Ne parlez pas d’ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulation) aux industriels non-US de l’armement, particuli\u00e8rement europ\u00e9ens. Cette l\u00e9gislation de r\u00e9gulation et de surveillance de l’exportation des technologies US est devenue un cauchemar, aussi bien pour les technologies touch\u00e9es (dont nombre sont int\u00e9gr\u00e9es, ou seraient susceptibles de l’\u00eatre dans des productions non-US) que pour les lenteurs bureaucratiques consid\u00e9rables que le processus de surveillance et de contr\u00f4le occasionne.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tLes milieux industriels US, appuy\u00e9s par des parlementaires, estiment depuis des ann\u00e9es qu’ITAR leur co\u00fbte des march\u00e9s importants et poussent pour une r\u00e9vision des proc\u00e9dures, notamment le processus bureaucratique coupable du ralentissement observ\u00e9. Un processus de r\u00e9vision d’ITAR, passant par une \u00e9ventuelle confiscation au State Department de la ma\u00eetrise qu’il exerce dessus, a \u00e9t\u00e9 lanc\u00e9 au Congr\u00e8s.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tLa chose est notamment l’objet d’une analyse de Colon Clark, de DoDBuzz.com<\/em>, le 7 juillet 2009<\/a>. Quelques pr\u00e9cisions sont donn\u00e9es, notamment sur les analyses lanc\u00e9es par le renseignement US sur les technologies \u00e0 surveiller, \u00e0 restreindre, etc. Le souci de rentabilit\u00e9, de recherche \u00e0 l’accessibilit\u00e9 des march\u00e9s ext\u00e9rieurs, est \u00e9galement mis en \u00e9vidence :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00ab In what could become a landmark study in the episodic battle over the International Traffic in Arms Regulation and the State Department that enforces it, the <\/em>[Congress’s House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence<\/em>] 2010 intelligence report requires the<\/em> [Director, National Intelligence<\/em>] to tell it, its Senate counterpart and the foreign affairs committees about the threat to national security posed by foreign government attempts to acquire sensitive technology and the effectiveness of ITAR in mitigating that threat.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbAfter more than a decade of reporting on the ITAR I can tell you that this has always been the weakest part of the debate over arms controls does ITAR work. The State Department always says that it’s trying to be transparent and to do a better job. Industry usually says the State Department is a pain, works too slowly and spends way too much time, effort and treasure trying to control things that don’t need controlling. Worst of all, ITAR has done much to help foreign competitors become stronger as the US tries unsuccessfully to stop other countries from getting their hands on the best military technology. The most dramatic statistics about this concern the commercial space business. Since the 1999 decision to place commercial space systems under the State Department’s purview, US dominance of commercial space dropped dramatically, from an average of 83 percent to less than 50 percent.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tL’aspect purement de s\u00e9curit\u00e9\u00a0\u00bb nationale est \u00e9galement \u00e9tudi\u00e9 avec la plus grande attention, par les organisations ad\u00e9quates. Il s’agit effectivement de la d\u00e9fense de la base technologique US.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abMI>At the same time as the committee looks at the ITAR, it has also commissioned a broader study on global supply chain vulnerabilities. The committee wants to know whether globalization has left the country vulnerable to defense and intelligence systems due to counterfeit components that may be defective or deliberately manipulated by a foreign government or a criminal organization. This sounds a lot like the concerns first voiced by John Hamre when he was deputy defense secretary and worried about the computer chips in America’s black boxes. In an interesting twist, the committee has told the National Counterintelligence Executive to consider the adequacy of the mechanisms to identify and mitigate vulnerabilities in the global supply chain that pose a risk to defense and intelligence systems due to counterfeit components that may be defective or deliberately manipulated by a foreign government or a criminal organization. \tCette seconde partie, ce second aspect de la r\u00e9forme d’ITAR, ont toutes les chances de devenir, de loin, les plus importants. Ils ont \u00e9videmment leur place au d\u00e9part, parce qu’une partie intelligence<\/em> et n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 existe toujours. Mais cet aspect du probl\u00e8me a une importance consid\u00e9rable ces derniers mois, notamment \u00e0 la suite d’\u00e9v\u00e9nements d\u00e9nonc\u00e9s, sans que cela soit prouv\u00e9 de fa\u00e7on irr\u00e9futable, comme des incursions au niveau informatique des secrets technologiques ou associ\u00e9s US. La r\u00e9cente affaire d’incursions o\u00f9 le JSF \u00e9tait impliqu\u00e9<\/a>, quels qu’en soient les tenants et les aboutissants, a constitu\u00e9 un cas de mobilisation m\u00e9diatique que la communaut\u00e9 de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale a fortement ressentie. Les n\u00e9gociations<\/a>, \u00e9galement concernant le JSF sur la question des transferts de technologies, entre Isra\u00ebl et les USA, participent \u00e9galement de ce ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne. D’une fa\u00e7on g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, les r\u00e9centes p\u00e9rip\u00e9ties du JSF, fortement m\u00e9diatis\u00e9es, ont fini par constituer un choc politique qui devrait conduire \u00e0 un durcissement des protections des technologies jug\u00e9es sensibles, pas seulement celles du JSF, mais celles qui constituent la base technologique des industrie \u00e9lectronique, a\u00e9rospatiale et de l’armement aux USA.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tTout cela contribue \u00e0 un esprit de mobilisation, m\u00eame si les cas cit\u00e9s n’ont techniquement qu’un rapport r\u00e9duit avec la question ITAR. Le fait dominant est qu’il existe une sensation nouvelle de vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 de la protection des technologies, qui est par ailleurs accentu\u00e9 par la crise g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, financi\u00e8re et \u00e9conomique. Dans cette logique \u00e0 finalit\u00e9 contradictoire, l’entreprise de r\u00e9forme d’ITAR pour faciliter les transferts de technologies pourrait conduire au contraire \u00e0 des recommandations d’une plus grande fermet\u00e9, et l’implication de contraintes bureaucratiques encore plus \u00e9touffantes que celles qui existent aujourd’hui, tout cela contribuant \u00e0 freiner encore plus les transferts de technologies.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 11 juillet 2009 \u00e0 09H14<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Ne parlez pas d’ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulation) aux industriels non-US de l’armement, particuli\u00e8rement europ\u00e9ens. Cette l\u00e9gislation de r\u00e9gulation et de surveillance de l’exportation des technologies US est devenue un cauchemar, aussi bien pour les technologies touch\u00e9es (dont nombre sont int\u00e9gr\u00e9es, ou seraient susceptibles de l’\u00eatre dans des productions non-US) que pour les lenteurs… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[2623,4793,250,3320,4096],"class_list":["post-70903","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-bureaucratie","tag-itar","tag-jsf","tag-reforme","tag-technologies"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70903","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70903"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70903\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70903"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70903"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70903"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}