{"id":71082,"date":"2009-09-17T11:10:51","date_gmt":"2009-09-17T11:10:51","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2009\/09\/17\/gates-et-le-jsf-prudence-de-sioux-et-quelques-avertissements-a-lm\/"},"modified":"2009-09-17T11:10:51","modified_gmt":"2009-09-17T11:10:51","slug":"gates-et-le-jsf-prudence-de-sioux-et-quelques-avertissements-a-lm","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2009\/09\/17\/gates-et-le-jsf-prudence-de-sioux-et-quelques-avertissements-a-lm\/","title":{"rendered":"Gates et le JSF: prudence de Sioux et quelques avertissements \u00e0 LM\u2026"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>Le secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense US Robert Gates a fait un discours important \u00e0 la convention annuelle de l&rsquo;Air Force Association (AFA), \u00e0 National Harbor, ce <a href=\"http:\/\/www.defenselink.mil\/speeches\/speech.aspx?speechid=1379\" class=\"gen\">16 septembre 2009<\/a>. C&rsquo;\u00e9tait un discours de r\u00e9conciliation, ou sans doute voulu comme tel par l&rsquo;AFA autant que par Gates, apr\u00e8s les d\u00e9cisions controvers\u00e9es du secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense, et sa longue bataille avec l&rsquo;USAF depuis <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article-gates_versus_l_usaf_a_fond_06_06_2008.html\" class=\"gen\">juin 2008<\/a>. (On sait, bien s\u00fbr, que l&rsquo;AFA est le principal lobby de l&rsquo;USAF aux USA.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tGates a parl\u00e9 de tout, plut\u00f4t que de tout et de rien, \u00e0 la gloire de l&rsquo;USAF revue selon ses conceptions. Pour ce cas, nous nous arr\u00eatons au passage qu&rsquo;il consacre au F-35 (JSF), parce qu&rsquo;il est d&rsquo;un certain int\u00e9r\u00eat, parce que le JSF nous int\u00e9resse, et \u00e9galement la position de Gates vis-\u00e0-vis du JSF<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>The largest piece of the U.S. air-dominance portfolio, designed to span a wide range of the conflict spectrum, is the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. It lacks some of the high-end air-to-air attributes of the F-22, but this fifth-generation stealth aircraft has cutting edge capabilities in electronic warfare and in suppressing enemy air defenses.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t<em>Without question, the F-35 program represents an ambitious effort. More than 3,000 aircraft, counting all military services and foreign partners. Twenty-two million lines of code. Over $46 billion for development plus an estimated $300 billion in total acquisition costs. A truly massive investment in the future of U.S. air power.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>As with every advanced military and commercial aircraft, the F-35 has seen its share of rising costs, delays, and other development issues  and no doubt will see more challenges in the future. Three weeks ago I had a chance to tour the F-35 plant in Fort Worth. I made clear to the manufacturers our expectations with regard to costs and schedule, and they assured me that earlier problems are being aggressively confronted and addressed.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Next year&rsquo;s budget reflects a major commitment to accelerate the development and production of the F-35  with nearly half a billion dollars added to the FY 10 budget to support the flight-test program. Our objective continues to be to equip the first training squadron at Eglin Air Force Base in 2011, and achieve initial operating capability for the Marines and Air Force in 2012 and 2013 respectively. I consider the F-35 program a major leadership priority  with all that entails with regard to funding, oversight, and accountability.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tD\u00e9codons les d\u00e9clarations de Gates Le moins qu&rsquo;on puisse dire est que la prudence et le quant-\u00e0-soi dominent la chose, et certaines pr\u00e9cautions, \u00e9galement, qui permettent \u00e0 Gates de prendre date  \u00e0 tout hasard. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t D&rsquo;abord, un r\u00e9sum\u00e9 rapide de l&rsquo;ampleur consid\u00e9rable du programme, avec des chiffres qui montrent qu&rsquo;on se trouve vraiment tr\u00e8s haut, avec autour de $346 milliards, et qu&rsquo;on reste encore dans l&rsquo;estimation qui tendrait plut\u00f4t vers l&rsquo;augmentation (\u00ab<em>Over $46 billion for development plus an estimated $300 billion in total acquisition costs.<\/em>\u00bb). Il s&rsquo;agit d&rsquo;une estimation qui d\u00e9passe celles qu&rsquo;on accepte g\u00e9n\u00e9ralement pour le programme.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t L&rsquo;\u00e9normit\u00e9, l&rsquo;ambition du programme, font que le JSF, comme tout autre programme de cette dimension a connu des probl\u00e8mes et en conna\u00eetra encore (\u00ab<em>the F-35 has seen its share of rising costs, delays, and other development issues  and no doubt will see more challenges in the future<\/em>\u00bb). Cette remarque est largement d\u00e9marqu\u00e9e de l&rsquo;habituelle description \u00e9clatante d&rsquo;optimisme et de certitude que font les officiels du domaine (Lockheed Martin [LM] et le JSF Program Office [JPO]). Elle marque la reconnaissance des difficult\u00e9s qu&rsquo;a connues le programme et des tr\u00e8s probables difficult\u00e9s, ou d\u00e9fis si l&rsquo;on veut, qui l&rsquo;attendent encore.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t Maintenant, mettons les choses au point, dit clairement le secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense. Il est all\u00e9 \u00e0 <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article-gates_et_jet_fort-worth_aller-retour_03_09_2009.html\" class=\"gen\">Fort-Worth<\/a> (le 31 ao\u00fbt) pour dire \u00e0 LM quelles sont les exigences de la direction du Pentagone pour les co\u00fbts et le d\u00e9veloppement, et il en rapport\u00e9 l&rsquo;assurance de LM que toutes les difficult\u00e9s qu&rsquo;a connues le programme sont prises en main et trait\u00e9es avec pugnacit\u00e9 (\u00ab<em>I made clear to the manufacturers our expectations with regard to costs and schedule, and they assured me that earlier problems are being aggressively confronted and addressed<\/em>\u00bb). Le moins qu&rsquo;on puisse dire est que Gates passe d\u00e9licatement la patate chaude \u00e0 LM. Le principal contractant du JSF est d\u00e9sormais clairement inform\u00e9 de ce qu&rsquo;on attend de lui; Gates prend bien soin de rapporter l&rsquo;affirmation de LM que les probl\u00e8mes du JSF sont <strong>en train<\/strong> d&rsquo;\u00eatre trait\u00e9s avec pugnacit\u00e9. (Ce dernier point, tout de m\u00eame d&rsquo;une certaine importance  les mots <em>are being<\/em> [sont en train de], ce qui sous-entend que ces difficult\u00e9s ne sont pas encore r\u00e9solues.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t Le JSF aura tout le soutien et le financement n\u00e9cessaires dans les ann\u00e9es \u00e0 venir, mais, en contrepartie et comme il est normal au regard de son importance, il sera plac\u00e9 sous une surveillance intensive (\u00ab<em>I consider the F-35 program a major leadership priority  with all that entails with regard to funding, oversight, and accountability<\/em>\u00bb).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t Observons, comme remarque compl\u00e9mentaire, que Gates ne partage pas compl\u00e8tement l&rsquo;estimation de LM qui tend \u00e0 faire du F-35 un appareil \u00e9quivalent au F-22 pour ses capacit\u00e9s de combat a\u00e9rien: \u00ab<em>It lacks some of the high-end air-to-air attributes of the F-22.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tGates est un habile bureaucrate. Avec ces quelques phrases, il nous d\u00e9crit le programme JSF tel qu&rsquo;il est: des difficult\u00e9s importantes de d\u00e9veloppement, qui ne sont pas encore r\u00e9solues, et certainement d&rsquo;autres \u00e0 venir; la responsabilit\u00e9 de Lockheed Martin bien affirm\u00e9e, et l&rsquo;annonce que le Pentagone suivra avec attention et vigilance tout ce qui se passera. Le JSF est d\u00e9sormais un programme sous surveillance, et rien de ce qu&rsquo;a dit le secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense ne d\u00e9ment toutes les inqui\u00e9tudes et critiques qui ont \u00e9t\u00e9 exprim\u00e9es et \u00e9mises \u00e0 son propos. Avec ces quelques phrases, \u00e9galement, Gates se met dans la position d&rsquo;arbitre plus que de partisan, avec \u00e9ventuellement, plus tard, en cas de malheur, la possibilit\u00e9 de d\u00e9signer le principal responsable.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 17 septembre 2009 \u00e0 10H27<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Le secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense US Robert Gates a fait un discours important \u00e0 la convention annuelle de l&rsquo;Air Force Association (AFA), \u00e0 National Harbor, ce 16 septembre 2009. C&rsquo;\u00e9tait un discours de r\u00e9conciliation, ou sans doute voulu comme tel par l&rsquo;AFA autant que par Gates, apr\u00e8s les d\u00e9cisions controvers\u00e9es du secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense,&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[248,3143,8473,8675,2969,3318,3984,250,3501,3502],"class_list":["post-71082","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-afa","tag-air","tag-association","tag-avertissement","tag-f-35","tag-force","tag-gates","tag-jsf","tag-lockheed","tag-martin"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/71082","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=71082"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/71082\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=71082"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=71082"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=71082"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}