L’\u00e9lection l\u00e9gislative au Japon, qui a balay\u00e9 le parti qui constitue la structure m\u00eame de la vie politique japonaise depuis la fin de la Deuxi\u00e8me Guerre mondiale, va-il modifier radicalement les relations entre ce pays et les USA? Voil\u00e0 la question pos\u00e9e par William Pfaff, le 1er septembre 2009<\/a>, sur Truthdig.com<\/em>. Il faut convenir que cette question est \u00e9videmment fondamentale, pour le Japon et, d’une certaine fa\u00e7on, pour les USA, et qu’elle se pose dans une situation internationale boulevers\u00e9e par la crise du 15 septembre 2008 et ses cons\u00e9quences. Pfaff la pose du point de vue qui importe, qui est celui d’une puissance (le Japon) qui assume une relation marqu\u00e9e par la soumission, et, de ce point de vue, par un caract\u00e8re humiliant constant. Ainsi \u00e9voque-t-il notamment le facteur psychologique, et m\u00eame [le facteur] spirituel, au travers de deux aspects de ces relations.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abThe negatives for Japan in this institutionalized subordination to the United States have become heavy to bear, not only politically but in certain ways psychologically, and even spiritually. Japan, after all, from its brilliant successes early in the Meiji era, in its 1904-1905 war with Russia, to its defeat by American nuclear bombs in 1945, was probably the most dynamic, ambitious and nationalistic country on Earth.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe leader of the victorious Democratic Party of Japan, Yukio Hatoyama, has written about two aspects of the American relationship to Japan today. The first is economic. In an essay published prior to the election, first in Japan and then syndicated around the world, he criticized American-led unrestrained market fundamentalism and financial capitalism, in which people are treated not as an end but as a means [and] human dignity is lost.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbHe wrote of respect for the local economic practices that have been fostered through our traditions. This is a sympathetic position, but it is not clear what he means in practice, even though he suggests that America’s world economic domination is waning.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tPfaff parle de deux aspects. Le second est celui des relations strat\u00e9gique, de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale, impliquant divers facteurs fondmentaux (la souverainet\u00e9 nationale, l’identit\u00e9, etc.): <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abThe most important political question faced by a Japan led by the Democratic Party concerns the Japanese-American security relationship. Mr. Hatoyama is deliberately vague on the question, and a Democratic Party colleague says it’s complete nonsense to think that the election of the Democrats will hurt U.S.-Japan relations. But he then adds that there are many things left unchanged from the last 50 years that need to be re-examined.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbOther Japanese observe that at a time when China is developing its military power and enlarging its global reliance on raw materials, the U.S. military presence in North Asia and the Japanese-American security alliance are sources of stability<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tMalgr\u00e9 l’extr\u00eame prudence avec laquelle les dirigeants japonais vont avoir \u00e0 aborder ces probl\u00e8mes, Pfaff observe que deux facteurs vont peser, par leur caract\u00e8re concret, sur le nouveau gouvernement pour qu’il les aborde. L’un des deux (que Pfaff aborde en second) est le fardeau \u00e9conomique et social in\u00e9gal, pour les Japonais, que la pr\u00e9sence de 50.000 soldats US et de leurs bases font peser. Le second, le plus important sans doute, est celui de l’opinion publique, qui est la raison m\u00eame du renversement politique qui a eu lieu au Japon: \u00abOne is public opinion. The subordinate place Japan occupies in the relationship is humiliating: as an advanced base for American military operations in Asia that have nothing to do with Japan’s security, and on which Japan has no voice (the case during the Vietnam war decade, and now with the war in Afghanistan).<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tIl appara\u00eet \u00e9vident qu’il existe des disparit\u00e9s fondamentales dans ces relations de vassalit\u00e9 du Japon avec les USA. Elles existent essentiellement parce que la structure politique qui a domin\u00e9 le Japon jusqu’\u00e0 l’\u00e9lection fait compl\u00e8tement partie d’un syst\u00e8me g\u00e9n\u00e9ral dont le centre et l’inspirateur est l’am\u00e9ricanisme. L’originalit\u00e9 de l’approche de William Pfaff est notamment qu’il fait un parall\u00e8le qui peut appara\u00eetre tr\u00e8s r\u00e9v\u00e9lateur s’il est pouss\u00e9 \u00e0 son terme, entre l’\u00e9lection japonaise et celle de Barack Obama. Comme l’\u00e9lection japonaise, l’\u00e9lection d’Obama a marqu\u00e9 un d\u00e9sir profond de changement de la part de l’opinion publique US, qu’on peut placer selon la m\u00eame approche que celle que Pfaff adopte pour appr\u00e9cier la situation japonaise. Selon notre interpr\u00e9tation, il s’agit du d\u00e9sir, qui n’est pas n\u00e9cessairement exprim\u00e9 d’une fa\u00e7on intelligible, de sortir de la tyrannie dominatrice d’un syst\u00e8me dans ce cas, le d\u00e9sir des Am\u00e9ricains par rapport au syst\u00e8me tyrannique de l’am\u00e9ricanisme mais le m\u00eame syst\u00e8me qui contraint le Japon depuis plus d’un demi-si\u00e8cle. Le pr\u00e9c\u00e9dent d’Obama, de ce point de vue, mesure la difficult\u00e9 de la t\u00e2che qui attend les nouveaux dirigeants japonais<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abThe landslide election of Japan’s Democratic Party in last weekend’s parliamentary vote parallels the election of Barack Obama to the American presidency last November. In both cases opposition parties long out of power (in the Japanese case, all but totally excluded from national power during the six decades of the postwar Japanese government’s existence) have been elected at a time of crisis to change the nation’s Policy.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbSuch changes are easier to talk about than think about, or worse, actually to accomplish, as Barack Obama has already found out.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tDe ce point de vue (suite), la situation japonaise ne peut certes \u00eatre consid\u00e9r\u00e9e en elle-m\u00eame seulement, r\u00e9duite \u00e0 ses seuls facteurs. Elle fait partie d’un ensemble beaucoup plus g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, dont on per\u00e7oit des signes puissants en ce moment. Un autre de ces facteurs est la situation nouvelle de l’Am\u00e9rique du Sud, telle que nous la percevons ces derniers jours notamment (voir le 31 ao\u00fbt 2009<\/a> et le 1er septembre 2009<\/a>).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 2 septembre 2009 \u00e0 06H06<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" L’\u00e9lection l\u00e9gislative au Japon, qui a balay\u00e9 le parti qui constitue la structure m\u00eame de la vie politique japonaise depuis la fin de la Deuxi\u00e8me Guerre mondiale, va-il modifier radicalement les relations entre ce pays et les USA? Voil\u00e0 la question pos\u00e9e par William Pfaff, le 1er septembre 2009, sur Truthdig.com. Il faut convenir que… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[2631,4141,8629,8627,4662,8628,8118,1131,2766,3014,8626],"class_list":["post-71032","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-de","tag-elections","tag-generales","tag-hatoyama","tag-japon","tag-japon-usa","tag-lamericanisme","tag-pfaff","tag-relations","tag-systeme","tag-yukio"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/71032","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=71032"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/71032\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=71032"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=71032"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=71032"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}