{"id":72325,"date":"2010-09-28T13:06:12","date_gmt":"2010-09-28T13:06:12","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2010\/09\/28\/les-clairs-obscurs-dun-accord-jsf-dod\/"},"modified":"2010-09-28T13:06:12","modified_gmt":"2010-09-28T13:06:12","slug":"les-clairs-obscurs-dun-accord-jsf-dod","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2010\/09\/28\/les-clairs-obscurs-dun-accord-jsf-dod\/","title":{"rendered":"Les clairs-obscurs d’un accord JSF-DoD"},"content":{"rendered":"

Les clairs-obscurs d’un accord JSF-DoD<\/h4>\n

Alors que certains claironnent un chant de victoire sur un JSF qui serait \u00e0 si bon march\u00e9 qu’on se croirait rajeuni de 15 ans (voir Loren B. Thompson, sur Early Warning<\/em> le 23 septembre 2010<\/a>), d’autres montrent un r\u00e9el scepticisme Il s’agit de l’annonce d’un accord pour un contrat entre Lockheed Martin et le d\u00e9partement de la d\u00e9fense portant sur la commande de 32 avions JSF (31 si la Hollande ne commande pas l’exemplaire qu’elle avait primitivement envisag\u00e9 de commander), de la tranche dite LRIP4, soit la quatri\u00e8me commande collective du JSF.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tUn de ces sceptiques est Stephen Trimble, de Flight International<\/em>, sur son blog<\/em> personnel DEW Line<\/em>, le 23 septembre 2010<\/a> \u00e9galement. Trimble, d’habitude plus prudent, prend un ton presque \u00e0-la-Sweetman (ancienne mani\u00e8re) pour passer rapidement en revue les divers aspects de l’accord, et autour de l’accord (un accord, s’exclame-t-il, qu’est-ce que cela veut dire tant qu’il n’y a pas un contrat ? \u00abWho knows! Maybe they agreed on the font size for the letterhead on the cover sheet<\/em>\u00bb)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tQuelques-unes de ses remarques :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abLockheed, meanwhile, says the value of the contract could be more than $5 billion. But that doesn’t mean the cost of each jet is at least $156 million, which is the mean. That number also includes production costs not associated with the flyaway price of the aircraft, such as extra tooling.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbWhy would the new contract include extra production costs even though the Department of Defense already gave Lockheed a $819 million contract two months ago to buy special tools and testing equipment for LRIP-4? Again, we don’t know the answer.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbHere’s what we do know: LRIP-4 negotiators will have to work hard to keep the average price per aircraft on a downward trajectory.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbIn May 2008, Lockheed received a $2.2 billion contract to build 12 F-35s in LRIP-2, which averaged $183 million per jet excluding the engine and long-lead acquisition costs.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbFourteen months later, Lockheed received a $2.1 billion contract to build 17 F-35s in LRIP-3, or $123 million per jet with the same exclusions as above.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbNow we’re waiting to see the value of the LRIP-4 order for 31 or 32 aircraft. If it’s anything like the $5 billion figure cited above, this blogger will need to see a lot more details to understand why the aircraft is getting cheaper.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\n

dedefensa.org<\/em><\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Les clairs-obscurs d’un accord JSF-DoD Alors que certains claironnent un chant de victoire sur un JSF qui serait \u00e0 si bon march\u00e9 qu’on se croirait rajeuni de 15 ans (voir Loren B. Thompson, sur Early Warning le 23 septembre 2010), d’autres montrent un r\u00e9el scepticisme Il s’agit de l’annonce d’un accord pour un contrat entre… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[14],"tags":[5267,5850,250,10101,8377],"class_list":["post-72325","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-ouverture-libre","tag-accord","tag-contrat","tag-jsf","tag-lrip4","tag-trimble"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/72325","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=72325"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/72325\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=72325"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=72325"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=72325"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}