{"id":70969,"date":"2009-08-07T17:45:17","date_gmt":"2009-08-07T17:45:17","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2009\/08\/07\/est-ce-bien-sur-le-jsf-too-big-to-fail\/"},"modified":"2009-08-07T17:45:17","modified_gmt":"2009-08-07T17:45:17","slug":"est-ce-bien-sur-le-jsf-too-big-to-fail","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2009\/08\/07\/est-ce-bien-sur-le-jsf-too-big-to-fail\/","title":{"rendered":"Est-ce bien s\u00fbr, \u2013 le JSF \u201ctoo big to fail<\/em>\u201d?"},"content":{"rendered":"

Un vent de grande interrogation, pour le moins, de panique diraient les pessimistes professionnels et mauvaises langues, commence \u00e0 envelopper le programme JSF. Il est manifeste aujourd’hui qu’il existe une d\u00e9marche officielle de mise en question du programme, notamment au travers du choix de remettre l’essentiel de l’autorit\u00e9 de l’\u00e9valuation de son \u00e9tat \u00e0 des organismes qui ne d\u00e9pendent pas de sa bureaucratie (JPO, ou JSF Program Office), essentiellement \u00e0 l’\u00e9quipe<\/a> JET<\/a>. Diverses appr\u00e9ciations circulent dans la presse, principalement sur le Net<\/em>, concernant des hypoth\u00e8ses sur l’avenir du programme. Nous reviendrons sans aucun doute sur le cas, mais l’on doit d’ores et d\u00e9j\u00e0 signaler plusieurs interventions.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t La question classique soulev\u00e9e au moment de la crise financi\u00e8re l’est d\u00e9sormais pour le JSF : Too big to fail?<\/em>, comme nous-m\u00eames l’avions soulev\u00e9e directement \u00e0 l’\u00e9poque, effectivement \u00e0 propos du JSF (voir notre F&C<\/em> du 25 septembre 2009<\/a>). (Nous ajouterions too big to fall?<\/em>, mais soit.) La question fatidique a \u00e9t\u00e9 pos\u00e9e sur le site Plane Talking<\/em> au tr\u00e8s l\u00e9gendaire ing\u00e9nieur Clarence Kelly Johnson, cr\u00e9ateur de quelques-uns des plus fameux avions de Lockheed (le P-80, le F-104, le U-2, le SR-71). Les r\u00e9ponses de Johnson, le 6 ao\u00fbt 2009<\/a>, sont tr\u00e8s ambigu\u00ebs et assez peu optimistes. Le principe Too big to fail?<\/em> implique une intervention du tr\u00e9sor public pour emp\u00eacher le b\u00e9n\u00e9ficiaire (une institution financi\u00e8re, essentiellement) de chuter, par tous les moyens financiers possibles (transferts d’argent). Le concept est acceptable parce que les \u00e9tablissements financiers sont des producteurs d’argent, et qu’un afflux d’argent peut effectivement relancer la production d’argent. Ce n’est pas le cas du JSF, qui est seulement consommateur d’argent et producteur d’autre chose que de l’argent. L’afflux d’argent pour appliquer le principe Too big to fail?<\/em> peut, au contraire, acc\u00e9l\u00e9rer l’encha\u00eenement dans les voies erron\u00e9es et renforcer la production d’un produit erron\u00e9. \u00abHerein lies the dilemma. Any application of the Too Big to Fail’ ethos to the JSF Program would be intended to spin out the time till few, if any, alternate options remain; would be totally disconnected from reality and common sense, and would produce an even bigger mistake.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Pourtant, il semble bien qu’il s’agisse de la th\u00e9rapie Too big to fail?<\/em> , c’est-\u00e0-dire la th\u00e9rapie du dollar, comme l’\u00e9crit le Daily Digest<\/em> d’Air Force Magazine ce 7 ao\u00fbt 2009<\/a>, qui soit envisag\u00e9e, d’apr\u00e8s les d\u00e9clarations du porte-parole du Pentagone le 5 ao\u00fbt 2009<\/a>. Le Daily Digest<\/em> \u00e9crit:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abThe Office of the Secretary of Defense is closely watching the progress of the F-35 stealth fighter program and is reserving the option of making additional funding adjustments should the F-35 joint estimating team, along with other Pentagon overseers, determine that the aircraft’s development is faltering, Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell said Wednesday.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbAlready OSD has pumped extra billions into the program as part of Defense Secretary’s Robert Gates’ drive to solidify the F-35 as the tactical fighter of the future and bolster the aircraft’s test phase to avoid delays. Morrell said the JET is in the process of doing more evaluations. Its initial look last year predicted a two-year slip, something that the F-35 program office has disputed.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbMorrell said the JET’s new findings are expected soon. If it is that they anticipate delays still, we have the ability to fund even more money to the test phase to buy back time and avoid delays essentially, he said, reiterating that Gates has placed enormous priority on the success of the F-35 and will be very, very much on top of that program as it goes forward.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Donc, il s’agirait d’acc\u00e9l\u00e9rer \u00e0 tout prix le programme JSF pour rattraper le retard annonc\u00e9 par l’\u00e9quipe JET (avec d’autres faiblesses), que tout le monde semble d\u00e9sormais s’accorder \u00e0 reconna\u00eetre. Comment l’acc\u00e9l\u00e9rer? En mettant plus d’argent? Nous tombons dans le cas de figure d\u00e9taill\u00e9 par Johnson. Comment croire que plus d’argent \u00e9viterait n\u00e9cessairement<\/strong> les probl\u00e8mes techniques qui sont cause des retards, si cela ne les aggraverait pas au contraire?<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tOn peut rappeler ces d\u00e9clarations du d\u00e9put\u00e9 John Murtha, qui pr\u00e9side la puissante commission d’appropriation des forces arm\u00e9es \u00e0 la Chambre (le 25 juin 2009<\/a>, sur le Daily Digest<\/em> de l’Air Force Association). (Le rappel est int\u00e9ressant, notamment l’observation de Murtha que le F-35 semble se diriger vers les m\u00eames probl\u00e8mes d’int\u00e9gration de l’\u00e9lectronique que ceux qu’a connus le F-22, un calvaire en perspective.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abThe F-35 is likely to have more growing pains, and as a result, Congress may slow the program down, according to Rep. John Murtha (D-Pa.), head of the House Appropriations defense subcommittee. Murtha on Wednesday told defense reporters in Washington, D.C., I’m for the F-35; I’m for a big buy in the F-35, but I’m not necessarily for buying it this year, if it’s not ready. He said the F-35 may be heading for a stall-out for technical reasonshe didn’t say what they might beand if so, Congress may apply the brakes. We haven’t decided it’s quite as bad as the F-22’s avionics problems near the end of its development, but it looks like it’s going in that direction. He added that, even though the F-35 is a priority for the Administration, we may not fund it at the level they would like.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t L’atmosph\u00e8re autour du JSF est si sombre qu’on peut mentionner, comme cerise sur le g\u00e2teau, une interview de Tom Burbage, vice-pr\u00e9sident de Lockheed Martin, par Associated Press, le 5 ao\u00fbt 2009<\/a>. Lockheed Martin commence \u00e0 l\u00e2cher du lest. Burbage y appara\u00eet en position de suspect, sinon d’accus\u00e9, qui tente de prouver sa bonne foi, notamment en acceptant de prendre en compte, par les r\u00e9ponses qu’il fait, les constats du rapport JET. Burbage a r\u00e9cemment rencontr\u00e9 les dirigeants du Pentagone. Il est manifeste qu’il s’est entendu signifier que, d\u00e9sormais, c’est l’\u00e9quipe JET qui m\u00e8ne la danse. Cette \u00e9quipe doit visiter Fort Worth en septembre, et Burbage la recevra avec un tapis rouge, sans savoir si l’argument est assez convaincant.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abThe last JET report estimated that development would cost an additional $5 billion and take two more years to complete than estimated by the Pentagon’s F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO). The panel is working on an updated report and will visit Lockheed’s Fort Worth facility next month. The report said program estimates were too optimistic in four areas, including manufacturing schedule, software coding, engineering staff reductions, and the pace of flight tests.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbBurbage said Lockheed was able to demonstrate progress in the first three areas, but it would take until mid-2010 to be able to demonstrate better flight test productivity. I think they would agree that we’re seeing progress in three of the four areas, and I’m hopeful that the<\/em> [Joint Estimating Team<\/em>] will recognize that, he said.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 7 ao\u00fbt 2009 \u00e0 17H48<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Un vent de grande interrogation, pour le moins, de panique diraient les pessimistes professionnels et mauvaises langues, commence \u00e0 envelopper le programme JSF. Il est manifeste aujourd’hui qu’il existe une d\u00e9marche officielle de mise en question du programme, notamment au travers du choix de remettre l’essentiel de l’autorit\u00e9 de l’\u00e9valuation de son \u00e9tat \u00e0 des… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3566,4817,8539,8540,7812,8500,2866,4083,250,3970,3108,7811,7810],"class_list":["post-70969","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-big","tag-burbage","tag-clarence","tag-estimate","tag-fail","tag-jet","tag-johnson","tag-joint","tag-jsf","tag-kelly","tag-team","tag-to","tag-too"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70969","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70969"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70969\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70969"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70969"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70969"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}