{"id":71044,"date":"2009-09-07T05:07:31","date_gmt":"2009-09-07T05:07:31","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2009\/09\/07\/de-lurss-aux-usa-via-kaboul\/"},"modified":"2009-09-07T05:07:31","modified_gmt":"2009-09-07T05:07:31","slug":"de-lurss-aux-usa-via-kaboul","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2009\/09\/07\/de-lurss-aux-usa-via-kaboul\/","title":{"rendered":"De l&rsquo;URSS aux USA, via Kaboul"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>Il est vrai que les chiffres et le symbole sont remarquables. Les pr\u00e9cisions que nous donne Mark Ames, de <em>AlterNet<\/em>, le <a href=\"http:\/\/www.alternet.org\/story\/142388\/\" class=\"gen\">5 septembre 2009<\/a>, nous sugg\u00e8rent effectivement un terrible symbole. Aujourd&rsquo;hui, le contingent US en Afghanistan d\u00e9passe de 5.000 hommes le contingent sovi\u00e9tique en Afghanistan (de 1980 \u00e0 1988).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>America now has more military personnel in Afghanistan than the Red Army had at the peak of the Soviet invasion and occupation of that country. According to a Congressional Research Service report, as of March of this year, the U.S. had 52,000 uniformed personnel and another 68,000 contractors in Afghanistan  a number that has likely grown given the blank check President Obama has written for what&rsquo;s now being called Obama&rsquo;s War.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>That makes 120,000 American military personnel fighting in Afghanistan, a figure higher than the Soviet peak troop figure of 115,000 during their catastrophic 9-year war. Just this week, General McChrystal, whom Obama appointed to command American forces in Afghanistan, is talking ofsending tens of thousands more American troops. At the height of the Soviet occupation,Western intelligence experts estimated that the Soviets had 115,000 troops in Afghanistan  but like America, the more troops and the longer the Soviets stayed, the more doomed their military mission became.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>We&rsquo;re also heading into the same casualty trap as the Soviets did. This summer has been the deadliest in the eight-year war for American troops. While the number of uniformed Americans killed in combat in Afghanistan may seem comparatively low  just over 800, most of those since 2007  the Soviets also suffered relatively light casualties. Between December 1979 and February 1989, just 13,000 Soviets were killed in Afghanistan, a seemingly paltry figure when you compare it to the 20 million Soviets killed in World War Two, and the millions upon millions who died in the Civil War and Stalin&rsquo;s Terror. Unlike America, Russians have a reputation for tolerating appalling casualty figures  and yet the war in Afghanistan destroyed the Soviet Empire.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tAutre symbole qui frappe Washington et l&rsquo;<em>establishment<\/em>, avec des effets politiques directs celui-l\u00e0, la prise de position  en faveur d&rsquo;un retrait d&rsquo;Afghanistan de George F. Will, la semaine derni\u00e8re (le <a href=\"http:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/wp-dyn\/content\/article\/2009\/09\/03\/AR2009090301866_pf.html\" class=\"gen\">4 septembre 2009<\/a> dans le Washington <em>Post<\/em>). Will est un des plus influents commentateurs conservateurs, hautement respect\u00e9, \u00e9chappant aux chapelles trop marqu\u00e9es (s&rsquo;il est en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral per\u00e7u comme proche des n\u00e9o-conservateurs, on ne peut en aucun cas le qualifier de n\u00e9o-conservateur, notamment \u00e0 cause d&rsquo;une attitude tr\u00e8s ind\u00e9pendante); \u00e9galement ferme et constant partisan de la politique expansionniste du syst\u00e8me, impeccable faucon Sa prise de position est per\u00e7ue comme un coup de tonnerre, ressentie comme une trahison par les interventionnistes.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tHier, George F. Will s&rsquo;expliquait une fois de plus, absolument pas sur la d\u00e9fensive, \u00e0 propos de cette prise de position, sur <em>ABC.News<\/em> (le <a href=\"http:\/\/blogs.abcnews.com\/george\/2009\/09\/george-will-takes-on-neocons-on-afghanistan.html\" class=\"gen\">6 septembre 2009<\/a>). Il en rajoutai en annon\u00e7ant qu&rsquo;il pourrait rassembler autour de lui autant de g\u00e9n\u00e9raux qu&rsquo;il faudrait pour soutenir sa prise de position, et citant une <a href=\"http:\/\/abcnews.go.com\/images\/ThisWeek\/Krulak_letter2.pdf\" class=\"gen\">lettre personnelle<\/a> de compl\u00e8te approbation de son article du Washington <em>Post<\/em>, du g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Krulak, ancien chef d&rsquo;\u00e9tat-major du Corps des Marines. En m\u00eame temps, Will s&rsquo;en prenait aux n\u00e9o-conservateurs qui l&rsquo;ont eux-m\u00eames vivement attaqu\u00e9 pour sa prise de position. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLes n\u00e9o-conservateurs, furieux et d\u00e9chain\u00e9s effectivement. Ils avaient en Will une r\u00e9f\u00e9rence constante de stabilit\u00e9, voire une r\u00e9f\u00e9rence de respectabilit\u00e9. Le changement de position de Will conduit Robert Kagan a publier une critique d&rsquo;une violence rare, le <a href=\"http:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/wp-dyn\/content\/article\/2009\/09\/04\/AR2009090403540.html\" class=\"gen\">5 septembre 2009<\/a>, sur la double trahison de George Will (En effet, et comme en passant, mais avec une certaine logique, Will estime que les USA doivent quitter l&rsquo;Irak sans tarder.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>It&rsquo;s hard to imagine a more disastrous blow to vital American security interests than the double surrender George Will has proposed this week. To withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan simultaneously would be to abandon American interests and allies in the Persian Gulf and the greater Middle East. The consequences of such a retreat would be to shift the balance of influence in the region decidedly away from pro-U.S. forces and in the direction of the most radical forces in Tehran, as well as toward al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah and the Taliban, to name just the most prominent beneficiaries. Longtime allies of the United States would either have to accommodate these radical forces and fall under their sway, or take matters into their own hands. What Will is proposing would constitute the largest strategic setback in American history.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>At a broader level, these withdrawals would signal to the world a new era of American isolationism. If we are willing to hand over Afghanistan and Iraq to radical terrorist forces, where would we not retreat?<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tAyez bien \u00e0 l&rsquo;esprit le mot important: isolationnisme, et r\u00e9alisez une fois de plus la rapidit\u00e9 extr\u00eame, non seulement de l&rsquo;\u00e9chauffement et de l&rsquo;approfondissement du d\u00e9bat, mais, plus encore, de l&rsquo;\u00e9volution des id\u00e9es alors qu&rsquo;on ne fait que commencer \u00e0 s&rsquo;installer dans la nouvelle phase de la guerre. (Ou, selon l&rsquo;amiral Mullen, pr\u00e9sident du Joint Chief of Staff, le <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article-notes_sur_une_guerre_sans_apres__01_09_2009.html\" class=\"gen\">v\u00e9ritable<\/a> d\u00e9but de la guerre: \u00ab<em>I recognize that we&rsquo;ve been there over eight years.<\/em> [] <em>But this is the first time we&rsquo;ve really resourced a strategy on both the civilian and military sides. So in certain ways, we&rsquo;re starting anew.<\/em>\u00bb)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tL&rsquo;enjeu ne cesse d&rsquo;\u00eatre hauss\u00e9, non plus en Afghanistan mais \u00e0 Washington. La guerre a d\u00e9finitivement bascul\u00e9, de Kaboul \u00e0 Washington, avec, de plus en plus nettement dessin\u00e9e, cette alternative extr\u00eamement inconfortable:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t Rester en Afghanistan et poursuivre ce conflit que le public repousse en majorit\u00e9, \u00e0 propos de laquelle l&rsquo;<em>establishment<\/em> s&rsquo;est divis\u00e9 en deux-trois semaines d&rsquo;une mani\u00e8re radicale et inattendue (encore la vitesse des choses). C&rsquo;est-\u00e0-dire se lancer dans une guerre ext\u00e9rieure, th\u00e9oriquement offensive sur le terrain, qui devient de plus en plus d\u00e9fensive \u00e0 Washington m\u00eame, de la part du parti des interventionnistes, qui dit d\u00e9sormais: on ne peut partir sinon toute notre politique expansionniste et h\u00e9g\u00e9monique est mise en cause. (Cela signifie, rester pour d\u00e9fendre une politique d&rsquo;ores et d\u00e9j\u00e0 en lambeaux)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t Quitter l&rsquo;Afghanistan (en plus de quitter l&rsquo;Irak), d&rsquo;une fa\u00e7on ou l&rsquo;autre, en trouvant l&rsquo;une ou l&rsquo;autre formule annexe de remplacement plus ou moins boiteuse (intervention a\u00e9rienne par engins guid\u00e9s, quelques groupes de contre-gu\u00e9rilla, etc.). Dans ce cas, et ceci \u00e0 cause de la tournure qu&rsquo;a pris le d\u00e9bat au niveau de la communication en transformant toute option de retrait en perception d&rsquo;une d\u00e9route, l&rsquo;op\u00e9ration serait aussit\u00f4t d\u00e9nonc\u00e9e, interpr\u00e9t\u00e9e, et bient\u00f4t per\u00e7ue effectivement comme une d\u00e9route des USA, un repli isolationniste, etc. On peut alors envisager des cons\u00e9quences importantes sur la stabilit\u00e9 d&rsquo;un r\u00e9gime qui est fond\u00e9 depuis plusieurs d\u00e9cennies sur un interventionnisme ext\u00e9rieur massif.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab[A]<em>nd yet the war in Afghanistan destroyed the<\/em> [<em>American<\/em>] <em>Empire<\/em>\u00bb? Une question de plus et une nouvelle crise en mode-<em>turbo<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 7 septembre 2009 \u00e0 05H10<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Il est vrai que les chiffres et le symbole sont remarquables. Les pr\u00e9cisions que nous donne Mark Ames, de AlterNet, le 5 septembre 2009, nous sugg\u00e8rent effectivement un terrible symbole. Aujourd&rsquo;hui, le contingent US en Afghanistan d\u00e9passe de 5.000 hommes le contingent sovi\u00e9tique en Afghanistan (de 1980 \u00e0 1988). \u00abAmerica now has more military personnel&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3236,4147,4118,464,3035,1242,3382,4849,3134,963,4200],"class_list":["post-71044","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-afghanistan","tag-deroute","tag-establishment","tag-f","tag-george","tag-isolationnisme","tag-kagan","tag-retrait","tag-robert","tag-urss","tag-will"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/71044","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=71044"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/71044\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=71044"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=71044"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=71044"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}