{"id":71821,"date":"2010-04-28T10:22:46","date_gmt":"2010-04-28T10:22:46","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2010\/04\/28\/start-ii-une-appreciation-involontairement-europeniste\/"},"modified":"2010-04-28T10:22:46","modified_gmt":"2010-04-28T10:22:46","slug":"start-ii-une-appreciation-involontairement-europeniste","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2010\/04\/28\/start-ii-une-appreciation-involontairement-europeniste\/","title":{"rendered":"START-II : une appr\u00e9ciation involontairement europ\u00e9niste\u2026"},"content":{"rendered":"

Dimitri Simes, pr\u00e9sident du Nixon Center and \u00e9diteur de The National Interest<\/em>, analyse le trait\u00e9 START-II. Dans Time.com<\/em> (l’hebdomadaire Time<\/em>), du 27 avril 2010<\/a>, Dimitri Simes donne son appr\u00e9ciation des r\u00e9sultats de l’accord START-II. Il le tient pour un \u00e9chec de l’administration Obama. C’est donc une th\u00e8se int\u00e9ressante \u00e0 examiner.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tApr\u00e8s avoir d\u00e9taill\u00e9 l’offensive de communication de Washington pour pr\u00e9senter START-II comme un succ\u00e8s, Simes explique pourquoi il consid\u00e8re START-II comme un \u00e9chec. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abThe facts are quite different, however, and the Administration’s handling of the agreement evokes strong echoes of history. Coverage of the deal in Russia’s state-controlled media has been unenthusiastic not because it is favorable to Washington, but largely because Kremlin officials specifically advised journalists to keep their excitement under control.<\/em> []<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbI saw the real Russian attitude toward the treaty while participating in a Russian television program called Think for Yourself. Broadcast after midnight, it is one of the few remaining shows during which participants can speak relatively freely on sensitive matters. There, prominent Russian specialists who had previously expressed concern about what the new treaty would look like were now endorsing it. According to Leonid Ivashov, a retired three-star general and well-known hard-liner, the treaty was a real diplomatic success, because the Russian delegation did not yield. Another well-known hardliner, Sergey Kurginyan, stated bluntly that Russia could not have an easier partner on the topic of nuclear arms than Obama.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbRussian experts and officials have this view because they believe that America made a tacit commitment not to develop an extended strategic missile defense. As a senior Russian official said to me, I can’t quote you unequivocal language from President Obama or Secretary Clinton in conversations with us that there would be no strategic missile defenses in Europe, but everything that was said to us amounts to this. In this official’s account, the full spectrum of U.S. officials from the President to working-level negotiators clearly conveyed that the reason they rejected more explicit restrictions on missile defense was not because of U.S. plans, but because of fear that such a deal could not win Senate ratification. A senior U.S. official intimately familiar with the talks has confirmed that the Russians were advised not to press further on missile defenses because the Administration had no intention to proceed with anything that would truly concern Moscow. Yet putting specific constraints in the treaty could block the Senate ratification. Read about how the U.S.-Russia nuke treaty is a small step on a long road.)<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThis background puts a different spin on the reference to the link between offensive and defensive weapons in the preamble of the new agreement and on the Russian government’s unilateral statement on the treaty, which asserts that the agreement \u00ab\u00a0can operate and be viable\u00a0\u00bb only if America \u00ab\u00a0refrains from developing its missile defense capabilities quantitatively or qualitatively.\u00a0\u00bb This language, coordinated in advance with the Obama Administration, means that Moscow might withdraw from the treaty if the U.S. deploys a meaningful strategic missile defense.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbIf the Administration actually wanted to build nuclear missile defenses, U.S. officials might be concerned about this prospect. Tellingly, however, the Administration has taken a rather benign view of the Russian statement, saying that since they have no plans for deploying strategic defenses in the foreseeable future, they had no reason to alarm the Russians with hypothetical situations.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbInstead, the Administration publicly and privately conveyed to Moscow that if Washington decides to pursue strategic missile defense, the U.S. would work to develop it jointly with Russia.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n

Notre commentaire<\/h4>\n

C’est une appr\u00e9ciation int\u00e9ressante dont on pourrait penser qu’elle compl\u00e8te \u00e9ventuellement le pr\u00e9c\u00e9dent Bloc-Notes<\/em> de ce 28 avril 2010<\/a> sur Medvedev annon\u00e7ant que la Russie est int\u00e9ress\u00e9e par une coop\u00e9ration avec l’OTAN sur les r\u00e9seaux ABM (anti-missiles).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tDimitri Simes est en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral bien inform\u00e9, avec de nombreux contacts chez les Russes. C’est l’un des grands sp\u00e9cialistes de la Russie \u00e0 Washington, et plut\u00f4t de tendance r\u00e9aliste comme les expets qui appartiennent au Nixon Center. Ce qu’il nous rapporte de l’attitude des Russes est plausible, d’ailleurs la chose avait filtr\u00e9 dans certaines d\u00e9p\u00eaches et articles russes. L’absence de r\u00e9actions enthousiastes ou satisfaites de la Russie apr\u00e8s le trait\u00e9 START-II avait pour cause la volont\u00e9 de ne pas compromettre le sort du trait\u00e9 START-II dans le cours de la ratification en insistant trop sur les clauses implicites des anti-missiles. (Malgr\u00e9 cela, il n’est nullement assur\u00e9 que le trait\u00e9 soit ratifi\u00e9 ais\u00e9ment. Il faudra au moins une ann\u00e9e, et encore selon les pr\u00e9visions les plus optimistes. Les pr\u00e9visions r\u00e9alistes-optimistes font laisser plut\u00f4t penser \u00e0 un retardement tel qu’on pourrait aboutir \u00e0 une non-ratification.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tMais ce que nous dit indirectement Simes, surtout, c’est qu’il existe une forte logique implicite de l’administration Obama d’un d\u00e9sengagement du programme anti-missiles en Europe, sous la forme larv\u00e9e de retard bureaucratiques, technologiques et autres. (On ajoutera le d\u00e9sint\u00e9r\u00eat pour l’Europe, aspect politique extr\u00eamement marquant de l’administration Obama.) Ce constat contraste \u00e9videmment avec l’insistance de l’OTAN pour une coop\u00e9ration avec la Russie, alors que l’OTAN a elle-m\u00eame son programme ABM (qui co\u00fbte $10 milliards). On trouve alors renforc\u00e9e deux tendances:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t D’une part, un certain d\u00e9sint\u00e9r\u00eat US, li\u00e9 \u00e0 START-II certes (et aux clauses russes de retrait du trait\u00e9), pour le syst\u00e8me ABM en Europe. Cela correspondrait \u00e0 une tendance politique g\u00e9n\u00e9rale de l’administration de m\u00eame qu’aux restrictions budg\u00e9taires vers lesquelles les USA se dirigent \u00e0 grande vitesse, et dont certains disent qu’elles toucheront malgr\u00e9 tout, et s\u00e9v\u00e8rement, le Pentagone, dont la dotation annuelle d\u00e9passe les $1.200 milliards.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t D’autre part, le d\u00e9veloppement renforc\u00e9 du syst\u00e8me de l’OTAN, o\u00f9 les USA n’ont qu’une partie beaucoup plus r\u00e9duite au niveau budg\u00e9taire, ce qui justifie \u00e9videmment toute la manuvre politique russe d\u00e9crite pr\u00e9c\u00e9demment. Il se pourrait bien ainsi que le projet US s’efface compl\u00e8tement en Europe derri\u00e8re un projet OTAN \u00e0 pr\u00e9dominance europ\u00e9enne, o\u00f9 les US serait d’ailleurs tr\u00e8s modestes dans leur participation (surtout budg\u00e9taire, certes), ce qui renforcerait alors la logique de la d\u00e9marche russe. Les Russes seraient alors fond\u00e9s \u00e0 croire qu’ils pourraient jouer un r\u00f4le pr\u00e9pond\u00e9rant dans le projet commun Russie-OTAN, supplantant m\u00eame \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard la participation US. Du point de vue russe, en fonction de la faible estime qu’ils ont pour le fonctionnement du pouvoir US, il pourrait y avoir l’id\u00e9e que la manuvre permet un rapprochement de l’OTAN en \u00e9change d’une europ\u00e9anisation de l’OTAN qui convient \u00e0 leurs ambitions.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t On notera \u00e9galement que certains pays europ\u00e9ens pourraient se rapprocher de la position russe et favoriser une europ\u00e9anisation de l’OTAN \u00e0 l’occasion de l’affaire des ABM OTAN-Russie. C’est le ces de la France, de l’Allemagne, peut-\u00eatre de la Pologne.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

`<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 27 avril 2010 \u00e0 10H28<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Dimitri Simes, pr\u00e9sident du Nixon Center and \u00e9diteur de The National Interest, analyse le trait\u00e9 START-II. Dans Time.com (l’hebdomadaire Time), du 27 avril 2010, Dimitri Simes donne son appr\u00e9ciation des r\u00e9sultats de l’accord START-II. Il le tient pour un \u00e9chec de l’administration Obama. C’est donc une th\u00e8se int\u00e9ressante \u00e0 examiner. Apr\u00e8s avoir d\u00e9taill\u00e9 l’offensive de… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[5541,3453,4314,2631,9539,2649,584,8521],"class_list":["post-71821","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-abm","tag-anti-missiles","tag-bmde","tag-de","tag-europeeanisation","tag-lotan","tag-otan","tag-simes"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/71821","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=71821"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/71821\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=71821"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=71821"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=71821"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}