{"id":72635,"date":"2011-01-05T05:18:08","date_gmt":"2011-01-05T05:18:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2011\/01\/05\/start-premiere-dissonance\/"},"modified":"2011-01-05T05:18:08","modified_gmt":"2011-01-05T05:18:08","slug":"start-premiere-dissonance","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2011\/01\/05\/start-premiere-dissonance\/","title":{"rendered":"START, premi\u00e8re dissonance"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>Alors que la <em>Douma<\/em> (Parlement) russe devrait tr\u00e8s rapidement ratifier le trait\u00e9 START-II (que les Russes d\u00e9signent d\u00e9sormais comme START-3), une premi\u00e8re dissonance s&rsquo;est faite entendre. L&rsquo;interpr\u00e9tation de la <em>Douma<\/em>, qui sera sans doute concr\u00e9tis\u00e9e par un document ou une d\u00e9claration formelle accompagnant l&rsquo;acte de la ratification, est que la note de pr\u00e9ambule sur le lien existant entre armements strat\u00e9giques offensifs (effectivement limit\u00e9s) et les missiles anti-missilmes (ABM), implique une limitation effective de l&rsquo;effort US dans ce domaine.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLe pr\u00e9ambule en question expose que \u00ab<em>the existence of the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms, that this interrelationship will become more important as strategic nuclear arms are reduced, and that current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the Parties&#8230;<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tL&rsquo;obligation de lier (<em>linkage<\/em>) la question des missiles offensifs et des missiles d\u00e9fensifs (antimissiles) constitue l&rsquo;opinion sans aucune restriction de Konstantin Kosachev, pr\u00e9sident de la commission des affaires internationales de la <em>Douma<\/em>. Cette interpr\u00e9tation a \u00e9t\u00e9 directement et cat\u00e9goriquement contredite par la Maison-Blanche, selon <em>ABC.News<\/em> le <a href=\"http:\/\/blogs.abcnews.com\/politicalpunch\/2011\/01\/white-house-contradicts-russian-duma-official-on-linkage-between-missile-defense-and-start.html\" class=\"gen\">3 janvier 2010<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab[T]<em>he Voice of Russia quoted Kosachev saying that, during the ratification of START in the U.S. Congress the American lawmakers noted that the link between strategic offensive armed forces and antimissile defense systems is not juridically binding for the parties. They referred to the fact that this link was fixed only in the preamble of the document. Such an approach can be regarded as the U.S.&rsquo; attempt to find an option to build up its strategic potential and the Russian lawmakers cannot agree with this.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Kosachev said that we will deal with these interpretations. The first thing is that our American colleagues do not recognize the legal force of the treaty&rsquo;s preamble. The preamble sets a link between strategic offensive arms and defensive arms. The second thing is an attempt to interpret certain provisions of the treaty unilaterally.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>And he was hardly the first Russian official to make such a statement.<\/em>  <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>In April, Sergei Prikhodko &#8211; Russia President Dmitri Medvedev&rsquo;s senior foreign policy adviser stated that Russian \u00ab\u00a0negotiators had to insert the inextricable connection between strategic offensive and strategic defensive armaments (i.e. missile defense) into the treaty. This was successfully fulfilled and the importance of this connection when reducing strategic offensive armaments will be included in the treaty and be legally binding&#8230;\u00a0\u00bb  Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov had also stated that linkage to missile defense is clearly spelled out in the accord and is legally binding.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Are they wrong? ABC News asked a senior Obama administration official at the time. Yes, was the reply.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tConcernant la d\u00e9claration de Kosachev, <em>ABC.News<\/em> a officiellement interrog\u00e9 le porte-parole d&rsquo;Obama, qui a renvoy\u00e9 cat\u00e9goriquement le cas \u00e0 <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article-ratifie_ou_pas_le_start-ii_de_la_rupture_20_12_2010.html\" class=\"gen\">la lettre<\/a> qu&rsquo;Obama a \u00e9crite aux s\u00e9nateurs r\u00e9publicains \u00ab<em>Asked for comment, White House spokesman Tommy Vietor tells ABC News, The President sent a letter to the Senate on December 18th that said: The New Start Treaty places no limitations on the development or deployment of our missile defense programs.&rsquo; That remains the case.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tCertes, il ne s&rsquo;agit pas de positions aux plus hauts niveaux. La <em>Douma<\/em> ne d\u00e9cide certainement pas de la politique du Kremlin, mais il appara\u00eet clairement que les d\u00e9put\u00e9s n&rsquo;ont \u00e9t\u00e9 nullement d\u00e9courag\u00e9s par le pouvoir politique d&rsquo;intervenir dans le sens o\u00f9 ils l&rsquo;ont fait. Dans ce cas, les d\u00e9put\u00e9s servent \u00e0 dire tout haut ce que les dirigeants russes pensent tout bas. La situation est fort diff\u00e9rente de Washington, o\u00f9 Obama doit jouer tr\u00e8s serr\u00e9 avec les r\u00e9publicains \u00e0 propos de cet accord de limitation des armes strat\u00e9giques, notamment et essentiellement sur cette question des antimissiles. Les r\u00e9publicains veulent un d\u00e9veloppement sans la moindre contrainte des r\u00e9seaux ABM, ce dont les Russes, et l\u00e0 aussi y compris au Kremlin, ne veulent pas entendre parler.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLa situation est \u00e9videmment \u00e9claircie depuis la ratification du trait\u00e9 par les USA (le S\u00e9nat). On sait d\u00e9sormais que les Russes y trouvent <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article-start-ii_point_de_vue_russe_et_consequences_29_12_2010.html\" class=\"gen\">leur avantage<\/a> et n&rsquo;envisageraient sans doute pas s\u00e9rieusement de d\u00e9noncer le trait\u00e9 m\u00eame s&rsquo;ils jugeaient que la question des antimissiles (le d\u00e9veloppement des antimissiles par les USA) devenait tr\u00e8s embarrassante pour eux. Par contre, ils feront tout ce qui est possible pour justement emp\u00eacher que l&rsquo;\u00e9volution de la position US dans le d\u00e9veloppement des antimissiles devienne tr\u00e8s embarrassante, sinon trop embarrassante pour eux, pour \u00e9viter l&rsquo;humiliation de rester dans le trait\u00e9 malgr\u00e9 une contradiction si flagrante de leurs positions publiques. On peut donc \u00eatre assur\u00e9 qu&rsquo;ils interviendront constamment dans le processus US de d\u00e9veloppement des ABM, et aussi, pour faire indirectement pression sur ces m\u00eames USA, dans les domaines o\u00f9 les USA peuvent se trouver en position ambigu\u00eb ou en position de demandeurs (notamment les relations avec l&rsquo;OTAN, les relations de la Russie avec certains pays europ\u00e9ens ind\u00e9pendamment des USA comme avec la France dans l&rsquo;affaire du <em>Mistral<\/em>, les voies de ravitaillement de l&rsquo;U.S. Army en Afghanistan, etc.). Dans ce contexte, l&rsquo;intervention de Kosachev et, plus g\u00e9n\u00e9ralement, la position de la <em>Douma<\/em>, r\u00e9pondent \u00e0 une logique \u00e9vidente de la part des Russes. Il s&rsquo;agit plut\u00f4t d&rsquo;une illustration des choses \u00e0 venir. On peut donc avancer que commence une nouvelle phase de la guerre de communication autour de la production et de la mise en place d&rsquo;un syst\u00e8me antimissile r\u00e9pondant aux vux et aux besoins de l&rsquo;industrie US d&rsquo;armement, mais sans aucune n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 strat\u00e9gique ni politique ; cette nouvelle phase aura, naturellement, des cons\u00e9quences de d\u00e9sordre et d&rsquo;antagonisme aux niveaux strat\u00e9gique et politique.  <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 5 janvier 2011 \u00e0 5H16<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Alors que la Douma (Parlement) russe devrait tr\u00e8s rapidement ratifier le trait\u00e9 START-II (que les Russes d\u00e9signent d\u00e9sormais comme START-3), une premi\u00e8re dissonance s&rsquo;est faite entendre. L&rsquo;interpr\u00e9tation de la Douma, qui sera sans doute concr\u00e9tis\u00e9e par un document ou une d\u00e9claration formelle accompagnant l&rsquo;acte de la ratification, est que la note de pr\u00e9ambule sur le&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[4056,3015,2631,6572,398,2645,2730,10685,9097],"class_list":["post-72635","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-antimissiles","tag-communication","tag-de","tag-douma","tag-europe","tag-guerre","tag-russie","tag-start-3","tag-start-ii"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/72635","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=72635"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/72635\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=72635"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=72635"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=72635"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}