Les mots divers du g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Petraeus le 16 mars devant le S\u00e9nat US ont ouvert une sacr\u00e9e pol\u00e9mique, on l’a vu<\/a>. Ils ont touch\u00e9 un nerf \u00e0 vif au cur du syst\u00e8me et conduisent d\u00e9sormais \u00e0 une mise en cause du plus beau r\u00e9visionnisme possible, avec une querelle \u00e0 mesure. Il s’agit de l’attitude des USA \u00e0 la naissance, en 1948, de l’Etat d’Isra\u00ebl, plus particuli\u00e8rement de l’attitude du Pentagone et, surtout, du secr\u00e9taire d’Etat de cette \u00e9poque, le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral George C. Marshall, certainement l’un des plus grands soldats de l’histoire militaire des USA avec le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Robert E. Lee. (Selon notre classification, qui se garde des anath\u00e8mes mais tient compte des qualit\u00e9s humaines d’un gentleman<\/em>, m\u00eame au cur d’un syst\u00e8me si pervers.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t D’abord, le 5 f\u00e9vrier 2010<\/a>, il y avait eu, sur Intifida-Palestine.com<\/em> un texte de Jeff Gates, excellent auteur critique de la politique US et anciennement (dans les ann\u00e9es 1980), conseiller de la commission des op\u00e9rations bancaires de la Chambre des Repr\u00e9sentants. Gates attaquait les divers mythes qui ont cours aujourd’hui sur Isra\u00ebl. Un passage nous int\u00e9resse, qui concerne les conditions dans lesquelles Truman d\u00e9cida de reconna\u00eetre l’Etat d’Isra\u00ebl (ou, dans tous les cas, certaines de ces conditions, Gates pr\u00e9sentant par ailleurs Truman comme un chr\u00e9tien fondamentaliste, type GW Bush, ou chr\u00e9tien-sioniste, acceptant l’id\u00e9e biblique de la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 du retour du peuple d’Isra\u00ebl sur sa terre ancestrale avant le retour du Messie). <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abWhite House counsel Clark Clifford cautioned Truman that his reelection was unlikely absent the funding that Jewish-Americanswith Israel’s recognitionwere eager to provide. In early May 1948, General George C. Marshall, Truman’s Secretary of State, argued vigorously against recognition. Strong objections were also heard from the diplomatic corps, the fledgling Central Intelligence Agency and the Pentagon’s Joint Chiefs of Staff.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbMarshall, the top-ranked U.S. military officer in WWII, was outraged that Clifford put domestic political expedience ahead of U.S. foreign policy interests. Marshall told Truman that he would vote against him if he extended sovereign status to an enclave of Zionist terrorists, religious fanatics and what Albert Einstein and Jewish philosopher Hannah Arendt called Jewish fascists. Marshall insisted that State Department personnel never again speak to Clifford.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbIn March 1948, a Joint Chiefs paper titled Force Requirements for Palestine predicted the Zionist strategy will seek to involve<\/em> [the U.S.<\/em>] in a continuously widening and deepening series of operations intended to secure maximum Jewish objectives. Those objectives included an expansionist agenda for Greater Israel that envisioned the taking of Arab land, ensuring armed clashes in which the U.S. was destined to become embroiled.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t L’int\u00e9r\u00eat de la chose est que, le 1er avril 2010<\/a>, sur Foreign Policy<\/em> (texte qui nous est signal\u00e9 par War In Context<\/em>, le m\u00eame 1er avril 2010<\/a>), Mark Perry, l’auteur du texte du 13 mars 2010<\/a> qui mit le feu aux poudres avant la d\u00e9position du 16 mars de Petraeus, reprend le m\u00eame th\u00e8me des d\u00e9bats entre Truman, Marshall et Clifford lors de la cr\u00e9ation d’Isra\u00ebl. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abThat Marshall was an anti-Semite has been retailed regularly since 1948 when it became known that, by that time as US Secretary of State, he not only opposed the U.S. stance in favor of the partition of Palestine, but vehemently recommended that the U.S. not recognize the State of Israel that emerged. Harry Truman disagreed and Marshall and Truman clashed in a meeting in the Oval Office, on May 12, 1948. Truman relied on president counselor Clark Clifford to make the argument. Clifford faced Marshall: the U.S. had made a moral commitment to the world’s Jews that dated from Britain’s 1919 Balfour Declaration, he argued, and the U.S would be supported by Israel in the Middle East. The Holocaust had made Israel’s creation an imperative and, moreover, Israel would be a democracy. He then added: Jewish-Americans, were an important voting bloc and would favor the decision.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbMarshall exploded. Mr. President, he said, I thought this meeting was called to consider an important, complicated problem in foreign policy. I don’t even know why Clifford is here. Truman attempted to calm Marshall, whom he admired but Marshall was not satisfied. I do not think that politics should play any role in our decision, he said. The meeting ended acrimoniously, though Truman attempted to placate Marshall by noting that he was inclined to side with him. That wasn’t true the U.S. voted to recognize Israel and worked to support its emerging statehood. Marshall remained enraged.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbWhen Marshall returned to the State Department from his meeting with Truman, he memorialized the meeting:<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbI remarked to the president that, speaking objectively, I could not help but think that suggestions made by Mr. Clifford were wrong. I thought that to adopt these suggestions would have precisely the opposite effect from that intended by him. The transparent dodge to win a few votes would not, in fact, achieve this purpose. The great dignity of the office of the president would be seriously damaged. The counsel offered by Mr. Clifford’s advice was based on domestic political considerations, while the problem confronting us was international. I stated bluntly that if the president were to follow Mr. Clifford’s advice, and if I were to vote in the next election, I would vote against the president.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbPut more simply, Marshall believed that Truman was sacrificing American security for American votes.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe Truman-Marshall argument over Israel has entered American lore and been a subject of widespread historical controversy. Was Marshall’s opposition to recognition of Israel a reflection of his, and the American establishment’s, latent anti-Semitism? Or was it a credible reflection of U.S. military worries that the creation of Israel would engage America in a defense of the small country that would drain American resources and lives? In the years since, a gaggle of historians and politicians have weighed in with their own opinions, the most recent being Ambassador Richard Holbrooke. Writing in the Washington Post on May 7, 2008, Holbrooke noted that beneath the surface of the Truman-Marshall controversy lay unspoken but real anti-Semitism on the part of some (but not all) policymakers. The position of those opposing recognition was simple oil, numbers and history.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\nNotre commentaire<\/h4>\n