Dans tous les cas, Teymoor Nabili, de Aljazeera.net<\/em>, pose la question (\u00abHas Mubarak won?<\/em>\u00bb), ce 3 f\u00e9vrier 2011<\/a>. Il la justifie par une r\u00e9f\u00e9rence \u00e0 l’analyse d’un professeur de la Naval Postgraduate School, Robert Springborg, publi\u00e9e le 2 f\u00e9vrier 2011<\/a>, sur Foreign Policy<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tSpringborg estime que Moubarak a manuvr\u00e9 en compl\u00e8te coordination avec l’arm\u00e9e, et que tous les \u00e9v\u00e9nements ont \u00e9t\u00e9 contr\u00f4l\u00e9s apr\u00e8s l’explosion populaire initiale, pour orienter la situation vers une normalisation qui renforcera le r\u00e9gime et ouvrira la porte au remplacement de Moubarak par un g\u00e9n\u00e9ral. Cette analyse n’est par ailleurs nullement complaisante puisqu’elle repr\u00e9sente, pour l’auteur, une d\u00e9faite de la d\u00e9mocratie et de la politique des USA, et une chance perdue dans ce cas puisque d\u00e9mocratie et politique des USA vont ensemble, et se d\u00e9finissent implicitement par le qualificatif de vertueux. Mais, dans l’analyse que d\u00e9veloppe Springborg, la politique des USA, effectivement vertueuse au d\u00e9part, a \u00e9t\u00e9 prise au pi\u00e8ge et sera d\u00e9sormais contrainte de soutenir un dictateur de plus, apr\u00e8s le d\u00e9part de Moubarak. On conclurait donc que, m\u00eame am\u00e9ricaniste, la vertu ne suffit pas.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe threat to the military’s control of the Egyptian political system is passing. Millions of demonstrators in the street have not broken the chain of command over which President Mubarak presides. Paradoxically the popular uprising has even ensured that the presidential succession will not only be engineered by the military, but that an officer will succeed Mubarak…<\/em> []<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe president and the military, have, in sum, outsmarted the opposition and, for that matter, the Obama administration. They skillfully retained the acceptability and even popularity of the Army, while instilling widespread fear and anxiety in the population and an accompanying longing for a return to normalcy. When it became clear last week that the Ministry of Interior’s crowd-control forces were adding to rather than containing the popular upsurge, they were suddenly and mysteriously removed from the street. Simultaneously, by releasing a symbolic few prisoners from jail; by having plainclothes Ministry of Interior thugs engage in some vandalism and looting (probably including that in the Egyptian National Museum); and by extensively portraying on government television an alleged widespread breakdown of law and order, the regime cleverly elicited the population’s desire for security. While some of that desire was filled by vigilante action, it remained clear that the military was looked to as the real protector of personal security and the nation as a whole. Army units in the streets were under clear orders to show their sympathy with the people.<\/em> []<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe Obama administration, having already thrown its weight behind the military, if not Mubarak personally, thereby facilitating the outcome just described, can be expected to redouble its already bad gamble. Fearing once again that the regime might be toppled, it will lean on the Europeans, the Saudis, and others to come to Egypt’s aid. The final nail will be driven into the coffin of the failed democratic transition in Egypt. It will be back to business as usual with a repressive, U.S.-backed military regime, only now the opposition will be much more radical and probably yet more Islamist. The historic opportunity to have a democratic Egypt led by those with whom the U.S., Europe, and even Israel could do business will have been lost, maybe forever. Uncle Sam will have to eat yet more humble pie, served up by the dictator who has just been insulting him.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \n dedfefensa.org<\/em><\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Moubarak a gagn\u00e9 Dans tous les cas, Teymoor Nabili, de Aljazeera.net, pose la question (\u00abHas Mubarak won?\u00bb), ce 3 f\u00e9vrier 2011. Il la justifie par une r\u00e9f\u00e9rence \u00e0 l’analyse d’un professeur de la Naval Postgraduate School, Robert Springborg, publi\u00e9e le 2 f\u00e9vrier 2011, sur Foreign Policy. Springborg estime que Moubarak a manuvr\u00e9 en compl\u00e8te coordination… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[14],"tags":[10789,3538,10788],"class_list":["post-72725","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-ouverture-libre","tag-egyptiens","tag-militaires","tag-springborg"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/72725","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=72725"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/72725\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=72725"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=72725"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=72725"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}