Lockheed Martin et, sans doute (qui sait?), le Pentagone continuent \u00e0 psalmodier les perspectives paradisiaques de vente du JSF, entre 4.500 et 6.000 pour commencer. A l’\u00e9poque o\u00f9 ces estimations d\u00e9j\u00e0 partout chuchot\u00e9es avaient \u00e9t\u00e9 officiellement affirm\u00e9es (voir le 12 juillet 2002<\/a>), nous avions not\u00e9 combien la m\u00e9thodologie usait d’une technique prospective s’apparentant \u00e0 la fois de la comptabilit\u00e9 de la firme Enron et de la philosophie des Marx brothers<\/em>. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tNotre ami Johan Boeder, qui tient depuis plusieurs ann\u00e9es le site<\/a> hollandais JSFNieuws<\/em> (avec traduction Google<\/em> en fran\u00e7ais<\/a> notamment) attach\u00e9 \u00e0 suivre le d\u00e9veloppement du JSF, a r\u00e9alis\u00e9 un rapport pour la commission de d\u00e9fense du parlement hollandais, sur les perspectives g\u00e9n\u00e9rales et globales de vente du JSF. Ce rapport a \u00e9t\u00e9 livr\u00e9 aux parlementaires en septembre. On peut y acc\u00e9der<\/a> directement depuis le 6 octobre. Il a \u00e9t\u00e9 pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 et comment\u00e9 notamment par defense-aerospace.com<\/em>, le m\u00eame 6 octobre 2009<\/a>. Ce rapport a \u00e9t\u00e9 remarquablement diffus\u00e9, au-del\u00e0 du r\u00e9seau Internet, notamment dans la grande presse sp\u00e9cialis\u00e9e US, par un tr\u00e8s long article de Defense News<\/em> le 19 octobre 2009<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tLe rapport, qui est pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 notamment dans son summary<\/em> sous la forme suivante, conclut que les estimations de 4.500-6.000 exemplaires promis \u00e0 la vente sont totalement d\u00e9pass\u00e9es et qu’il faut aujourd’hui se baser plut\u00f4t, dans des conditions normales o\u00f9 le programme serait r\u00e9alis\u00e9 selon les conditions et la chronologie officielles (hypoth\u00e8se optimiste), sur tout au plus 2.500 exemplaires, avec les cons\u00e9quences qu’on imagine sur l’avion lui-m\u00eame, notamment d’augmentation des co\u00fbts par exemplaire.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abThis 136 page report examines in detail the various figures provided by Lockheed Martin and the JSF Program Office to prospective JSF partners, including the Netherlands, to support the JSF’s business case in these countries. It demonstrates that, while Lockheed and JSF Program Office are still using figures based on the state of the fighter market in the late 1990s, these are no longer credible.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe report describes what will potentially cause lower numbers in the US Forces and several other Air Forces and what clear indications we have already about the increasing F-35 number to be procured.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tL’int\u00e9r\u00eat de l’intervention de Defense News<\/em> est que son article, en plus de d\u00e9tailler le travail de Boeder, pr\u00e9sente des interventions d’un expert US, allant dans le sens du rapport, et une r\u00e9action qu’on peut tenir pour officielle de Lockheed Martin repoussant \u00e9videmment les conclusions du rapport. Le fait remarquable est cette r\u00e9action \u00e0 une analyse non-US portant sur un programme US d’une importance fondamentale. Certes, les Hollandais sont impliqu\u00e9s dans le programme, mais l’establishment<\/em> et l’industrie US n’ont pas l’habitude d’accorder quelque importance que ce soit \u00e0 des observations et des analyses, m\u00eame de pays alli\u00e9s comptabilis\u00e9s comme de futurs utilisateurs, sur un de leurs programmes strat\u00e9giques fondamentaux. L’habitude unilat\u00e9rale de la toute-puissance, aux USA, implique le d\u00e9sint\u00e9r\u00eat pour le Rest Of the World<\/em> et pour ce qu’il pense. Il faut donc conclure que cette habitude se heurte d\u00e9sormais \u00e0 une tr\u00e8s forte pr\u00e9occupation quant \u00e0 la validit\u00e9 de cette toute-puissance, \u00e0 une inqui\u00e9tude \u00e9vidente, qui refl\u00e8tent autant l’\u00e9tat catastrophique du programme JSF que le d\u00e9clin acc\u00e9l\u00e9r\u00e9 de la puissance US en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tVoici un extrait de l’article de Defense News<\/em> sur cet aspect pr\u00e9cis des r\u00e9actions US au rapport de Boeder<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abLockheed dismisses Boeder’s forecast, saying that the company anticipates no drop in demand for F-35s. F-35 quantities have held steady for most of the decade, Lockheed spokesman Chris Geisel said. Year after year, the program has received strong political and budgetary support. Geisel said that if F-35 numbers change, it is more likely that they will increase than decrease. That’s because hundreds of current fighters are approaching retirement age, and nations beyond the nine countries that are F 35 partners are expressing interest in buying the aircraft, he said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbBut U.S. defense analyst Barry Watts agreed that ultimately, it is likely that only half of the planned F-35s will be built. Watts, of the Washington-based Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, said history is against the F-35. In the four stealthy aircraft programs that preceded the F-35, the U.S. military declared a need for 2,378 planes, but ultimately bought only 267. Those programs were the F-117, A-12, B-2 and F-22.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbCurrent plans are for the U.S. military to buy 2,443 F-35s, but if history is any guide, I would not hold my breath waiting for that many purchases to be completed. I think the number is going to be about half of that, said Watts, who is a retired Air Force combat pilot and former chief of the Pentagon’s Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation. Such a sharp decrease in the number of F 35s built would mean that huge research and development costs will be spread across fewer planes, increasing the cost of each, he said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbWatts said he expects the U.S. Air Force to buy 800 to 1,000 F-35s instead of the 1,763 in current service plans. The Air Force can get by with fewer F-35s because it has decided to keep A-10s and F-15Es in service. And the U.S. Navy is likely to reconsider F 35 buys because the plane does not have adequate range to permit U.S. aircraft carriers to operate outside the range of area denial weapons being developed by China and other nations, Watts said.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 27 octobre 2009 \u00e0 07H29<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Lockheed Martin et, sans doute (qui sait?), le Pentagone continuent \u00e0 psalmodier les perspectives paradisiaques de vente du JSF, entre 4.500 et 6.000 pour commencer. A l’\u00e9poque o\u00f9 ces estimations d\u00e9j\u00e0 partout chuchot\u00e9es avaient \u00e9t\u00e9 officiellement affirm\u00e9es (voir le 12 juillet 2002), nous avions not\u00e9 combien la m\u00e9thodologie usait d’une technique prospective s’apparentant \u00e0 la… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[7247,3019,4275,3203,250,4003,7603,5295,8853],"class_list":["post-71212","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-boeder","tag-defense","tag-exportations","tag-hollande","tag-jsf","tag-news","tag-prevision","tag-rapport","tag-vente"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/71212","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=71212"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/71212\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=71212"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=71212"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=71212"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}