off-shore<\/em>, au large de la Louisiane, qui est responsable de l’une des tr\u00e8s, tr\u00e8s grandes catastrophes \u00e9cologiques de nos temps radieux de la modernit\u00e9.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tOn citera ci-dessous le passage concernant le comportement g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de BP, qui s’est montr\u00e9 particuli\u00e8rement avis\u00e9 dans le contr\u00f4le de cette catastrophe. Lorsque celle-ci a eu lieu, BP a annonc\u00e9 qu’il avait calcul\u00e9 qu’il s’agissait d’un d\u00e9versement de 42.000 gallons de p\u00e9trole par jour. Puis, tr\u00e8s vite, BP a accept\u00e9 la comptabilit\u00e9 des garde-c\u00f4tes am\u00e9ricains qui calculaient 210.000 gallons par jour. L’organisation SkyTruth<\/em>, elle, estime \u00e0 partir de mesures par satellites, le d\u00e9versement \u00e0 850.000 gallons par jour, 20 fois plus que le calcul initial de BP.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tVoici le long passage sur le comportement de BP, soutenu par les autres grandes compagnies p\u00e9troli\u00e8res qui nous convainquent chaque jour que le r\u00e9chauffement climatique est un complot mondial indescriptible. Toutes ces compagnies luttent avec alacrit\u00e9 contre les r\u00e9glementations gouvernementales qui entravent, comme chacun ne doute pas, la bonne marche de l’\u00e9conomie mondiale prometteuse de tant d’avenirs radieux que le seul danger qui nous menace semble \u00eatre d’\u00e9touffer de bonheur.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00abWhile the cause of the fire and explosion on Deepwater Horizon is still uncertain, one thing is clear: BP, which was in charge of operating the rig, has a history of fighting tough regulations and safety inspections, misleading federal authorities about the dangers of a potential oil spill, and actively advocating for more relaxed safety standards much like Massey Energy Co. repeatedly fought tougher regulation of mines. Following a March 2005 explosion at a BP refinery, the company assembled a blue-ribbon panel to examine the company’s safety practices. The commission concluded that the oil company skimped on spending and failed to take other steps that would have prevented the explosion, writing that BP had not learned from a long string of past accidents, had ‘a false sense of confidence’ about safety, did not always ensure that adequate resources were effectively allocated to support or sustain a high level’ of safety in the industrial process and rotated refinery chiefs too quickly. BP gets it, and I get it too, chief executive John Browne said following the commission’s report. I recognize the need for improvement. However, a Wall Street Journal investigation found that BP was one of several companies that opposed efforts to tighten up safety procedures offshore. These efforts, led by the U.S. Minerals Management Service (MMS), would have required lessees and operators to have their safety and environmental management system programs audited at least once every three years by either an independent third party or by qualified personnel designated within the company, replacing the voluntary approach adopted in 1994. In a September 2009 letter to the MMS, BP said that it is not supportive of additional regulation of the industry and instead supported \u00ab\u00a0voluntary programs\u00a0\u00bb to secure the safety of its sites. New MMS guidelines had not yet been implemented, and the $600 million rig had passed three federal inspections, the most recent on April 1, suggesting that the federal government needs to take a more robust approach to site inspection. Additionally, BP’s oil exploration plan, which allowed it to avoid filing a more detailed site-specific plan, mapped out a worst-case scenario that a spill would release 162,000 gallons a day which pales in comparison to the volume of the current spill. Meanwhile, as a Center for American Progress report notes, BP’s Q1 profits rose 133 percent from just a year ago, while consumers were gouged at the pump. Unfortunately, other oil companies have joined BP in opposing tougher regulation. Chevron and Exxon Mobil both also submitted comments in opposition to the new MMS rule. Responding to the disaster, Louisiana shrimpers have filed a lawsuit against BP, Transocean, Cameron International Corp., which supplied the rig’s blow-out prevention equipment, and Halliburton Energy Services Inc., which was responsible for engaging in cementing operations of the [rig’s] well and well cap. The suit alleges that the companies’ negligence and are responsible for the massive economic disaster.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\n
dedefensa.org<\/em><\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"BP et la Louisiane Le Progress Report de ThinkProgress.org du 30 avril 2010 est \u00e0 consulter et \u00e0 conserver. Il donne toutes les indications et une multitude de liens sur la catastrophe de la station BP off-shore, au large de la Louisiane, qui est responsable de l’une des tr\u00e8s, tr\u00e8s grandes catastrophes \u00e9cologiques de nos… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[14],"tags":[7781,7884,9547,2888,9548],"class_list":["post-71833","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-ouverture-libre","tag-bp","tag-louisiane","tag-maree","tag-noire","tag-off-shore"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/71833","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=71833"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/71833\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=71833"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=71833"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=71833"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}