{"id":72602,"date":"2010-12-22T07:24:14","date_gmt":"2010-12-22T07:24:14","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2010\/12\/22\/liran-larabie-et-laustralie\/"},"modified":"2010-12-22T07:24:14","modified_gmt":"2010-12-22T07:24:14","slug":"liran-larabie-et-laustralie","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2010\/12\/22\/liran-larabie-et-laustralie\/","title":{"rendered":"L&rsquo;Iran, l&rsquo;Arabie&#8230; et l&rsquo;Australie"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h4>L&rsquo;Iran, l&rsquo;Arabie&#8230; et l&rsquo;Australie<\/h4>\n<p>Quelques commentateurs font un certain grand cas de l&rsquo;analyse publi\u00e9e dans <em>Atimes.com<\/em> le <a href=\"http:\/\/atimes.com\/atimes\/Middle_East\/LL18Ak02.html\" class=\"gen\">18 d\u00e9cembre 2010<\/a>. (Voir notamment Paul Woodward dans son <em>War in Context<\/em> le <a href=\"http:\/\/warincontext.org\/2010\/12\/20\/why-a-nuclear-iran-could-be-good-for-the-us\/ \" class=\"gen\">20 d\u00e9cembre 2010<\/a>.) L&rsquo;auteur se nomme Chan Akya, ce qui est une variation, peut-\u00eatre accidentelle qui sait, autour du nom de <a href=\"http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Chanakya\" class=\"gen\">Chanyaka<\/a>, que la connaissance classique et rationnelle occidentale d\u00e9finit comme le Machiavel indien (Chanyaka v\u00e9cut 1.800 ans avant notre Niccolo).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tChan Akya d\u00e9fend dans son texte, au nom m\u00eame des arguments modernistes classiques occidentaux, l&rsquo;int\u00e9r\u00eat d&rsquo;un Iran nucl\u00e9aire ou, dans tous les cas, d&rsquo;un Iran puissance dominante dans la r\u00e9gion,  essentiellement aux d\u00e9pens de l&rsquo;Arabie. Chan Akya se r\u00e9f\u00e8re aux d\u00e9claration r\u00e9v\u00e9l\u00e9es par <em>WikiLeaks<\/em>, non sans <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article-au_fait_l_arabie_est-elle_d_accord_pour_qu_on_attaque_l_arabie__06_12_2010.html\" class=\"gen\">contradictions<\/a> r\u00e9v\u00e9latrices avec d&rsquo;autres c\u00e2bles, d&rsquo;un roi d&rsquo;Arabie demandant aux USA d&rsquo;attaquer l&rsquo;Iran,  \u00ab<em> to cut off the head of the snake<\/em>\u00bb ; sur quoi, Chan Akya encha\u00eene : \u00ab<em>Firstly, what is the snake that King Abdullah refers to?<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tChan Akya d\u00e9veloppe ensuite la th\u00e8se que l&rsquo;Arabie est la vraie cause du terrorisme, non seulement par son action de financier de nombreux groupes islamistes, mais aussi par sa forme de gouvernement. Selon cet argument, estime Chan Akya, l&rsquo;Iran serait au contraire, potentiellement, le v\u00e9ritable \u00e9l\u00e9ment stabilisateur dans la r\u00e9gion.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>In case that is too obtuse, what I am referring to is the \u00ab\u00a0snake\u00a0\u00bb of religious terrorism, and in particular the problem of disaffected youth in predominantly Sunni kingdoms such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait et al; as well as those in anarchies such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is not entirely clear that the natural enemy of such youth is necessarily the Americans; more likely, it is the established order of the Middle East, where the wealth of nations is controlled by a bunch of aging monarchies.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>This snake of religious terrorism is the one that bit the US on 9\/11. Most of the hijackers on September 11, 2001, were of Saudi origin and despite nominally falling under the leadership of Osama bin Laden it stands to reason that they were mainly disenchanted due to the stifling anti-democracy of Saudi Arabia and the inherent hypocrisy of Wahhabism in a country that spent most of its time kowtowing to the Americans.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Fearing the tactical nightmare of dealing with hundreds if not thousands of these disaffected youth, America and Europe chose to make the strategic blunder of supporting the crumbling monarchies as long as they attacked their own youth. This was a stupid bargain, to put it mildly.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>A sustainable situation would be to engender wider regime change in the Middle East by booting out the creaking and corrupt monarchies, to be replaced progressively with Islamic leaders capable of taking a development-oriented approach to their countries. To ensure this new generation of Middle East leaders do not get overly tempted by the possibilities of attacking America or Israel, it would be necessary to have a natural check in the region &#8211; namely Iran.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tUn autre point remarquable de l&rsquo;article de Chan Akya est la citation d&rsquo;un autre c\u00e2ble diplomatique mise \u00e0 jour dans le cadre de <em>Cablegate<\/em> et qui est pass\u00e9e relativement inaper\u00e7ue. (Dans notre cas, sans aucun doute.) Cette d\u00e9p\u00eache, publi\u00e9e dans la presse australienne et reprise par Reuters le 13 d\u00e9cembre, d\u00e9taille une position tr\u00e8s originale de l&rsquo;Australie sur la question du nucl\u00e9aire iranien.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>Australia is at odds with its major security ally the United States over Iran, saying it is not a rogue state and its nuclear weapons program is for deterrence, not attack, according to US cables released by WikiLeaks. The documents, published in the Sydney Morning Herald on Monday, also reveal that Australia&rsquo;s top security organization believes Tehran sees a grand bargain with the United States as its best way to ensure national security.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>But the Office of National Assessments (ONA) shared Washington&rsquo;s fears that Iran&rsquo;s pursuit of nuclear weapons could lead to conventional or nuclear war, noting a conflict between Israel and Iran was the greatest challenge to Middle East stability.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The ONA was also concerned that nuclear proliferation in the Middle East may drive Southeast Asian nations to pursue their own nuclear capabilities. It&rsquo;s a mistake to think of Iran as a rogue state&rsquo;, then ONA chief Peter Varghese told the United States in a briefing, according to the 2008 US diplomatic cables from Canberra. The cables said the ONA sought a balanced view of Tehran as a sophisticated diplomatic player rather than one liable to behave impulsively or irrationally.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p>\n<p class=\"signature\"><em>dedefensa.org<\/em><\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>L&rsquo;Iran, l&rsquo;Arabie&#8230; et l&rsquo;Australie Quelques commentateurs font un certain grand cas de l&rsquo;analyse publi\u00e9e dans Atimes.com le 18 d\u00e9cembre 2010. (Voir notamment Paul Woodward dans son War in Context le 20 d\u00e9cembre 2010.) L&rsquo;auteur se nomme Chan Akya, ce qui est une variation, peut-\u00eatre accidentelle qui sait, autour du nom de Chanyaka, que la connaissance&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[14],"tags":[10590,3259,4787,10589,2773,10593,3004,10591],"class_list":["post-72602","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-ouverture-libre","tag-akya","tag-arabie","tag-australie","tag-chan","tag-iran","tag-moyen-oriuent","tag-nucleaire","tag-stabilisateur"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/72602","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=72602"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/72602\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=72602"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=72602"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=72602"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}