{"id":72089,"date":"2010-07-15T09:31:34","date_gmt":"2010-07-15T09:31:34","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2010\/07\/15\/us-navy-versus-iran\/"},"modified":"2010-07-15T09:31:34","modified_gmt":"2010-07-15T09:31:34","slug":"us-navy-versus-iran","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2010\/07\/15\/us-navy-versus-iran\/","title":{"rendered":"U.S. Navy versus<\/em> Iran"},"content":{"rendered":"

U.S. Navy versus<\/em> Iran<\/h4>\n

Il nous semble int\u00e9ressant de revenir sur une nouvelle publi\u00e9e sur Early Warning<\/em>, sur le site du Lexington Institute le 7 juillet 2010<\/a>, sous la signature de Daniel Goure. On conna\u00eet Goure, repr\u00e9sentant typique de l’establishment<\/em> le plus belliciste et conservateur \u00e0 Washington, et, pour cela, bien inform\u00e9 sur certains sujets bien pr\u00e9cis.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCe petit texte donne une \u00e9valuation des menaces qu’affronterait l’U.S. Navy (5\u00e8me Flotte), qui serait oblig\u00e9e de se d\u00e9ployer dans le Golfe Persique en cas d’attaque de l’Iran, de la part des divers moyens de riposte de l’Iran. Cas typique de guerre asym\u00e9trique navale, avec nombre de d\u00e9tails et de pr\u00e9cisions, sans aucun doute venus des sources m\u00eame d’\u00e9valuation de l’U.S. Navy. En s’en tenant \u00e0 ces pr\u00e9cisions, le constat est que la Navy aurait bien des difficult\u00e9s. On observe que parmi les hypoth\u00e8ses, celle d’attaques suicide se r\u00e9f\u00e9rant directement aux attaques des kamikaze<\/em> japonais (notamment lors de la bataille d’Okinawa en 1945) rappelle les seuls cas dans l’histoire o\u00f9 l’U.S. Navy rencontra de tr\u00e8s graves difficult\u00e9s et des pertes cons\u00e9quentes, de la part de forces de qualit\u00e9s tr\u00e8s m\u00e9diocres par rapport aux normes technologiques (les kamikaze<\/em> japonais, form\u00e9s de pilotes sans aucune formation, utilisant des avions compl\u00e8tement d\u00e9pass\u00e9s). Le fait m\u00eame de ce rappel, sans aucun doute venue des planificateurs de la Navy, mesure les craintes que la Navy \u00e9prouve dans la perspective d’un conflit avec l’Iran.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abIran is preparing to block the flow of oil out of the Persian Gulf. It is creating a capability to practice hybrid warfare at sea. The Iranian plan is to use a combination of conventional and unconventional or asymmetric systems in large numbers to overwhelm their adversary, particularly the U.S. Navy. In addition to the Iranian Navy’s mix of corvettes, patrol boats and Russian-built conventional submarines, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) is deploying a large array of missile and torpedo armed patrol boats, armed speed boats and mine laying vessels. Both the Navy and IRGC have deployed land-based fixed and mobile anti-ship cruise missile launchers as well as obsolescing U.S. and Russian aircraft. The IRGC also possesses and has exercises with a number of innovative platforms including semi-submersible vessels, unmanned boats and even midget submarines similar to the North Korean ship thought to have sunk a South Korean patrol craft. U.S. intelligence sources have suggested that Iran might even use a combination of manned and unmanned aircraft in suicide attacks on high value U.S. naval platforms in a tactic reminiscent of the kamikaze attacks of World War Two.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbIn the confined waters of the Persian Gulf, Iran stands a significant chance of being able to inflict serious casualties on the U.S. Navy. In 2005, the U.S. Navy conducted a war game focused on a U.S.-Iranian confrontation in the Persian Gulf. According to reports, that war game alarmed commanders at the Pentagon by showing that it would be relatively easy for the Iranians to neutralize the Fifth Fleet through the use of a combination of high-speed gunboats and airborne suicide attacks. While the U.S. Navy is likely eventually to gain control of the Persian Gulf, Iran could win a significant victory, politically and psychologically just by holding off the U.S. for some period of time and inflicting significant casualties.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbSince that time the U.S. Navy has taken steps to counter the growing Iranian threat. With the deployment of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) the Navy will have a platform designed precisely to address the threat posed by small boats, submarines and mines. Armed unmanned aerial systems such as the Fire Scout and Predator would also be useful against Iranian swarm boat tactics.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\n

dedefensa.org<\/em><\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

U.S. Navy versus Iran Il nous semble int\u00e9ressant de revenir sur une nouvelle publi\u00e9e sur Early Warning, sur le site du Lexington Institute le 7 juillet 2010, sous la signature de Daniel Goure. On conna\u00eet Goure, repr\u00e9sentant typique de l’establishment le plus belliciste et conservateur \u00e0 Washington, et, pour cela, bien inform\u00e9 sur certains sujets… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[14],"tags":[3745,2870,3723,5708,2773,9841,3319,5220],"class_list":["post-72089","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-ouverture-libre","tag-asymetrique","tag-attaque","tag-golfe","tag-goure","tag-iran","tag-kamikaze","tag-navy","tag-persique"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/72089","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=72089"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/72089\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=72089"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=72089"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=72089"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}