2 f\u00e9vrier 2011<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00abHosni Mubarak is finally on his way out. But the regime he presided over for 30 years is still very much in power and will remain so until a new order can be established, optimally through free and fair elections. That represents an enormous challenge.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbAfter a week in the headlights, the regime is showing signs of regaining its nerve and assembling a strategy to overcome its perilous predicament. Whether it can work is another matter.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThe survival plan centres on Omar Suleiman, who is head of intelligence, Mubarak’s close confidant, and the newly installed vice-president. Right now Suleiman is the most powerful man in Egypt, backed by the military (from which he hails), the security apparatus, and a frightened ruling elite hoping to salvage something from the wreckage.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbSuleiman is, in effect, heading a junta of former or acting military officers. Mubarak has been reduced to a figurehead, sheltering behind this clique. But they will not humiliate him. There will be no ignominious flight to Saudi Arabia, like that of Tunisia’s deposed president, Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbMubarak’s pride won’t allow it; the military’s pride won’t allow it. As they see it, the honour of the nation demands no less. They will insist on a dignified departure for a man who, for all his faults, led Egypt through war and peace into the modern era.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThe army’s pledge not to use violence against peaceful protesters was a canny political move with Suleiman’s fingerprints all over it. If the armed forces stick to that vow, it could help de-escalate the crisis especially if Mubarak’s television announcement is enough to satisfy most of the demonstrators that they have achieved a signal victory.<\/em>[]<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbA set timetable for fresh parliamentary and presidential elections, possibly this autumn, coinciding with the end of Mubarak’s term in September, under some form of international or independent supervision, may soon be forthcoming another way for the regime to escape the morass.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThis will require a lot of negotiating with opposition parties. Mubarak could then hand over power in the normal way (though it would be abnormal for Egypt). The supposed presidential ambitions of his son, Gamal, must now be considered defunct. Just how honest and open new elections might be, once pressure on the streets has reduced, is questionable. Whether they would usher in a truly new era for Egypt is highly doubtful. At this historic moment, there remains all to play for. But through history, the fate of revolutions is to be hijacked. Egyptians will hope they don’t get fooled again.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\n
dedefensa.org<\/em><\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"L’Egypte selon Simon Tisdall Le chroniqueur du Guardian Simon Tisdall pr\u00e9sente une version r\u00e9aliste de la situation en Egypte, selon l’appr\u00e9ciation que le pouvoir en place garde encore le contr\u00f4le de la situation, l’arm\u00e9e jouant avec lui dans le registre de la conciliation. Bien entendu, Moubarak doit s’en aller, mais avec les honneurs, tandis que… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[14],"tags":[2894,10774,8031,6694],"class_list":["post-72719","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-ouverture-libre","tag-armee","tag-egyptienne","tag-moubarak","tag-tisdall"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/72719","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=72719"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/72719\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=72719"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=72719"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=72719"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}