Antiwar.com<\/em>, Gareth Porter d\u00e9veloppe un commentaire qui s’attache surtout \u00e0 montrer combien nombre de chefs militaires et du renseignement isra\u00e9liens sont d\u00e9favorables \u00e0 l’attaque, et comment Netanyahou lui-m\u00eame sut parfois composer avec les perspectives iraniennes, mais c’\u00e9tait en 1996<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00abBut the article provides new evidence that senior figures in the Israeli intelligence and military leadership oppose such a strike against Iran and believe that Netanyahu’s apocalyptic rhetoric about an Iranian nuclear threat as an existential threat is unnecessary and self-defeating.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbAlthough not reported by Goldberg, Israeli military and intelligence figures began to express their opposition to such rhetoric on Iran in the early 1990s, and Netanyahu acted to end such talk when he became prime minister in 1996. <\/em> []<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbGoldberg reports that other Israeli leaders, including defense minister Ehud Barack, acknowledge the real problem with the possibility of a nuclear Iran is that it would gradually erode Israel’s ability to retain its most talented people. But that problem is mostly self-inflicted. Goldberg concedes that Israeli generals with whom he talked worry that talk of an existential threat’ is itself a kind of existential threat to the Zionist project, which was meant to preclude such threats against the Jewish people.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbA number of sources told Goldberg, moreover, that Gabi Ashkenazi, the Israeli army chief of staff, doubts the usefulness of an attack.w<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bb Top Israeli intelligence officials and others responsible for policy toward Iran have long argued, in fact, that the kind of apocalyptic rhetoric that Netanyahu has embraced in recent years is self-defeating. Security correspondent Ronen Bergman reported in Yedioth Ahronoth, Israel’s most popular newspaper, in July 2009 that former chief of military intelligence Major General Aharon Zeevi Farkash said the Israeli public perception of the Iranian nuclear threat had been distorted. Farkash and other military intelligence and Mossad officials believe Iran’s main motive for seeking a nuclear weapons capability was not to threaten Israel but to deter U.S. intervention and efforts at regime change, according to Bergman.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThe use of blatantly distorted rhetoric about Iran as a threat to Israel and Israeli intelligence officials’ disagreement with it goes back to the early 1990s, when the Labor Party government in Israel began a campaign to portray Iran’s missile and nuclear programs as an existential threat to Israel, as Trita Parsi revealed in his 2007 book Treacherous Alliance. An internal Israeli inter-ministerial committee formed in 1994 to make recommendations on dealing with Iran concluded that Israeli rhetoric had been self-defeating, because it had actually made Iran more afraid of Israel, and more hostile toward it, Parsi writes.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbIronically, it was Netanyahu who decided to stop using such rhetoric after becoming prime minister the first time in mid-1996. Mossad director of intelligence Uzi Arad convinced him that Israel had a choice between making itself Iran’s enemy or allowing Iran to focus on threats from other states. Netanyahu even sought Kazakh and Russian mediation between Iran and Israel.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbBut he reversed that policy when he became convinced that Tehran was seeking a rapprochement with Washington, which Israeli leaders feared would result in reduced U.S. support for Israel, according to Parsi’s account. As a result, Netanyahu reverted to the extreme rhetoric of his predecessors.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThat episode suggests that Netanyahu is perfectly capable of grasping the intelligence community’s more nuanced analysis of Iran, contrary to his public stance that the Iranian threat is the same as that from Hitler’s Germany.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbNetanyahu administration officials used Goldberg to convey the message to the Americans that they didn’t believe Obama would launch an attack on Iran, and therefore Israel would have to do so. But Israel clearly cannot afford to risk a war with Iran without the assurance that the United States being committed to participate in it<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\n
dedefensa.org<\/em><\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Et quelques vagues notables Il y a eu d\u00e9j\u00e0 de nombreuses r\u00e9actions \u00e0 l’article de Goldberg, que nous pr\u00e9sentons par ailleurs ce m\u00eame 16 ao\u00fbt 2010. Ces r\u00e9actions sont tr\u00e8s diverses, parfois contradictoires. On en mentionne deux ici, de commentateurs que nous connaissons. Steve Clemons fait un tr\u00e8s long commentaire sur l’article de Goldberg. Il… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[14],"tags":[2870,6179,9939,2773,2774,2790,7463],"class_list":["post-72185","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-ouverture-libre","tag-attaque","tag-clemons","tag-goldberg","tag-iran","tag-israel","tag-netanyahou","tag-porther"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/72185","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=72185"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/72185\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=72185"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=72185"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=72185"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}