{"id":72738,"date":"2011-02-08T17:39:38","date_gmt":"2011-02-08T17:39:38","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2011\/02\/08\/la-furtive-marginalisation-du-jsf\/"},"modified":"2011-02-08T17:39:38","modified_gmt":"2011-02-08T17:39:38","slug":"la-furtive-marginalisation-du-jsf","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2011\/02\/08\/la-furtive-marginalisation-du-jsf\/","title":{"rendered":"La furtive marginalisation du JSF"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>Le Joint Strike Fighter, ou JSF, ou F-35, n&rsquo;en finit semble-t-il jamais de continuellement restructurer son propre programme de d\u00e9veloppement, ses tests, ses co\u00fbts, etc. Des nouvelles nous arrivent donc \u00e0 propos de la nouvelle structure du programme, int\u00e9grant les derni\u00e8res r\u00e9ductions de commande et les derniers contr\u00f4les budg\u00e9taires du Pentagone.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t Un long article de <em>Aviation Week &#038; Space Technology<\/em>, du <a href=\"http:\/\/www.aviationweek.com\/aw\/generic\/story.jsp?topicName=Check6&#038;id=news\/awst\/2011\/02\/07\/AW_02_07_2011_p25-287076.xml&#038;headline=F-35%20Replan%20Adds%20Time,%20Resources%20For%20Testing&#038;channel=&#038;from=topicalreports\" class=\"gen\">7 f\u00e9vrier 2011<\/a> d\u00e9taille ces nouvelles dispositions. Parmi les diverses nouvelles (Bill Sweetman les r\u00e9sume dans un autre article), on trouve ceci, qui est un des points les plus significatifs, qui est le retard accumul\u00e9 dans le d\u00e9veloppement du logiciel : \u00ab<em>For the mission system, the replan means more software development engineers, more integration laboratory capacityand more time. The final software standard, Block 3C, is scheduled to be released to flight test in June 2015. Of the 8 million lines of code on the aircraft, we have 4 million to do, but we still have four years of development, says Eric Branyan, deputy general manager of the F-35 program.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t Donc, comme signal\u00e9 plus haut, Bill Sweetman fait un r\u00e9sum\u00e9 des nouvelles dispositions de d\u00e9veloppement du JSF, et rappelle qu&rsquo;il ne s&rsquo;agit en aucune fa\u00e7on d&rsquo;une surprise tant les avertissements, de toutes les sources possibles, se sont accumul\u00e9s depuis 2006-2007. (L&rsquo;article de Sweetman, sur <em>Ares<\/em>, le <a href=\"http:\/\/www.aviationweek.com\/aw\/blogs\/defense\/index.jsp?plckController=Blog&#038;plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&#038;newspaperUserId=27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7&#038;plckPostId=Blog%3a27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post%3a9d65f000-2715-442a-ae57-50b88a5d7203&#038;plckScript=blogScript&#038;plckElementId=blogDest<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tEarly Warning on JSF Delays\u00a0\u00bb class=\u00a0\u00bbgen\u00a0\u00bb>7 f\u00e9vrier 2011<\/a>.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>Development testing is not now due to be completed until October 2016, completion being marked by the end of testing on Block 3 software. The new program will include 7,800 flights, restoring the 2,000 test sorties that the JSF Program Office cut in 2007. In total, this represents a five-year delay since the program started.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>To take a more recent benchmark: in September 2008, the schedule called for Block 3 development testing to be finished in mid-2013, five years away. Today, that milestone is more than five-and-a-half years off: in short, the JSF program has gone six to nine months backwards in just over two years.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>According to the Government Accountability Office&rsquo;s testimony of last March, development costs in then-year dollars had increased from a baseline of $34.4 billion on 2001 to $49.3 billion by that time. This was revised upwards to $50.8 billion as part of last year&rsquo;s Nunn-McCurdy review. The latest extension will cost an additional $4.6 billion, bringing the total overrun to $21 billion or 61 percent<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tCitant les conclusions d&rsquo;une \u00e9quipe d&rsquo;experts de la Navy, de l&rsquo;USAF et de la RAF \u00e9tudiant le programme JSF en 2006, Sweetman souligne le parti pris d\u00e9lib\u00e9r\u00e9, dans les premi\u00e8res structures et calendriers du programme, du refus de tout d\u00e9lai, de tout probl\u00e8me, de toute difficult\u00e9, comme si le JSF ne pouvait \u00eatre qu&rsquo;un succ\u00e8s in\u00e9luctable et total dans tous les domaines concevables, avant m\u00eame que d&rsquo;exister,  ce qui est effectivement sa philosophie, d&rsquo;une sorte qu&rsquo;on nommerait de l&rsquo;extr\u00e9misme am\u00e9ricanisteLe JSF fut donc pr\u00e9vu, planifi\u00e9 et programm\u00e9 pour \u00eatre le succ\u00e8s irr\u00e9sistible que l&rsquo;\u00e9quipe de relations publiques et la <em>narrative<\/em> virtualiste annonc\u00e8rent qu&rsquo;il serait. Il n&rsquo;y eut jamais de place, dans le programme JSF, pour l&rsquo;incursion de la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 et de ses incertitudes. \u00ab<em>What the team found,<\/em> [] <em>was that software development and testing schedules are success-oriented and have little margin to accommodate delays<\/em> [] <em>The investigators also reported that the flight test schedule provides little capability to respond to unforeseen problems and still meet scheduled start of operational testing.<\/em>\u00bb.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t Pour compl\u00e9ter le registre des nouvelles peu exaltantes, on mentionnera ce qui nous vient de Hollande, via le site <em>JSFNieuws<\/em> de Johan Boeder (le <a href=\"http:\/\/translate.google.com\/translate?hl=en&#038;sl=nl&#038;tl=fr&#038;u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.jsfnieuws.nl%2F\" class=\"gen\">5 f\u00e9vrier 2011<\/a>, en traduction Google). La nouvelle commente la publication par le <em>Telegraaf<\/em> d&rsquo;un rapport secret pour le minist\u00e8re de la d\u00e9fense, sur la restructuration des d\u00e9penses de d\u00e9fense, recommandant la r\u00e9duction de la commande de JF de 85 \u00e0 30-35 appareils. Le m\u00eame rapport recommande \u00e9galement d&rsquo;examiner l&rsquo;option de l&rsquo;achat d&rsquo;un avion europ\u00e9en.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t Par contraste avec toutes ces nouvelles tr\u00e8s d\u00e9pressives sur le programme JSF, nous signalons une s\u00e9rie d&rsquo;articles sur certaines dispositions et commandes qui sont prises et envisag\u00e9es, pour moderniser des avions actuellement en service aux USA, voire en commander de nouveaux. Un article du Los Angeles <em>Times<\/em> du <a href=\"\/latimes.com\/business\/la-fi-fighter-jet-20110204,0,2947856.story%3C\/p%3E%3C\/p%3E%3Cp%3E%3Cp%3Elatimes.com\" class=\"gen\">4 f\u00e9vrier 2011<\/a> rapporte la situation \u00e0 l&rsquo;usine Northrop de El Segundo, qui est co-producteur avec Boeing du F\/A-18 de l&rsquo;U.S. Navy.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>The boon for Northrop&rsquo;s 1,100 F\/A-18 workers in El Segundo  and the more than 700 parts suppliers in California  is the byproduct of an embarrassment for the Pentagon. By now, the military had hoped to start phasing out the F\/A-18 and begin flying the radar-evading F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. But production on the next-generation jet is years behind schedule and billions of dollars over budget.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Just last month, frustrated Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said the F-35, which is to be used jointly by the Navy, Marines and Air Force, is still not ready. To bridge the gap, he announced the Navy intended to buy 41 more F\/A-18s. The move will hedge against more delays in the deployment of the Joint Strike Fighter, he said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>This is good news for longtime Northrop workers, such as technician Martin Martinez, 46, of Whittier. He runs a final diagnostic on the plane&rsquo;s hydraulics, electrical, and fuel systems before the fuselage is sent out of the plant on a big rig. We&rsquo;ve been blessed for jobs in this plant for the last year or so, he said. We joke that there&rsquo;s a lucky charm buried around here somewhere.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Less than a year ago, the outlook in El Segundo wasn&rsquo;t as rosy. The plant had just enough work to last until this year, and there were fears that it could join the dozens of other Southland airplane manufacturing plants that have either slowed production or closed their doors altogether. But then the orders picked up. Last March, the Navy ordered 124 additional planes. Then came Gates&rsquo; announcement about buying still more.<\/em> []<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tL&rsquo;article se termine sur une observation de Todd Harrison, du Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments : \u00ab<em>The aircraft has been a good insurance policy for the Navy. The F\/A-18 will be in demand for as long as there are problems with the F-35 program. And if you look how that program has gone over the last several years, there&rsquo;s no telling how long that will be.<\/em>\u00bb Ce jugement est d&rsquo;autant plus \u00e0 consid\u00e9rer que Boeing vient de pr\u00e9senter publiquement une nouvelle version du F\/A-18, modernis\u00e9e dans le sens qu&rsquo;il faut, notamment avec des capacit\u00e9s furtives am\u00e9lior\u00e9es, et baptis\u00e9e <em>International Super Hornet<\/em>. <em>Aviation Week &#038; Space Technology<\/em> pr\u00e9sente cette version avec cette question, sous-entendant qu&rsquo;il s&rsquo;agit d&rsquo;un concurrent direct du JSF sur les march\u00e9s internationaux : \u00ab<em>JSF Killer ?<\/em>\u00bb Dans le m\u00eame num\u00e9ro (17 janvier 2010), l&rsquo;hebdomadaire d\u00e9taille les plans de l&rsquo;USAF pour une modernisation massive de ses F-16C\/D, portant sur 1.021 exemplaires et permettant une prolongation de leur vie op\u00e9rationnelle au-del\u00e0 de 2020.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tAinsi s&rsquo;organise, aux USA, et peut-\u00eatre ailleurs, un monde des armements sans le JSF,  pour un certain temps, peut-\u00eatre pour plus longtemps encore. C&rsquo;est une ann\u00e9e importante \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard, comme le signale l&rsquo;article du Los Angeles <em>Times<\/em>. Lorsque le journal annonce cette commande combin\u00e9e de 165 F\/A-18 suppl\u00e9mentaires en moins d&rsquo;un an, alors que les cha\u00eenes de production devaient s&rsquo;arr\u00eater cette ann\u00e9e, il marque qu&rsquo;on a chang\u00e9 d&rsquo;\u00e9poque,  de 2010, o\u00f9 l&rsquo;on vivait encore avec la perspective que le JSF resterait \u00e0 peu pr\u00e8s, m\u00eame si \u00e0 trois ou quatre ans pr\u00e8s, dans son enveloppe de pr\u00e9vision pour son entr\u00e9e en service,  \u00e0 2011, o\u00f9 l&rsquo;on constate que le JSF est sorti de notre monde, qu&rsquo;il est entr\u00e9 dans l&rsquo;inconnu de pr\u00e9visions impossibles \u00e0 faire, et qu&rsquo;il faut d\u00e9sormais s&rsquo;organiser sans compter sur une chronologie \u00e9tablie de son entr\u00e9e en service.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tIl s&rsquo;agit de conditions subreptices, ou furtives, qui re\u00e7oivent fort peu de publicit\u00e9 parce qu&rsquo;elles contrarient grandement, sinon totalement, la <em>narrative<\/em> officielle concernant le programme JSF. Officiellement, c&rsquo;est-\u00e0-dire selon cette <em>narrative<\/em>, le JSF existe, il est plus que jamais conqu\u00e9rant, irr\u00e9sistible, etc. Nul ne doute, selon le jugement conforme aux consignes du Syst\u00e8me, qu&rsquo;il emportera tous les march\u00e9s ext\u00e9rieurs qu&rsquo;il voudra bien consid\u00e9rer. Un seul cas risque de rendre plus difficile la concr\u00e9tisation de cette issue acquise d&rsquo;avance : l&rsquo;existence m\u00eame du JSF, c&rsquo;est-\u00e0-dire sa non-existence, ce qui est d\u00e9sormais une hypoth\u00e8se \u00e0 consid\u00e9rer. Ce \u00e0 quoi l&rsquo;on assiste est un mouvement puissant de r\u00e9\u00e9quipement par modernisation ou par achats discrets, sans publicit\u00e9 particuli\u00e8re, des forces arm\u00e9es US avec des \u00e9quipements courants, alors que se d\u00e9veloppent des versions nouvelles de ces \u00e9quipements courants. (Outre l&rsquo;<em>International Super Hornet<\/em>, Boeing offre d\u00e9j\u00e0 une version avanc\u00e9e du F-15, le F-15 <em>Silent Eagale<\/em>.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tUn autre \u00e9v\u00e9nement important quoique annexe pour le contexte qu&rsquo;on d\u00e9crit pourrait survenir si le nouveau Congr\u00e8s parvient \u00e0 relancer la cha\u00eene de production du F-22 <em>Raptor<\/em> \u00e0 l&rsquo;occasion du d\u00e9part du secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense Robert Gates. Cette relance conduirait \u00e0 marginaliser encore plus le JSF<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tMarginaliser, quel mot \u00e9trange pour cet avion de combat dont le but initial \u00e9tait de s&rsquo;imposer \u00e9videmment comme la seule possibilit\u00e9 d&rsquo;acquisition pour ce domaine dans le XXI\u00e8me si\u00e8cle ; c&rsquo;est-\u00e0-dire, dont le but initial \u00e9tait de marginaliser tous les autres. C&rsquo;est pourtant bien ce qu&rsquo;on d\u00e9crit avec les diverses \u00e9volutions qu&rsquo;on enregistre,  l&rsquo;hypoth\u00e8se de plus en plus \u00e0 consid\u00e9rer d&rsquo;une marginalisation subreptice, ou furtive bien entendu, du JSF, qui sera laiss\u00e9 dans son monde de <em>narrative<\/em> virtualiste, hoquetant de restructuration en restructuration, de million de lignes code en million de lignes code. Le reste, le monde r\u00e9el, il faudra bien qu&rsquo;il continue, par cons\u00e9quent, \u00e9ventuellement sans lui.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 8 f\u00e9vrier 2011 \u00e0 17H38<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Le Joint Strike Fighter, ou JSF, ou F-35, n&rsquo;en finit semble-t-il jamais de continuellement restructurer son propre programme de d\u00e9veloppement, ses tests, ses co\u00fbts, etc. Des nouvelles nous arrivent donc \u00e0 propos de la nouvelle structure du programme, int\u00e9grant les derni\u00e8res r\u00e9ductions de commande et les derniers contr\u00f4les budg\u00e9taires du Pentagone. Un long article de&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[9387,464,1015,4711,7714,250,10808,10269,3487,6769],"class_list":["post-72738","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-a-18","tag-f","tag-f-16","tag-hornet","tag-international","tag-jsf","tag-marginalisation","tag-modernisation","tag-super","tag-sweetman"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/72738","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=72738"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/72738\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=72738"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=72738"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=72738"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}