{"id":71016,"date":"2009-08-27T13:33:01","date_gmt":"2009-08-27T13:33:01","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2009\/08\/27\/le-bmde-a-du-serieux-plomb-dans-laile\/"},"modified":"2009-08-27T13:33:01","modified_gmt":"2009-08-27T13:33:01","slug":"le-bmde-a-du-serieux-plomb-dans-laile","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2009\/08\/27\/le-bmde-a-du-serieux-plomb-dans-laile\/","title":{"rendered":"Le BMDE a du s\u00e9rieux plomb dans l&rsquo;aile"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>Plusieurs indications, venues de milieux auxquels on peut faire confiance, montrent que le projet initial de syst\u00e8me anti-missiles en Europe (BMDE), en Pologne et en Tch\u00e9quie, est s\u00e9rieusement compromis. La plupart de ces nouvelles transitent autour de et par Riki Ellison, personnage original puisqu&rsquo;il s&rsquo;agit du principal lobbyist des r\u00e9seaux anti-missiles US au travers de son association MDAA (Missile Defense Adocacy Alliance), soutenue par pr\u00e8s de 10.000 sponsors dont on devine ais\u00e9ment les centres d&rsquo;int\u00e9r\u00eat, et qu&rsquo;il s&rsquo;agit \u00e9galement d&rsquo;une ancienne <em>star<\/em> du football am\u00e9ricain reconvertie (dix saisons en professionnels, notamment dans l&rsquo;\u00e9quipe des Los Angeles <em>Raiders<\/em>, dans les ann\u00e9es 1980). (Voir le portrait d&rsquo;Ellison dans <em>Bloomberg.News<\/em> le <a href=\"http:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/apps\/news?pid=20601079&#038;sid=aDh61ZczyuJE\" class=\"gen\">16 juillet 2009<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t Ce <a href=\"http:\/\/euobserver.com\/9\/28587\/?rk=1\" class=\"gen\">27 ao\u00fbt 2009<\/a>, <em>EUObserver<\/em> signale un article d&rsquo;Ellison dans <em>Gazeta Wyborcza<\/em>, pr\u00e9sentant une image extr\u00eamement pessimiste de l&rsquo;avenir du BMDE, du moins dans les conditions jusqu&rsquo;ici pr\u00e9vues des bases en Pologne et en Tch\u00e9quie. Il s&rsquo;agit clairement de pr\u00e9senter une \u00e9volution de l&rsquo;administration Obama li\u00e9e au d\u00e9sir de donner toute la priorit\u00e9 \u00e0 l&rsquo;am\u00e9lioration des relations avec la Russie. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>The United States has all-but abandoned plans to house anti-missile bases in Poland and the Czech republic, according to a senior White House lobbyist. Riki Ellison, the chairman of the 10,000 member-strong Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, said in Polish daily Gazeta Wyborcza on Thursday (26 August) that the US has changed its mind to avoid a rift with Russia and is now looking at Israel, Turkey, the Balkans or ship-borne facilities instead.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The signals given by generals from the Pentagon are clear: the current US government is looking for different solutions on the question of missile defence than Poland and the Czech republic, he said. The new<\/em> [US] <em>team is paying more attention to Russian arguments, the lobbyist added. Obama&rsquo;s people believe that many problems in the world can be more easily solved together with Moscow &#8230;It&rsquo;s a question of priorities. For many Democrats, the priority is disarmament and they are capable of sacrificing a lot in order to achieve a new agreement with Russia on the reduction of strategic [nuclear] weapons.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t L&rsquo;article d&rsquo;Ellison mentionne une interpr\u00e9tation g\u00e9n\u00e9rale d&rsquo;une conf\u00e9rence qui s&rsquo;est tenue \u00e0 Huntsville, en Alabama, entre les 17 et 20 ao\u00fbt, portant sur la d\u00e9fense anti-missiles. De nombreux g\u00e9n\u00e9raux du Pentagone, y compris l&rsquo;adjoint au pr\u00e9sident du Joint Chiefs of Staff, y intervenaient. Le message qu&rsquo;Ellison a clairement d\u00e9chiffr\u00e9, et qu&rsquo;il r\u00e9percute aupr\u00e8s de ses amis polonais, concerne la fin des plans actuels de d\u00e9ploiement en Pologne et en Tch\u00e9quie. Le compte-rendu \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard est publi\u00e9 le <a href=\"http:\/\/www.missiledefenseadvocacy.org\/news_category.aspx?categoryID=2\" class=\"gen\">21 ao\u00fbt 2009<\/a>, par Ellison, sur son site MDAA. Pour lui, le signe est clair: on n&rsquo;a pas dit un seul mot de la formule actuelle du BMDE (Pologne + Tch\u00e9quie) durant cette conf\u00e9rence, et l&rsquo;on a beaucoup parl\u00e9 de nouvelles solutions (soit des anti-missiles navals, sur des unit\u00e9s AEGIS, soit des missiles utilis\u00e9s par les AEGIS, type SM-3, d\u00e9velopp\u00e9s en versions terrestres); l&rsquo;on a parl\u00e9 de d\u00e9ploiements mobiles possibles dans les Balkans, en Isra\u00ebl et en Turquie, selon des accords \u00e0 r\u00e9aliser. (Pour ce qui concerne les Balkans, une localisation possible pourrait \u00eatre dans la zone de l&rsquo;immense base de l&rsquo;U.S. Army de Camp Bondsteel, situ\u00e9e dans la partie sud du Kosovo.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>The biggest departure of strategy from the previous Administration is the omission in this conference of any discussion of the third missile defense site in Poland and the Czech Republic. A strong case was made by General Kevin P. Chilton, US Strategic Command Commander, that strategic stability between the U.S. and Russia and the U.S. and China are the top priority for the command and as to prevent incentives to be unstable. In China&rsquo;s case who feel strategically stable with the US, that they don&rsquo;t develop and deploy more strategic nuclear missiles. Thereby stating who is the US  missile defense capability is aimed at and  not aimed at,  clearly defining that it is not aimed at Russia or China.  Furthermore, General Chilton presented Russia&rsquo;s strategic sensitivities to the third site in Poland moving in a direction away from deployment there. <\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>One alternative solution that was referenced in many of the discussions as well as presented by Lt General Patrick O&rsquo;Reilly, Director of the Missile Defense Agency, is the concept of land-basing the SM3 and Aegis sea-based missile defense system and integrating it with current missile defense sensors and with new sensors such as remote UAVs, and space-based sensors such as the STSS (Space Tracking Surveillance System). This would enable the system if placed in geographic desired locations and with further development to engage to intercept in the early ascent phase of a threatening ballistic missile thereby expanding the defended area considerably. This solution uses the commonality of the Aegis SM3 system that NATO and other European nations have incorporated and the testing history success of a proven system which aligns with the administration&rsquo;s position on missile defense. The land-based SM3 could alleviate some of Russia&rsquo;s concern on the third site due to range and placement of those sites. The system would first be placed in Israel and additional land-based SM3&rsquo;s will likely be placed in Turkey or the Balkan nations if an international agreement could be attained. The placement in Turkey and the Balkans could potentially have the ability to protect the U.S. homeland on early assent intercepts of ballistic missiles from Iran.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t Signalons \u00e9galement un article, le <a href=\"http:\/\/online.wsj.com\/article\/SB10001424052970204884404574362771820985060.html?mod=googlenews_wsj#articleTabs%3Darticle\" class=\"gen\">25 ao\u00fbt 2009<\/a> dans le Wall Street <em>Journal<\/em>, de deux lobbyist-experts, plut\u00f4t de type strat\u00e8ges ou humanitaire-id\u00e9ologique au choix (Illan Berman, vice pr\u00e9sident, American Foreign Policy Council, et Clifford D. May , pr\u00e9sident, Foundation for Defense of Democracies). Berman-May d\u00e9plorent ce qu&rsquo;ils jugent \u00eatre un abandon progressif, insidieux, par saucissonnage, de tous les plans anti-missiles. Ils ont ce passage particulier concernant le BMDE:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>Mr. Obama has also targeted the Bush administration&rsquo;s premier missile-defense venture, the deployment of ground-based interceptors and radars in Poland and the Czech Republic to defend against the growing ballistic missile threat from Iran. Instead, because of the Kremlin&rsquo;s objections, the Obama team is preparing to sacrifice this planned deployment as part of a reset of U.S. relations with Russia.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tIl s&rsquo;agit de signes sans aucun doute convaincants. Lorsque l&rsquo;on observe que la bureaucratie militaire, dont la Missile Defense Agency elle-m\u00eame, et l&rsquo;industrie de l&rsquo;armement sont d\u00e9j\u00e0 au travail pour trouver des alternatives cr\u00e9dibles aux plans actuels du BMDE que le Kremlin ne supporte pas, la chose devient tr\u00e8s s\u00e9rieuse. Ces alternatives sont \u00e9loign\u00e9es du secteur est-europ\u00e9en qui indispose les Russes, et largement concentr\u00e9s vers la sph\u00e8re r\u00e9gionale m\u00e9ridionale (Sud des Balkans, et surtout Isra\u00ebl et Turquie), largement rapproch\u00e9e de l&rsquo;Iran. Elles portent sur des syst\u00e8mes mobiles, \u00e9ventuellement en mode naval ou terrestre; il s&rsquo;agit de situations qui peuvent accompagner ais\u00e9ment tout changement de politique ou d&rsquo;orientation. La tendance ainsi signal\u00e9e est sans aucun doute celle d&rsquo;un d\u00e9sengagement net du th\u00e9\u00e2tre central europ\u00e9en, impliquant la suppression de l&rsquo;hypoth\u00e8que anti-russe qui marque les plans initiaux du BMDE. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tL&rsquo;id\u00e9e g\u00e9n\u00e9rale du BMDE se r\u00e9gionalise en quittant le th\u00e9\u00e2tre implicite de l&rsquo;ancienne confrontation Est-Ouest, participant en cela \u00e0 une r\u00e9duction des ambitions strat\u00e9giques US qui caract\u00e9rise l&rsquo;\u00e9volution de l&rsquo;administration Obama depuis son entr\u00e9e en service. Cela accompagne \u00e9galement la pouss\u00e9e anti-nucl\u00e9aire tr\u00e8s pr\u00e9sente dans le jugement du pr\u00e9sident des USA, dans la mesure o\u00f9 le BMDE dans son concept initial (Pologne + Tch\u00e9quie) est un un obstacle tr\u00e8s important \u00e0 un accord de r\u00e9duction des armes nucl\u00e9aires entre les USA et la Turquie. Dans tous les cas, il s&rsquo;agit d&rsquo;une \u00e9volution g\u00e9n\u00e9rale tourn\u00e9e vers la r\u00e9duction des ambitions US et des politiques de confrontation (avec la Russie), cette r\u00e9duction cons\u00e9cutive aux diverses crises que connaissent les USA et l&rsquo;affaiblissement de puissance qui va avec.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 27 ao\u00fbt 2009 \u00e0 13H29<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Plusieurs indications, venues de milieux auxquels on peut faire confiance, montrent que le projet initial de syst\u00e8me anti-missiles en Europe (BMDE), en Pologne et en Tch\u00e9quie, est s\u00e9rieusement compromis. La plupart de ces nouvelles transitent autour de et par Riki Ellison, personnage original puisqu&rsquo;il s&rsquo;agit du principal lobbyist des r\u00e9seaux anti-missiles US au travers de&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[6131,8604,3453,3496,4314,3019,6858,2774,6765,3957,2827,5551,2613],"class_list":["post-71016","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-aegis","tag-agency","tag-anti-missiles","tag-balkans","tag-bmde","tag-defense","tag-ellison","tag-israel","tag-mdaa","tag-missile","tag-pologne","tag-tchequie","tag-turquie"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/71016","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=71016"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/71016\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=71016"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=71016"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=71016"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}