{"id":71017,"date":"2009-08-28T06:05:07","date_gmt":"2009-08-28T06:05:07","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2009\/08\/28\/guerre-identifiee-en-afghanistan-holbrooke-versus-karzai\/"},"modified":"2009-08-28T06:05:07","modified_gmt":"2009-08-28T06:05:07","slug":"guerre-identifiee-en-afghanistan-holbrooke-versus-karzai","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2009\/08\/28\/guerre-identifiee-en-afghanistan-holbrooke-versus-karzai\/","title":{"rendered":"Guerre identifi\u00e9e en Afghanistan: Holbrooke versus<\/em> Karza\u00ef"},"content":{"rendered":"

Les marionnettes ne sont vraiment plus ce qu’elles \u00e9taient, aux USA comme ailleurs<\/a>; tandis que les guerres, elles, ne sont plus du tout ce qu’on esp\u00e9rait. Il s’agit de l’Afghanistan, la star<\/em> du moment. Il y a eu, nous dit BBC.News<\/em> le 27 ao\u00fbt 2009<\/a>, une tr\u00e8s difficile rencontre entre l’envoy\u00e9 sp\u00e9cial US pour la r\u00e9gion, Richard Holbrooke, et le pr\u00e9sident Karza\u00ef, le 21 ao\u00fbt, au lendemain des \u00e9lections pr\u00e9sidentielles. Explosif est le qualificatif employ\u00e9. Le sujet \u00e9tait l’\u00e9lection effectivement, \u00e9nimennement d\u00e9mocratique comme chacun sait, comme toujours pour cette sorte de sport sous contr\u00f4le et f\u00e9rule US dans les pays qui re\u00e7oivent l’amical soutien des USA.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abThe US special envoy to Afghanistan has held an \u00ab\u00a0explosive\u00a0\u00bb meeting with Afghan President Hamid Karzai over the country’s election, the BBC has learnt. Richard Holbrooke raised concerns about ballot-stuffing and fraud, by a number of candidates’ teams, sources say.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe US envoy also said a second-round run-off could make the election process more credible, the sources said. Concerns have already been raised about Afghanistan’s election, although final results are not due until September.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbA number of senior sources have confirmed the details of a meeting between Mr Holbrooke and Mr Karzai held on 21 August, one day after the election. The meeting was described as explosive and a dramatic bust-up.<\/em> […] <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbMr Karzai reacted very angrily and the meeting ended shortly afterwards, the sources said.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tOn imagine d’ici la sc\u00e8ne lorsqu’on conna\u00eet les m\u00e9thodes de blulldozer de Holbrooke et la mauvaise humeur permanente de Karza\u00ef vis-\u00e0-vis de la fa\u00e7on dont les USA conduisent la guerre. Une discussion sur les charmes de la d\u00e9mocratie dans de telles conditions conduisent effectivement \u00e0 des entretiens marqu\u00e9s par une incompr\u00e9hension explosive.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tL’arri\u00e8re-plan de cette rencontre, plut\u00f4t que des consid\u00e9rations sur la d\u00e9mocratie et les droits de la femme en Afghanistan, devrait \u00eatre celui qu’expose Paul Reynolds, correspondant pour la d\u00e9fense du m\u00eame BBC.News<\/em>, le 23 ao\u00fbt 2009<\/a>, lorsqu’il expose une analyse de la nouvelle strat\u00e9gie de l’administration Obama en Afghanistan: \u00abNew tactics, same strategy?<\/em>\u00bb.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abThe new strategy under consideration by the Obama administration might end up being a repackaging of elements that have been tried before. Some old Afghan hands tend to think that the new team is coming in painting as dark a picture as it can in order to show how well they can do.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe strategy is not going to change in real terms, said one such former Western official. This is the concept of the three-legged stool-security, development and governance. It’s called the ‘comprehensive’ or ‘integrated approach’ and it has been applied since 2002. It’s saying that everything needs to work in a synergistic way. That is not going to change, it can’t change, everyone knows that, it is classic and fundamental.<\/em> []<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbNobody has ever said you can defeat the Taleban by military means alone. Richard Holbrooke<\/em> [the new US envoy to the region] talks as if we have been trying to do that. That’s not to say it is going well. But the issue is not one of strategy, it is one of implementation. And military force is going to be a big element in the new package anyway, with 17,000 extra US troops being sent, some around Kabul but many to the south where the Taleban is making its main effort<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tEt Reynolds continue dans ce sens, expliquant comment la strat\u00e9gie de l’aministration Obama consiste effectivement \u00e0 donner un nom diff\u00e9rent \u00e0 des choses qui furent d\u00e9j\u00e0 faites, avec le succ\u00e8s qu’on sait. Ainsi, le principal effort de guerre pourrait-il \u00eatre ramen\u00e9 essentiellement \u00e0 trouver une nouvelle d\u00e9finition de ce qu’est un succ\u00e8s, pour qu’on puisse enfin \u00e9noncer une strat\u00e9gie de sortie \u00abPresident Obama himself has said that the US needs an \u00ab\u00a0exit\u00a0\u00bb strategy. By that, he does not mean retreat, he means success – even if at the same time he is downgrading the definition of success.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tPar cons\u00e9quent, plus \u00e7a change, plus c’est la m\u00eame chose, mais en pire, certes plus \u00e7a change, plus c’est pire Les USA se trouvent dans la situation attendue par tous, qui ne cesse de se confirmer, dont l’\u00e9lection du mois d’ao\u00fbt est la derni\u00e8re p\u00e9rip\u00e9tie sans surprise. La nouvelle initiative fondamentale de l’administration Obama s’enlise dans les m\u00eames erreurs, les m\u00eames incompr\u00e9hensions, dont l’effet est d\u00e9mesur\u00e9ment grandi par l’annonce faite \u00e0 grands fracas que la guerre d’Afghanistan est d\u00e9sormais essentielle et qu’on va tout y changer. Karza\u00ef est ce qu’il est, une marionnette r\u00e9volt\u00e9e, comme Maliki en Irak; homme corrompu, bien s\u00fbr, mis en place d’ailleurs dans des conditions corruptrices qui ne peuvent qu’installer un syst\u00e8me compl\u00e8tement corrupteur; surtout, un homme qui d\u00e9fend de plus en plus ch\u00e8rement sa position en s’appuyant pour riposter sur l’himalayesque incomp\u00e9tence des USA \u00e0 mener cette guerre, o\u00f9 chaque op\u00e9ration aggrave encore les conditions de la guerre. Dans ces conditions, on comprend qu’Holbrooke-le-bulldozer est compl\u00e8tement l’homme de la situation.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 28 ao\u00fbt 2009 \u00e0 06H05<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Les marionnettes ne sont vraiment plus ce qu’elles \u00e9taient, aux USA comme ailleurs; tandis que les guerres, elles, ne sont plus du tout ce qu’on esp\u00e9rait. Il s’agit de l’Afghanistan, la star du moment. Il y a eu, nous dit BBC.News le 27 ao\u00fbt 2009, une tr\u00e8s difficile rencontre entre l’envoy\u00e9 sp\u00e9cial US pour la… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3236,4141,8605,4575,2642,3440],"class_list":["post-71017","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-afghanistan","tag-elections","tag-hobrooke","tag-karzai","tag-nouvelle","tag-strategie"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/71017","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=71017"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/71017\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=71017"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=71017"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=71017"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}