Le site War In Context<\/em> cite, le 16 avril 2010<\/a>, un discours de l’ancien ambassadeur US Ches Freeman. L’ancien diplomate parle de la militarisation des USA .<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abThe excesses that brought about the wide-ranging devaluation of our global standing originate, I think, in our politically self-serving reinterpretation of the Cold War soon after it ended. As George Kennan predicted, the Soviet Union was eventually brought down by the infirmities of its system. The USSR thus lost its Cold War with America and our allies. We were still standing when it fell. They lost. We won, if only by default. Yet Americans rapidly developed the conviction that military prowess and Ronald Reagan’s ideological bravado not the patient application of diplomatic and military containment to a gangrenous Soviet system had brought us victory. Ours was a triumph of grand strategy in which a strong American military backed political and economic measures short of war to enable us to prevail without fighting. Ironically, however, our politicians came to portray this as a military victory. The diplomacy and alliance management that went into it were forgotten. It was publicly transmuted into a triumph based on the formidable capabilities of our military-industrial complex, supplemented by our righteous denunciation of evil.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbMany things followed from this neo-conservative-influenced myth. One conclusion was the notion that diplomacy is for losers. If military superiority was the key to victory in the Cold War, it followed for many that we should bear any burden and pay any price to sustain that superiority in every region of the world, no matter what people in these regions felt about this. This was a conclusion that our military-industrial complex heard with approval. It had fattened on the Cold War but was beginning to suffer from enemy deprivation syndrome that is, the disorientation and queasy apprehension about future revenue one gets when one’s enemy has irresponsibly dropped dead. With no credible enemy clearly in view, how was the defense industrial base to be kept in business? The answer was to make the preservation of global military hegemony our objective. With no real discussion and little fanfare, we did so. This led to increases in defense spending despite the demise of the multifaceted threat posed by the USSR. In other words, it worked.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbOnly a bit over sixty percent of our military spending is in the Department of Defense budget, with the rest hidden like Easter eggs in the nooks and crannies of other federal departments and agencies’ budgets. If you put it all together, however, defense-related spending comes to about $1.2 trillion, or about eight percent of our GDP. That is quite a bit more than the figure usually cited, which is the mere $685 billion (or 4.6 percent of GDP) of our official defense budget. Altogether, we spend more on military power than the rest of the world friend or foe combined. (This way we can be sure we can defeat everyone in the world if they all gang up on us. Don’t laugh! If we are sufficiently obnoxious, we might just drive them to it.) No one questions this level of spending or asks what it is for. Politicians just tell us it is short of what we require. We have embraced the cult of the warrior. The defense budget is its totem.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n Chas Freeman, ancien ambassadeur US (notamment en Arabie Saoudite), fut la premi\u00e8re victime d’importance du lobby isra\u00e9lien \u00e0 Washington sous l’administration Obama, en mars 2009<\/a>. Le lobby isra\u00e9lien \u00e0 Washington est l’une des pi\u00e8ces de ce syst\u00e8me anthropotechnique militaro-industriel dont le Pentagone est la pi\u00e8ce centrale (cela, tout en observant que cette partie du syst\u00e8me, entre Pentagone et lobby isra\u00e9lien, est lui-m\u00eame aujourd’hui plong\u00e9 dans une crise s\u00e9rieuse sinon gravissime<\/a> les choses \u00e9voluent vite). Ce syst\u00e8me a conduit \u00e0 une intense militarisation des USA, notamment durant ces vingt derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es. C’est sur ce sujet que Chas Freeman s’est exprim\u00e9.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tDans l’extrait de son discours donn\u00e9 par War In Context<\/em>, ci-dessus, on retient ce passage o\u00f9 Freeman explique ce nouveau stade de militarisation des USA \u00e0 partir des ann\u00e9es 1980, avec son \u00e9valuation des v\u00e9ritables<\/strong> allocations budg\u00e9taires du Pentagone. Cette \u00e9valuation est \u00e9videmment celle d’une somme colossale. La chose vient ici d’un diplomate et non d’un expert militaire, ce qui donne plus de poids \u00e0 une \u00e9valuation qui tend de plus en plus, et fort heureusement, \u00e0 remplacer dans l’esprit g\u00e9n\u00e9ral des observateurs la narrative<\/em> que recouvre la comptabilit\u00e9 officielle, \u00e9videmment faussaire, que le syst\u00e8me donne de ses d\u00e9penses militaires. Le niveau atteint ne se commente plus en termes budg\u00e9taires et comptables, mais en observations \u00e9videntes sur une schizophr\u00e9nie de syst\u00e8me. Dans ce cas, oui, nous pouvons parler de la pathologie d’un syst\u00e8me anthropotechnique comme si nous parlions d’une personne.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tL’int\u00e9r\u00eat de l’intervention de Freeman est qu’il place son \u00e9valuation dans la perspective historique et fait implicitement justice de la version selon laquelle c’est le r\u00e9armement entrepris sous Reagan qui eut raison de l’Union Sovi\u00e9tique. Au contraire, Freeman estime que c’est la diplomatie prudente des USA qui permit l’\u00e9volution de la situation o\u00f9 l’URSS s’\u00e9croula de l’int\u00e9rieure, toute seule si l’on veut (c’est-\u00e0-dire sans l’intervention US mais avec l’intervention essentielle de Mikha\u00efl Gorbatchev). \u00abAs George Kennan predicted, the Soviet Union was eventually brought down by the infirmities of its system. The USSR thus lost its Cold War with America and our allies. We were still standing when it fell. They lost. We won, if only by default. Yet Americans rapidly developed the conviction that military prowess and Ronald Reagan’s ideological bravado<\/em> [] had brought us victory<\/em>\u00bb C’est apr\u00e8s cet effondrement que l’histoire fut r\u00e9invent\u00e9e d’une victoire par la course aux armements impos\u00e9e par les USA, justifiant qu’on lance effectivement aux USA une politique de surarmement apr\u00e8s la chute de l’URSS, qui devint effective \u00e0 la fin du si\u00e8cle, avec le passage de l’administration Clinton \u00e0 l’administration GW Bush.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tIl s’agit d’une r\u00e9\u00e9criture de l’histoire r\u00e9cente qui est un pur produit du syst\u00e8me de communication. Cette r\u00e9\u00e9criture fut d\u00e9velopp\u00e9e dans les ann\u00e9es 1990, notamment gr\u00e2ce \u00e0 l’habilet\u00e9 de communication des groupes n\u00e9oconservateurs soutenus par des puissances d’argent. L’aspect le plus remarquable de cette \u00e9volution est qu’elle se fit sans aucune n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 strat\u00e9gique et militaire de quelque ordre que ce soit, puisque, d\u00e8s les ann\u00e9es 1990, les USA constituaient la puissance militaire dominante sans la moindre rivale possible (l’hyperpuissance, disait V\u00e9drines \u00e0 la fin des ann\u00e9es 1990). Les d\u00e9penses qui vinrent ensuite, caract\u00e9ris\u00e9es par l’absence compl\u00e8te de frein et de contr\u00f4le comme cons\u00e9quence du climat \u00e9tabli par l’attaque 9\/11, ne pr\u00e9sentaient pas la moindre n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 et apport\u00e8rent au contraire une sorte de grippage, un blocage complet du syst\u00e8me du Pentagone. Sur ce point, on peut ais\u00e9ment montrer que la puissance militaire US, depuis 2000, a d\u00e9cru en efficacit\u00e9, en puissance d’influence et en capacit\u00e9 de projection, alors que la budget r\u00e9el<\/strong> du Pentagone a \u00e9t\u00e9 multipli\u00e9 par quatre ou cinq. (Par exemple, l’USAF a perdu en en un peu plus d’une d\u00e9cennie un gros tiers de ses capacit\u00e9s de combat en nombre d’avions et la moiti\u00e9 de ses capacit\u00e9s de projection. Il serait aujourd’hui hors de question de monter une op\u00e9ration comme Temp\u00eate du D\u00e9sert en 1990-1991 contre l’Irak, avec 600.000 hommes; les plus r\u00e9cents calculs envisageant le cas de la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 d’une invasion terrestre de l’Iran avec un million de soldats envisagent un d\u00e9lai minimum<\/strong> de 4 \u00e0 5 ann\u00e9es pour constituer cette force d’invasion.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tIl ne s’agit plus des seules incomp\u00e9tences de gestion, des habituels travers humains de corruption, de duplication, etc., propres aux bureaucraties. On se trouve devant un ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne qui renvoie sans le moindre doute \u00e0 la crise centrale du syst\u00e8me anthropotechnique, \u00e0 son \u00e9trange caract\u00e8re de multiplier l’inefficacit\u00e9 et la paralysie \u00e0 mesure que les moyens financiers \u00e0 sa disposition s’accumulent. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tComme le fait remarquer Freeman d’une fa\u00e7on classique, il s’agit certes d’une militarisation de l’action diplomatique, mais il nous semble n\u00e9cessaire d’aller au-del\u00e0, et d’avancer ces explications d’ordre syst\u00e9mique o\u00f9 les hommes ne jouent plus qu’un r\u00f4le secondaire d’ex\u00e9cutants. Il y a un v\u00e9ritable mouvement presque positif, presque constructif (de notre point de vue, s’entend), qui \u00e9volue d’une fa\u00e7on in\u00e9luctable vers l’inefficacit\u00e9, vers l’impuissance des processus bureaucratiques et technologiques, vers le blocage de tous les efforts d’int\u00e9gration qui permettent d’aboutir au d\u00e9veloppement de syst\u00e8mes, aux efforts d’organisation des forces permettant de mettre en place des unit\u00e9s combattantes en nombre suffisant.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 19 avril 2010 \u00e0 06H10<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Le site War In Context cite, le 16 avril 2010, un discours de l’ancien ambassadeur US Ches Freeman. L’ancien diplomate parle de la militarisation des USA . \u00abThe excesses that brought about the wide-ranging devaluation of our global standing originate, I think, in our politically self-serving reinterpretation of the Cold War soon after it ended.… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[9389,3012,3003,5379,3123,3014],"class_list":["post-71787","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-anthropotechnique","tag-complexe","tag-freeman","tag-militarisation","tag-militaro-industriel","tag-systeme"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/71787","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=71787"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/71787\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=71787"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=71787"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=71787"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}Notre commentaire<\/h4>\n