Nous avons choisi de nous attarder \u00e0 un \u00e9ditorial d’un quotidien US qui nous para\u00eet caract\u00e9ristique de l’\u00e9volution probable du sentiment d’une bonne partie de l’establishment<\/em> washingtonien vis-\u00e0-vis de l’\u00e9volution \u00e9gyptienne, d’une certaine fa\u00e7on, quelle que soit<\/strong> cette \u00e9volution \u00e9gyptienne, parce que cette \u00e9volution washingtonienne serait le produit de l’extr\u00e9misme qui, depuis 9\/11 (mais aussi depuis la guerre du Kosovo, malgr\u00e9 les contradictions entre les acteurs des deux \u00e9v\u00e9nements), colore le sentiment g\u00e9n\u00e9ral le plus offensif et le plus conqu\u00e9rant dans la capitale de la Grande R\u00e9publique Il s’agit de l’\u00e9ditorial du Washington Times<\/em> du 1er f\u00e9vrier 2011<\/a>, avec le titre \u00abThe Egyptians hate us<\/em><\/strong>, Mubarak’s fall would spell trouble for America<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abIn June 2009, President Obama launched his much heralded outreach effort to the Muslim people with a speech in Cairo. Now the people of that city are clamoring for reform, but their view of the United States is worse than it was at the height of the George W. Bush administration. According to survey data from the Pew Global Attitudes Project released in June 2010, the United States had a 30 percent approval rating in Egypt in 2006, which at the time was higher than U.S. approval in Spain. This dropped to 22 percent by the end of the Bush years. The burst of enthusiasm that attended Mr. Obama’s outreach effort boosted favorability slightly to 27 percent, but in 2010 disappointment set in and approval dropped 10 points to 17 percent, tying Egypt with Turkey and Pakistan for the most negative view of the United States of any country in the world.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbOnly a third of Egyptians think the U.S. will do the right thing in world affairs, and 31 percent of Egyptian Muslims expressed confidence in President Obama, which is down 10 points from 2009. The radical Palestinian Hamas movement, by contrast, has 49 percent approval. Seventy three percent oppose U.S. anti-terrorism efforts and 81 percent want U.S. troops out of Afghanistan. The Egyptians discovered that Mr. Obama’s outreach did not exceed his grasp.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe worst case scenario in Egypt is an Iran redux, a revolution in which a staunchly pro-U.S. autocrat is replaced by a virulently anti-American Islamic regime. Some say relax, it can’t happen there. Pew survey data from December 2010 showed that only 20 percent of Egyptians are concerned about extremism in their country. But American views of what constitutes the extreme may differ from those of Egyptians. The same survey showed that over 80 percent approve of such hard-line shariah-compliant laws as capital punishment for adultery or for leaving Islam, and 77 percent think that whippings and cutting off hands for crimes like theft and robbery are a great idea.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe events in Egypt are being described as a leaderless revolution, but what that means is that the best organized faction will take power. In this case it is the Muslim Brotherhood, the region’s oldest Islamic extremist movement, with deep roots in Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood is the largest opposition bloc in the Egyptian parliament, and is in talks with protest leader Mohammed ElBaradei to form a national unity government. On Monday White House spokesman Robert Gibbs gave a nod to the group when he said the administration believes that a new government has to include a whole host of important nonsecular actors that give Egypt a strong chance to continue to be [a] stable and reliable partner.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThis is an odd statement given that the Muslim brothers have long despised America, and see President Hosni Mubarak as a puppet of both the U.S. and Israel<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tD’autres positions extr\u00eames dans ce sens commencent \u00e0 \u00eatre affirm\u00e9es, du c\u00f4t\u00e9 des neocons<\/em> et autres extr\u00e9mistes qui rassemblent des arguments plus sp\u00e9cifiques que le th\u00e8me g\u00e9n\u00e9ral et cat\u00e9gorique du Washington Times<\/em> (ils nous ha\u00efssent). Bien entendu, ces arguments renvoient tous aux th\u00e8ses isra\u00e9liennes, hostiles \u00e0 un d\u00e9part de Moubarak. (Voir notre Bloc-Notes<\/em> du 31 janvier 2011<\/a>.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tUn texte de The Nation<\/em> du 31 janvier 2011<\/a> reprend l’argument n\u00e9oconservateur contre El Baradei, d\u00e9j\u00e0 largement d\u00e9velopp\u00e9 pendant des ann\u00e9es (cela est rappel\u00e9 par l’article), lorsque El Bareadei \u00e9tait directeur de l’Agence Internationale de l’Energie Atomique (AIEA). Bien entendu, il s’agit de la d\u00e9nonciation d’un El Baradei pr\u00e9tendument favorable \u00e0 l’Iran.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abMohamed ElBaradei, a Nobel Peace Prize recipient and the former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has recently emerged as a leading figure in the Egyptian pro-democracy movement and a credible alternative to Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbElBaradei’s emergence has angered pro-Mubarak neoconservatives, such as Malcolm Hoenlein, executive vice president of the Council of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations, which is closely aligned with Israeli Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu. There is a myth being created that ElBaradei is a human rights activist,\u00a0\u00bb Hoenlein told an Orthodox Jewish website on Sunday. He is a stooge of Iran, and I don’t use the term lightly. When he was the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, for which he got a Nobel Peace Prize, he fronted for them, he distorted the reports.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbHysterical rhetoric about ElBaradei is nothing new. The same people who were wrong about Iraq’s nonexistent WMD program are once again trying to distort his work, this time as a prominent dissident in Egypt<\/em>\u00bb []<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbFormer Bush speechwriter Ari Fleischer added his voice to the anti-Elbaradei neocon caucus, posting on Twitter: I don’t trust Mohamed ElBaradei. For America, he would be bad news of a different kind. It appears that the Bush Administration’s so-called freedom agenda does not apply to democratic leaders it does not like.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tIl y a d’autre part des d\u00e9clarations de John Bolton, affirmant que la chute \u00e9ventuelle de Moubarak acc\u00e9l\u00e9rerait l’attaque isra\u00e9lienne contre l’Iran (ce qui semblerait nous sugg\u00e9rer que celle-ci est d\u00e9j\u00e0 pr\u00e9vue ?). Bolton consid\u00e8re que toute alternative \u00e0 Moubarak serait inacceptable pour Isra\u00ebl, que ce soit El Baradei, violemment d\u00e9nonc\u00e9 pour son attitude vis-\u00e0-vis de l’Iran du temps de l’AIEA, ou une perspective encore plus horrible pour le m\u00eame Bolton, qui est l’arriv\u00e9e des Fr\u00e8res Musulmans au pouvoir. (Sur RAW Story<\/em> le 1er f\u00e9vrier 2011<\/a>, d’apr\u00e8s une interview sur Fox.News<\/em>.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abFormer US Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton said the ouster of embattled Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak would speed the timetable for an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbDo you think that the Israelis are going to have to strike they are going to have to take action? Fox News Republican opinion host Sean Hannity asked the former ambassador on his radio program Monday. As you pointed out, ElBaradei ran cover for the Iranians for all those years that he was with the IAEA. And, I just don’t think the Israelis have much longer to wait they’re going to have to act in fairly short order.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbI think that’s right, Bolton responded. I don’t think there’s much time to act. And I think the fall of a Egyptian government committed to the peace agreement will almost certainly speed that timetable up. Bolton chided the protests in Egypt last week, saying that the real alternative is not Jefferson democracy versus the Mubarak regime, but that it’s the Muslim Brotherhood versus the Mubarak regime, and that has enormous implications for the US, for Israel, and our other friends in the r\u00e9gion.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tApr\u00e8s les premiers jours de flottement depuis qu’il est apparu que la chute de Moubarak \u00e9tait une probabilit\u00e9 presque in\u00e9luctable, un regroupement est en train de s’amorcer \u00e0 Washington autour des th\u00e8mes extr\u00e9mistes habituels de la politique<\/a> de l’id\u00e9ologie et de l’instinct, regroupement \u00e9videmment renforc\u00e9 par les pressions d’Isra\u00ebl qui montre une crainte hyst\u00e9rique de la chute de Moubarak. Ce qui est amusant dans ce d\u00e9veloppement, c’est qu’il va mettre certains neocons<\/em> (William Kristoll, la d\u00e9put\u00e9e Ros-Lehtinen, parmi ceux qui avaient \u00e9t\u00e9 cit\u00e9s), s’ils veulent suivre, dans l’obligation d’effectuer un virage \u00e0 180\u00b0 par rapport \u00e0 leurs premi\u00e8res prises de position qui glorifiaient la th\u00e8se de la d\u00e9mocratisation du Moyen-Orient, qui fut la grande philosophie de toute l’action de l’administration GW Bush \u00e0 partir de 2002.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n