A consid\u00e9rer par rapport \u00e0 la relation et \u00e0 l’analyse que nous faisons des premiers \u00e9chos du trait\u00e9 START-II (voir ce 29 mars 2010<\/a>), une analyse d’AFP (SpaceWar.com<\/em> ce 29 mars 2010<\/a>) qui consid\u00e8re que les Russes ont obtenu beaucoup.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tL’analyse est fond\u00e9e sur le fait que les Russes \u00e9tablissent une position de parit\u00e9 avec les USA, et que, sur la question des anti-missiles non r\u00e9solue de fa\u00e7on satisfaisante, ils ont des moyens d’action l\u00e9galement pr\u00e9vues par le trait\u00e9. Ce jugement, fond\u00e9 sur ce qu’on sait actuellement du trait\u00e9, montre surtout que diverses interpr\u00e9tations sont possibles et que l’\u00e9valuation r\u00e9elle du trait\u00e9 est pour l’instant tr\u00e8s difficile \u00e0 faire. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abRussia has much to be happy about in its new nuclear disarmament treaty with the United States, including a respectable compromise on the hot-button issue of missile defence, analysts said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbWith the treaty finally ready after months of difficult negotiations, Russia is now watching warily to see whether it will be ratified by the US Senate, where conservative Republicans have the power to kill it.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbRussian analysts described the new treaty as balanced an accomplishment in and of itself, given Moscow’s hunger to be seen as an equal to Washington after losing the Cold War and suffering a deep decline in the 1990s.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbIt is very good for Russia that it reached an agreement which on the whole was fairly even in nature, Roland Timerbaev, a retired Russian diplomat and veteran of US-Soviet arms control talks, told AFP. At the end of the day America is more powerful than Russia. This is clear, said Timerbaev, who took part in the original talks on the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which the new agreement will replace.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbMoscow has touted the fact that the treaty, due to be signed by US President Barack Obama and his Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev in Prague on April 8, includes language linking strategic offensive arms to missile defence.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbRussia, which is unhappy about US plans to build missile defences in eastern Europe, had long pushed for such a linkage and the issue was one of the main problems dragging out the negotiations.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbWashington says its missile defences are meant to protect against the threat of short- and medium-range missiles from Iran and not against Russia’s vast arsenal of long-range missiles, but Moscow is still wary of the plans.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe new treaty will impose no restrictions on US missile defences, both US Defence Secretary Robert Gates and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said on Friday after the agreement was announced. However, Lavrov made it clear that Russia reserved the right to pull out of the nuclear disarmament process if it believed the United States was going too far with missile defence.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThis is a fairly even compromise. There could not have been any limits on missile defence in the treaty, because it is a treaty on strategic arms and not on missile defence, said retired Russian general Vladimir Dvorkin. The agreement is balanced and reflects the interests of both Russia and the United States, Dvorkin, who is now an analyst at the Centre for International Security in Moscow, told AFP.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \n dedefensa.org<\/em><\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" START-II : bon pour les Russes ? A consid\u00e9rer par rapport \u00e0 la relation et \u00e0 l’analyse que nous faisons des premiers \u00e9chos du trait\u00e9 START-II (voir ce 29 mars 2010), une analyse d’AFP (SpaceWar.com ce 29 mars 2010) qui consid\u00e8re que les Russes ont obtenu beaucoup. L’analyse est fond\u00e9e sur le fait que les… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[14],"tags":[3453,2730,9097,2804],"class_list":["post-71716","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-ouverture-libre","tag-anti-missiles","tag-russie","tag-start-ii","tag-usa"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/71716","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=71716"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/71716\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=71716"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=71716"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=71716"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}