{"id":71040,"date":"2009-09-04T15:08:52","date_gmt":"2009-09-04T15:08:52","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2009\/09\/04\/discorde-chez-les-amis\/"},"modified":"2009-09-04T15:08:52","modified_gmt":"2009-09-04T15:08:52","slug":"discorde-chez-les-amis","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2009\/09\/04\/discorde-chez-les-amis\/","title":{"rendered":"Discorde chez les amis"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>On savait qu&rsquo;il y avait grande difficult\u00e9 \u00e0 d\u00e9finir le front en Afghanistan. Cela n&rsquo;est pas d\u00e9menti. On ajoute simplement que cette diversit\u00e9 des choses commence \u00e0 appara\u00eetre \u00e9galement chez ceux qui nous semblaient jusqu&rsquo;ici convaincus d&rsquo;une fa\u00e7on unanime de la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 de faire cette \u00e9trange guerre  aux USA m\u00eame, au sein de l&rsquo;administration Obama elle-m\u00eame. La situation tend \u00e0 se compliquer au sein de l&rsquo;administration en des fronts oppos\u00e9s sur la question de l&rsquo;engagement en Afghanistan.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tC&rsquo;est le site <em>Antiwar.com<\/em>, notamment, qui signale la chose en date du <a href=\"http:\/\/news.antiwar.com\/2009\/09\/03\/officials-say-obama-advisers-split-on-afghan-escalation\/\" class=\"gen\">3 septembre 2009<\/a>, dans une rapide synth\u00e8se de divers articles, avec les liens n\u00e9cessaires.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>Despite public comments being almost universally in favor of the continued escalation of the Afghan War, behind the scenes several key Obama Administration advisers are starting to express serious doubts about the wisdom of throwing more and more troops at the ever worsening conflict.<\/em> \u00bb []<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Vice President Joe Biden is among the skeptics, insisting that expanding the presence into Afghanistan may distract from what he sees as the real fight: Pakistan. National Security Adviser James Jones is also reportedly in opposition and had previous told McChrystal not to ask for more troops.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tUn des articles chronologiquement originels de cette perception est de Nancy A. Youssef, de McClatchy Newspapers, le <a href=\"http:\/\/www.mcclatchydc.com\/washington\/story\/74649.html\" class=\"gen\">31 ao\u00fbt 2009<\/a>. Il a depuis \u00e9t\u00e9 largement confirm\u00e9 par diverses autres sources. Youssef cite une source, au Pentagone, qui r\u00e9sume le probl\u00e8me: \u00ab<em>I think they<\/em> [<em>the Obama administration<\/em>] <em>thought this would be more popular and easier, a senior Pentagon official said. We are not getting a Bush-like commitment to this war.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tWashington D.C. n&rsquo;est pas \u00e9pargn\u00e9 par les remous et les doutes qui touchent \u00e9galement Londres, comme on l&rsquo;observe ce  <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article-le_freedom_of_speech_de_l_ex-major_reconverti_dans_l_establishment_04_09_2009.html\" class=\"gen\">4 septembre 2009<\/a> du c\u00f4t\u00e9 britannique. L&rsquo;<a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article-un_nouveau_front_pour_bho_le_retrait_d_afghanistan_24_08_2009.html\" class=\"gen\">impression<\/a> est effectivement, depuis quelques semaines, depuis les pr\u00e9visions d&rsquo;envoi de troupes suppl\u00e9mentaires, d&rsquo;un emballement de la perception du conflit. La rapidit\u00e9 avec laquelle le doute a touch\u00e9 certains des plus hauts dirigeants de l&rsquo;administration est remarquable.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tSi l&rsquo;on admet l&rsquo;id\u00e9e de l&rsquo;amiral Mullen selon laquelle la guerre <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article-notes_sur_une_guerre_sans_apres__01_09_2009.html\" class=\"gen\">ne fait que commencer<\/a>, dans tous les cas pour l&rsquo;effort de guerre US et pour la perception g\u00e9n\u00e9rale de l&rsquo;importance du conflit, alors la comparaison avec Vietnam doit \u00eatre pr\u00e9cis\u00e9e comme celle d&rsquo;un Vietnam en raccourci. Il fallut au moins trois ans (de 1965, avec l&rsquo;engagement des forces US r\u00e9guli\u00e8res et le d\u00e9but des bombardements sur le Nord,  \u00e0 1968) pour que la guerre devienne impopulaire en majorit\u00e9 dans le public et commence \u00e0 faire douter la direction politique. Cette fois, quelques semaines ont suffi.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 4 septembre 2009 \u00e0 15H14<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>On savait qu&rsquo;il y avait grande difficult\u00e9 \u00e0 d\u00e9finir le front en Afghanistan. Cela n&rsquo;est pas d\u00e9menti. On ajoute simplement que cette diversit\u00e9 des choses commence \u00e0 appara\u00eetre \u00e9galement chez ceux qui nous semblaient jusqu&rsquo;ici convaincus d&rsquo;une fa\u00e7on unanime de la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 de faire cette \u00e9trange guerre aux USA m\u00eame, au sein de l&rsquo;administration Obama&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3236,1235,8638,5370,583,1010],"class_list":["post-71040","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-afghanistan","tag-biden","tag-doutes","tag-impopularite","tag-jones","tag-vietnam"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/71040","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=71040"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/71040\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=71040"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=71040"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=71040"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}