\u00e9n\u00e9ral des relations Russie-USA et une deuxi\u00e8me sur la prolif\u00e9ration nucl\u00e9aire, Obama avait r\u00e9pondu ceci qui clarifie d’une fa\u00e7on officielle la position US. On souligne en gras la fin de ce passage, qui pr\u00e9cise les \u00e9v\u00e9nements de coop\u00e9ration pr\u00e9vus dans ce domaine, d\u00e9terminant effectivement que la question du BMDE est d\u00e9sormais incluse dans les n\u00e9gociations nucl\u00e9aires g\u00e9n\u00e9rales. Les USA doivent terminer leur revue g\u00e9n\u00e9rale de la question du BMDE \u00e0 la fin de l’\u00e9t\u00e9, ces r\u00e9sultats seront communiqu\u00e9es aux Russes et des n\u00e9gociations commenceront sur la question.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abThe difference that we’ve had has been on the specifics of a missile defense system that the United States views as a priority not to deal with Russia, but to deal with a missile coming in from Iran or North Korea or some other state, and that it’s important for the United States and its allies to have the capacity to prevent such a strike. There is no scenario from our perspective in which this missile defense system would provide any protection against a mighty Russian arsenal.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbAnd so, in that sense, we have not thought that it is appropriate to link discussions of a missile defense system designed to deal with an entirely different threat unrelated to the kinds of robust capabilities that Russia possesses.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbNow, having said that, President Medvedev has been very clear that this is a point of deep concern and sensitivity to the Russian government. I suspect when I speak with President Prime Minister Putin tomorrow, he will say the same thing. And what we would like to do is to work with Russia to advance a system that ensures that a stray missile, whether it was one or 10 or a handful of missiles coming from a third source, that we have the capabilities to prevent those from doing damage. I think we can arrive at those kinds of understandings, but it’s going to take some hard work because it requires breaking down longstanding suspicions.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbWith respect to this particular configuration that was proposed several years ago, as you know, we’re undergoing a thorough review of whether it works or not, what has been proposed.<\/em> That review should be completed by the end of the summer and I indicated to President Medvedev that as soon as that review is complete, we will provide the Russian government our assessment of how we think we should proceed, and that will be the subject of extensive negotiations.<\/em><\/strong>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIl semble qu’on puisse situer la position US comme ayant constitu\u00e9 un d\u00e9marquage important par rapport \u00e0 la politique pr\u00e9c\u00e9dente, et un rapprochement important de la position russe, sur le point de la conf\u00e9rence de presse pr\u00e9cis\u00e9 ici. Dans sa question, Matt Spetalnick de Reuters, indique very clearly<\/em>: \u00abPresident Obama, you have said very clearly that you would not accept the linkage between the missile systems and arms control talks.<\/em>\u00bb La r\u00e9ponse pr\u00e9cise d’Obama, rapidement dans le d\u00e9veloppement g\u00e9n\u00e9ral qu’il fait pour r\u00e9pondre, se situe dans cette phrase, qui accepte le principe de linkage<\/em> en soi, sans r\u00e9f\u00e9rence au desiderata<\/em> russe et en r\u00e9f\u00e9rence \u00e0 our discussions<\/em> sur les questions de l’\u00e9quilibre strat\u00e9gique nucl\u00e9aire: \u00abI also believe that it is entirely legitimate for our discussions to talk not only about offensive weapon systems but also defensive weapon systems.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tVoici, pour la pr\u00e9cision, la question pos\u00e9e sur le BMDE durant la conf\u00e9rence de presse. Insistons sur le fait qu’elle vient tr\u00e8s rapidement dans la conf\u00e9rence (la troisi\u00e8me), apr\u00e8s une question sur la relations Russie-USA en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral et sur la prolif\u00e9ration nucl\u00e9aire. (Tous ces extraits viennent du compte-rendu officiel de la conf\u00e9rence, sur le site de la Maison-Blanche le 6 juillet 2009<\/a>).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abQUESTION (Matt Spetalnick from Reuters )<\/em><\/strong>: Thank you. Deep divisions over a proposed U.S. missile shield have contributed greatly to the deterioration of U.S.-Russian relations in recent years, and it does not seem that you gentlemen have finally resolved that issue either. President Obama, you have said very clearly that you would not accept the linkage between the missile systems and arms control talks. President Medvedev, you and Prime Minister Putin have said that these issues must be linked. Are either of you gentlemen willing to budge or compromise on this issue? And if not, could this also contribute to a blockage or obstacle to reaching a final START II agreement?<\/em> [] <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbPRESIDENT OBAMA<\/em><\/strong>: <\/em>[] On missile defense, we have agreed that we are going to continue to discuss this critical issue. That is part of the joint statements that we’ve signed. I also believe that it is entirely legitimate for our discussions to talk not only about offensive weapon systems but also defensive weapon systems.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbPart of what got us through the Cold War was a sufficient sense of parity and deterrent capability; that both sides during those very difficult times understood that a first strike, the attempt to use nuclear weapons in a military conflict against the other, could result in a extremely heavy price. And so any discussion of nuclear strategy, security, has to include defensive as well as offensive capabilities.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe difference that we’ve had has been on the specifics of a missile defense system that the United States views as a priority not to deal with Russia, but to deal with a missile coming in from Iran or North Korea or some other state, and that it’s important for the United States and its allies to have the capacity to prevent such a strike. There is no scenario from our perspective in which this missile defense system would provide any protection against a mighty Russian arsenal.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbAnd so, in that sense, we have not thought that it is appropriate to link discussions of a missile defense system designed to deal with an entirely different threat unrelated to the kinds of robust capabilities that Russia possesses.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbNow, having said that, President Medvedev has been very clear that this is a point of deep concern and sensitivity to the Russian government. I suspect when I speak with President Prime Minister Putin tomorrow, he will say the same thing. And what we would like to do is to work with Russia to advance a system that ensures that a stray missile, whether it was one or 10 or a handful of missiles coming from a third source, that we have the capabilities to prevent those from doing damage. I think we can arrive at those kinds of understandings, but it’s going to take some hard work because it requires breaking down longstanding suspicions.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbWith respect to this particular configuration that was proposed several years ago, as you know, we’re undergoing a thorough review of whether it works or not, what has been proposed. That review should be completed by the end of the summer and I indicated to President Medvedev that as soon as that review is complete, we will provide the Russian government our assessment of how we think we should proceed, and that will be the subject of extensive negotiations.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbSo, ultimately, I think the more progress we make on some of the issues that I discussed earlier non-proliferation, being able to track ballistic missiles coming from other sources to the extent that we are building deeper cooperation on those fronts, I think the more effectively we’re going to be able to resolve this issue. I believe that over time we will end up seeing that the U.S.-Russian positions on these issues can be reconciled and that in fact we have a mutual interest in protecting both of our populations from the kinds of dangers that weapons proliferations is posing today.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbPRESIDENT MEDVEDEV<\/em><\/strong>: I’ll say a couple of words on this subject. Of course anti-ballistic missile d\u00e9fense not ballistic missile defense, but the problem of the third region area is a difficult subject for our discussion.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbBut I would like to draw your attention to what President Obama said, and I would like to point it out myself. In our mutual understanding that has just been signed, we talk about the linkage between offensive and defensive weapons, and this already constitutes a step forward. Some time ago, on this question, we had all only differences. Now this linkage is being stated and this opens up the opportunity of bringing positions closer to each other.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbSecondly, nobody is saying that ballistic missile defense is harmful or is posing a danger. It is aimed at resolving a number of practical tasks. The question is of linking this configuration of missile defense with interests of other countries. I would like to point out specially that our American partners, unlike what was happening in recent years, have taken a pause and now are studying this situation. As a result of this, they will formulate their final position.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbAs at least, this is also a step forward in reaching possible compromise on this fairly difficult subject. Before we just heard that all decisions have been made, they do not concern you, but they present no threat to you. Our position is somewhat different. You’re well familiar with it. I’m not going to say it again. Our understanding is that these decisions do concern us and we will have to come to terms on these positions. We realize fully well that the number of threats, including link to the medium-range and ballistic missiles, is not diminishing but is growing in number. So we all have to think about what configuration on the whole the global anti-ballistic missile defense could have. And this, during our limited composition meeting, I mentioned to my colleague.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n

Dilemme explosif<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

\tFaut-il juger de cette affaire, comme on fait aujourd’hui dans toutes les affaires de diplomatie en se conformant \u00e0 l’id\u00e9ologie unique qui nous inspire, \u00e0 ce niveau, en terme de concurrence, ou d’une sorte de z\u00e9ro-sum game<\/em> pour la situation objective (qui l’emporte ne laisse rien \u00e0 l’autre, rien de concret ne se construit en dehors de ce que les deux n\u00e9gociateurs obtiennent ou perdent selon leurs int\u00e9r\u00eats)? Ce serait trahir le fondement de la diplomatie, qui n’est pas de satisfaire les int\u00e9r\u00eats des nations point final, mais de faire \u00e9voluer, ou mettre en place, une structure objective d’ordre sans trop l\u00e9ser les int\u00e9r\u00eats nationaux et en tentant au contraire de les satisfaire dans la mesure du respect de la structure mis en place; dans l’esprit de la chose, d’ailleurs, l’\u00e9tablissement d’une structure objective d’ordre (structurante) devrait \u00eatre per se<\/em> dans l’int\u00e9r\u00eat national des deux ou des diverses nations qui l’\u00e9tablissent, sans autre consid\u00e9ration, si nous avions l’esprit qui importe. C’est l\u00e0 une d\u00e9marche qui contredit la diplomatie am\u00e9ricaniste et occidentaliste des derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es; qui contredit, pour en revenir \u00e0 nos images, le gouvernement de l’id\u00e9ologie et de l’instinct contre le gouvernement de raison. Alors, on peut consid\u00e9rer que le sommet de Moscou est une r\u00e9ussite; il l’est pianissimo<\/em> et plut\u00f4t discreto<\/em>, comme il sied \u00e0 ces questions de principe qui ne font pas les titres all\u00e9chants et trahissent le dogme de la foi courante mais il l’est fondamentalement.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tD’ailleurs, les titres de journaux ont assez peu favoris\u00e9 cet aspect des choses (l’accord du linkage<\/em>). Pas assez spectaculaire et puis la presse-Pravda<\/em>, qui fonctionne selon la philosophie de l’id\u00e9ologie et de l’instinct, pourrait \u00eatre conduite \u00e0 y voir un recul US; on n’insiste pas trop par cons\u00e9quent, par go\u00fbt de l’objectivit\u00e9 et sens de la vertu selon nos normes. Il n’y a pas de recul mais ainsi fonctionne cette pens\u00e9e r\u00e9duite aux instincts primaire. Une envol\u00e9e lyrique sur la r\u00e9duction des armes nucl\u00e9aires, qui satisfait notre cause humaniste et permet d’\u00e9viter quelque avantage aux Russes, ferait mieux l’affaire.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tNous en sommes l\u00e0 pour l’instant et il reste \u00e0 s’entendre. Comme on sait, le bon Dieu est dans les d\u00e9tails (ou the devil’s in the d\u00e9tails<\/em>), ce qui promet des discussions ardues sur la formule \u00e0 trouver pour faire au BMDE, si c’est possible, un sort qui satisfasse les deux partis. Mais la dynamique structurante existe sur le point essentiel, r\u00e9ellement essentiel du sommet (la question du linkage<\/em> avec le BMDE), et elle va dans le sens entrevu ces derniers mois dans la diplomatie Obama. Consid\u00e9rant l’importance du sujet et son aspect structurant, on s’abstiendra de le mettre au rayon de la tactique (la th\u00e8se d’un Obama, version soft<\/em> et plus efficace des comiques Bush-Cheney). Il s’agit d’une attaque directe contre un projet fondamental de la politique d\u00e9structurante am\u00e9ricaniste en cours prestissimo<\/em> depuis 9\/11 (le r\u00e9seau BMDE d\u00e9velopp\u00e9 hors de tout cadre l\u00e9gal international structurant, d’une fa\u00e7on barbare et sauvage). On devrait voir fleurir les critiques contre cette orientation, aux USA, dans les prochaines semaines; mais des critiques vicieuses et indirectes, parce que ce cas, s’il est profond\u00e9ment sacril\u00e8ge pour l’id\u00e9ologie et l’instinct, l’est trop discr\u00e8tement pour exciter et justifier l’hyst\u00e9rie habituelle.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIl y aura une pouss\u00e9e puissante, constante, pressante et hyst\u00e9rique pour tenter d’interdire une concr\u00e9tisation de la voie ouverte \u00e0 Moscou. Parce qu’il y a eu un r\u00e9sultat tangible au sommet de Moscou, m\u00eame s’il est soigneusement dissimul\u00e9 comme tel, il y a tout lieu d’\u00eatre pessimiste pour la suite. C’est ainsi, aujourd’hui, dans le maniement constant du paradoxe, que doit aller fermement la logique historique du commentateur. La seule r\u00e9serve \u00e0 ce pessimisme mais sans le contredire, cela point illogiquement puisque le pessimisme est aussi construit en faveur de la destruction de la coh\u00e9sion du syst\u00e8me, est que les affrontements \u00e0 venir au cur du syst\u00e8me poussent \u00e0 une situation de rupture en son sein, avec BHO comme premier concern\u00e9, et oblig\u00e9 de se d\u00e9terminer. S’il se d\u00e9termine en fonction de la logique (r\u00e9)ouverte \u00e0 Moscou, c’est l’affrontement avec le syst\u00e8me; s’il se d\u00e9termine en fonction de la logique du syst\u00e8me, c’est l’affrontement avec la Russie. Nous viendrons vite \u00e0 ce dilemme explosif, qui vaut tous les d\u00e9comptes d’apothicaire sur le nombre de t\u00eates nucl\u00e9aires. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Ouverture pianissimo 7 juillet 2009 Les Russes ne sont pas m\u00e9contents. Dans le d\u00e9sordre d\u00e9structurant qu’est la politique du monde, ils voient leur go\u00fbt pour les accords formels qui structurent les relations notablement renforc\u00e9. Sur la question des anti-missiles, c’est-\u00e0-dire de l’affaire BMDE (anti-missiles en Europe), ils estiment avoir cet accord formel. Pour eux, il… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[3453,4314,8112,2858,2707,6208,3045,7845],"class_list":["post-70890","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-anti-missiles","tag-bmde","tag-linkage","tag-medvedev","tag-moscou","tag-obama","tag-sommet","tag-structurant"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70890","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70890"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70890\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70890"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70890"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70890"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}

\tCe qui nous conduit, une fois de plus, au cas BHO. Le myst\u00e8re demeure. Le moment de v\u00e9rit\u00e9 en fut un, et rien n’a compl\u00e8tement d\u00e9courag\u00e9 la th\u00e8se d’un BHO pouvant apporter du nouveau, alors que le doute avait refleuri ces derni\u00e8res semaines. Par contre, ce qui a pr\u00e9c\u00e9d\u00e9<\/a>, la confusion du c\u00f4t\u00e9 US avec les manuvres de BHO, et les premiers commentaires qui paraissent, \u00e0 c\u00f4t\u00e9 du sujet, ou bien extraordinairement sceptiques , voire m\u00e9prisants (nous en reparlerons), montrent que rien n’est fait de fondamental, si tant est que nous acceptions l’id\u00e9e que BHO veut faire quelque chose de fondamental. Ce quelque chose de fondamental ne peut \u00eatre qu’un apport civilisateur \u00e0 des relations internationales d\u00e9vast\u00e9es par la politique de l’id\u00e9ologie et de l’instinct de l’am\u00e9ricanisme et de l’occidentalisme, c’est-\u00e0-dire la construction d’une situation structurante. Tous les instincts des r\u00e9seaux politiques et de communication dominants vont contre cela, avec notamment un formidable m\u00e9pris de la Russie et une diffamation constante de ce pays (on sait o\u00f9 l’on trouve<\/a> l’esprit de la Guerre froide, dans ce qu’il eut de pire, fa\u00e7on LeMay et McCarthy). Non seulement BHO n’est pas au bout de ses peines, mais, pire encore, sa peine va \u00eatre paradoxalement grandie et aggrav\u00e9e par ce sommet; la faiblesse d’Obama dans cette sorte d’occurrence est de manuvrer trop finement, et il pourrait le faire jusqu’\u00e0 risquer de perdre les assises puissantes de la position qu’il a prise, voire risquer de perdre la compr\u00e9hension de ce qu’il y a de puissant dans cette position. C’est \u00e0 lui de voir et de faire.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n