{"id":71324,"date":"2009-12-09T09:41:10","date_gmt":"2009-12-09T09:41:10","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2009\/12\/09\/du-troisieme-reich-au-jsf\/"},"modified":"2009-12-09T09:41:10","modified_gmt":"2009-12-09T09:41:10","slug":"du-troisieme-reich-au-jsf","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2009\/12\/09\/du-troisieme-reich-au-jsf\/","title":{"rendered":"Du Troisi\u00e8me Reich au JSF"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>Le JSF \u00e9tant le programme le plus avanc\u00e9 du point de vue technologique et de tous les points de vue modernistes et postmodernistes qui vont avec, on n&rsquo;est pas plus \u00e9tonn\u00e9 que cela d&rsquo;apprendre que l&rsquo;acc\u00e9l\u00e9ration du programme voulu par le secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense Gates d\u00e9pend, notamment, pour le cas expos\u00e9 ici, d&rsquo;un mat\u00e9riel datant des ann\u00e9es 1950 \u00e0 partir de machines allemandes dont la conception initiale fut d\u00e9velopp\u00e9e durant la Deuxi\u00e8me Guerre mondiale, sous le Troisi\u00e8me Reich. Ces machines semblent actuellement incapables de suivre le nouveau rythme demand\u00e9 et connaissent des ennuis \u00e0 mesure. On sait l&rsquo;importance pour l&rsquo;\u00e9ventuelle survie du programme de l&rsquo;acc\u00e9l\u00e9ration de sa production, qui devrait permettre l&rsquo;acc\u00e9l\u00e9ration du programme d&rsquo;essais en vol, donc la r\u00e9duction de l&rsquo;encha\u00eenement des modifications \u00e0 effectuer, donc la r\u00e9duction des co\u00fbts et ainsi de suite.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tApr\u00e8s nous avoir d\u00e9crit toutes ces circonstances pressantes, la petite nouvelle de <em>France-M\u00e9tallurgie<\/em>, qui est mise en ligne le <a href=\"http:\/\/aciers.free.fr\/index.php\/2009\/12\/08\/la-panne-de-presse-dalcoa-freine-le-programme-du-chasseur-f-35-de-lus-air-force-us\/\" class=\"gen\">8 d\u00e9cembre 2009<\/a>, poursuit:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>Because the F-35 relied on foreign partners for investment in its development companies in these countries have been given some of the manufacturing work. Alcoa Inc. (AA) is one the companies that will provide aluminum alloy bulkheads used to assemble the aircraft&rsquo;s fuselage. These are large, complex shapes that must be made through the use of a press. In 2007 Lockheed subcontracted to Alcoa for these parts some of which are up to twenty-three feet long. In order to meet the new accelerated production goals of the program Alcoa is investing its own money in refurbishing its twenty-five ton press which will aid in making these assemblies.This one year, $110 million project will be critical to both Alcoa and Lockheed to support the new schedule. Of interest this press was actually one of two built by the U.S. Government in the Fifties to support its domestic aviation industry. It has actually been named a historical landmark by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME). This means that America&rsquo;s most technically advanced aircraft will be made by equipment that is over fifty years old and is considered a historical landmark. Of further interest it is based on a German designed one from World War II. This illustrates that the U.S. and many other countries would have a hard time increasing production of such items due to limits on key industrial capability. The ability to quickly build something like this press would be hard. It is in some ways a testament to modern industrial engineering that this piece of equipment still exists and is available for this program. It also illustrates that without this kind of investment it will be hard to increase JSF production rates.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tS&rsquo;il y a divers motifs d&rsquo;\u00e9tonnement et de r\u00e9flexion dans cette nouvelle, il y a d&rsquo;abord le constat concernant la planification et la gestion du programme. On est donc fond\u00e9 \u00e0 se demander comment Lockheed Martin (et le Pentagone, qui aurait du suivre l&rsquo;affaire) a pu programmer la fourniture de pi\u00e8ces si importantes \u00e0 partir d&rsquo;appareillages qui semblent compl\u00e8tement hors de son contr\u00f4le, qui paraissent dans un \u00e9tat de marche d\u00e9licat (ce qui se comprend, vu l&rsquo;\u00e2ge de la chose), qui semblent se trouver \u00e0 un tel rythme de fourniture (n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 de la comp\u00e9titivit\u00e9) qu&rsquo;ils ne peuvent acc\u00e9l\u00e9rer leur rythme de production et ainsi de suite. Cette situation est la cons\u00e9quence directe du cloisonnement des conceptions dans le cadre de la globalisation per\u00e7ue comme une donn\u00e9e acquise, sans aucune consid\u00e9ration pour les pr\u00e9cautions habituellement prises pour les programmes de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale (notamment avec le contr\u00f4le de tous les \u00e9l\u00e9ments de fabrication et de leurs sources).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLockheed Martin a pass\u00e9 ses contrats de sous-traitance selon le seul crit\u00e8re de la comp\u00e9titivit\u00e9 qui est la r\u00e8gle d&rsquo;or du syst\u00e8me, sans le moindre souci des questions politiques habituelles (fournisseurs \u00e9trangers, capacit\u00e9 de ces fournisseurs de soutenir ou d&rsquo;augmenter en cas de n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 le rythme de la production, autorit\u00e9 sur ces fournisseurs, etc.). Le programme JSF est effectivement l&rsquo;arch\u00e9type de la globalisation du syst\u00e8me et de son \u00e9chec. Il n&rsquo;est pas sorti de son auberge globalis\u00e9e, et l&rsquo;on se doute bien que le cas Alcoa est exemplaire bien plus qu&rsquo;exceptionnel.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 9 d\u00e9cembre 2009 \u00e0 09H47<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Le JSF \u00e9tant le programme le plus avanc\u00e9 du point de vue technologique et de tous les points de vue modernistes et postmodernistes qui vont avec, on n&rsquo;est pas plus \u00e9tonn\u00e9 que cela d&rsquo;apprendre que l&rsquo;acc\u00e9l\u00e9ration du programme voulu par le secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense Gates d\u00e9pend, notamment, pour le cas expos\u00e9 ici, d&rsquo;un mat\u00e9riel&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[8991,8992,2632,250,3182,5630],"class_list":["post-71324","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-alcoa","tag-competitivite","tag-globalisation","tag-jsf","tag-reich","tag-troisieme"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/71324","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=71324"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/71324\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=71324"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=71324"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=71324"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}