{"id":72782,"date":"2011-02-22T14:42:19","date_gmt":"2011-02-22T14:42:19","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2011\/02\/22\/j-20-f-22-jsf-lelasticite-souple-de-linformation-postmoderniste\/"},"modified":"2011-02-22T14:42:19","modified_gmt":"2011-02-22T14:42:19","slug":"j-20-f-22-jsf-lelasticite-souple-de-linformation-postmoderniste","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2011\/02\/22\/j-20-f-22-jsf-lelasticite-souple-de-linformation-postmoderniste\/","title":{"rendered":"J-20, F-22, JSF : l’\u00e9lasticit\u00e9 souple de l’information postmoderniste"},"content":{"rendered":"

Prenons un sujet d’int\u00e9r\u00eat courant et \u00e9lev\u00e9, celui des avions de combat, notamment des avions J-20<\/a> chinois, F-22 et JSF (F-35) am\u00e9ricanistes, et de leurs rapports entre eux, et voyons ce qu’il fut \u00e9crit r\u00e9cemment \u00e0 leur propos, selon des sources souvent cit\u00e9es et proclam\u00e9es honorables et s\u00e9rieuses. Nous en tirerons un enseignement non pas sur la valeur de ces avions, mais sur le bon usage de l’information.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Le 13 f\u00e9vrier 2011<\/a>, dans Air Force Times<\/em>, le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de l’USAF Deptula (qui vient de partir \u00e0 la retraite) est largement cit\u00e9. Deptula est, semble-t-il, une bonne source, selon les crit\u00e8res courants ; il dirigeait le renseignement de l’USAF lorsqu’il a pris sa retraite et, en 1990-1991, il fut un des concepteurs de l’offensive a\u00e9rienne contre l’Irak.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abLt. Gen David Deptula said the<\/em> [J-20] fifth-generation fighter may turn out to be a very, very formidable aircraft if the Chinese can effectively harness active electronically scanned array radars, engines and stealth.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe J-20, like the F-22, would be able to cruise at supersonic speeds at very high altitudes, Deptula said. But it would also carry more weapons, including three types now under development: air-to-air missiles with longer ranges than their U.S. counterparts; anti-ship and anti-surface weapons; and, potentially, weapons to destroy U.S. satellites. Such a plane might be used against U.S. refueling planes and large sensor aircraft such as the E-3 Sentry and E-8 JSTARS, he said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe emergence of both the J-20 and the Russian fifth-generation fighter, the PAK-FA, indicates that a U.S. advantage is slipping away, Deptula said. The United States has owned a monopoly on stealth for the last 25 years, and now, as both the Russians and Chinese acquire that same capability, you’re going to see that advantage we used to hold disappear very quickly, and that is going to have a very significant effect on our current operational plans, Deptula said. The first flight of the J-20 needs to be a wake-up call to the strategic complacency of those in the United States who assume continued air and naval dominance in the Pacific.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe J-20’s appearance also should cause prudent decision-makers to reconsider the closure of the F-22 [production] line, Deptula said<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Cinq jours plus tard, le 18 f\u00e9vrier 2010<\/a> (sur Military.com<\/em>), le secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense US Robert Gates est cit\u00e9 \u00e0 propos du J-20. C’est tout juste s’il n’en fait pas une antiquit\u00e9 tout juste bonne \u00e0 figurer au mus\u00e9e des occasions perdues (Pr\u00e9cisons tout de m\u00eame que Gates parlait au Congr\u00e8s, qu’il a abandonn\u00e9 le programme F-22 contre le vu de nombreux parlementaires, qu’il est oppos\u00e9 \u00e0 la relance de ce m\u00eame F-22 \u00e0 cause du J-20, qu’il sait qu’il existe des groupes de pression pr\u00eats \u00e0 agir dans ce sens au Congr\u00e8s, justement.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abThe United States will retain a far bigger fleet of top-end fighter planes than China for years to come despite Beijing’s early test of a Stealth-style jet that has stoked concern over its military buildup, the U.S. defense chief said. Defense Secretary Robert Gates told lawmakers Thursday that China faces a long road before deploying its J-20 stealth fighter in any numbers, and predicted a continuing huge disparity compared with America’s fleet of low-observable aircraft.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Pr\u00e9cisons le sujet du J-20 compar\u00e9 aux avions US, avec les deux Laurel et Hardy, tous deux glorieux Ph.D, du Lexington Institute, Daniel Goure et Loren B. Thompson. En citant quatre textes de ces deux-l\u00e0 (Early Warning<\/em>, sur le site du Lexington Institute), deux pour chacun, on aura une image assez kal\u00e9idoscopique des qualit\u00e9s du J-20, par rapport au F-22 et au F-35, selon qu’il est int\u00e9ressant de nous faire regretter l’un (le F-22) ou de nous rassurer sur l’autre (le F-35)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Le 13 f\u00e9vrier 2011<\/a>, Laurel B. Thompson sonne l’alarme \u00e0 propos du J-20. Il entend d\u00e9montrer que le secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense Gates a eu grand tort d’abandonner le F-22, qui semble \u00eatre, sous sa plume, si l’on lit bien (soulign\u00e9 en gras) ce qu’il \u00e9crit \u00e0 propos du Japon tr\u00e8s pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment, le seul<\/strong> avion, disons du monde libre pour ne faire d’erreur, capable d’affronter le J-20<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abGates defenders will counter that although the Chinese J-20 looks a lot like an F-22 in its forward aspect, side and rear views suggest an airframe that is nowhere near as stealthy. Well maybe so, but balanced against that is the fact that China is probably more interested in using the new jet for striking U.S. naval assets, since it won’t be feasible for U.S. fighters to sustain a continuous presence in Chinese air space (there aren’t enough nearby bases). Forward-aspect stealth is more important in strike missions than whether you are visible from behind after bombs have been released.<\/em> The J-20 also looks like a fine tool for threatening neighbors like Japan, which practically begged the Pentagon for years to sell it the F-22. Now it looks unlikely to have anything comparable to the J-20 that it can field for its homeland defense.<\/em><\/strong>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Cinq jours plus tard, le 18 janvier 2011<\/a>, Goure-Hardy vient \u00e0 la rescousse de Laurel B. Thompson. Il s’agit de montrer que les USA, sans le F-22 en nombre bien plus important qu’ils n’ont, sont en grand danger. Certes, il y a le F-35, mais la tr\u00e8s ch\u00e8re petite chose, d\u00e9cid\u00e9ment, ne fait pas le poids<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abIn view of the new appreciation of the threat it is time to bring back the F-22. Recent war games by Western think tanks have concluded that the projected U.S. tactical fighter force would be overwhelmed by the sheer number of less capable third and fourth-generation Chinese fighters.<\/em> Add in the J-20 and the outlook for the U.S. military becomes decidedly bleak. Even when the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is deployed this will not provide the U.S. with enough offensive capability given the limited number of F-22s that will be combat capable.<\/em><\/strong>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Revenons \u00e0 Laurel B. Thompson. Le 1er f\u00e9vrier 2011<\/a>. Sans s’attarder un instant \u00e0 la nouvelle qu’il n’est pas du tout<\/a> question que l’Inde ach\u00e8te le JSF, il d\u00e9veloppe une argumentation superbe en faveur du F-35, qui semble \u00eatre l’avion qu’attend l’Inde depuis son ind\u00e9pendance, qui est sup\u00e9rieur \u00e0 n’importe quel avion tactique chinois (Mais attardons-nous \u00e0 ce membre de phrase : le F-35 \u00abis far superior to any tactical aircraft China possesses<\/em>today<\/em><\/strong>\u00bb ; il n’y a rien de r\u00e9ellement faux, le F-35 est sup\u00e9rieur \u00e0 tout ce que les Chinois ont en service aujourd’hui<\/strong>, puisqu’ils n’ont pas encore le J-20 en service, et cela en n’ajoutant surtout pas qu’il parle d’un F-35 id\u00e9al, qui ne sera en service avec toutes ses capacit\u00e9s, si l’est jamais et s’il existe jamais, que dans 7 \u00e0 8 ans d’ici.) <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abBut that requires equipping India with weapons capable of matching or surpassing the warfighting systems of the Peoples Liberation Army. The F-35 fits that description perfectly. It is far superior to any tactical aircraft China possesses today, and it will remain operationally relevant long after the current crop of non-stealthy fighters passes into history.<\/em><\/strong> With India recently showing greater interest in acquiring U.S. military technology, it makes eminent sense to welcome New Delhi into the still-exclusive club of F-35 partners. The F-35 is well suited to Indian security needs so much so that the Indians will probably team with Russia on developing a similar plane if America is unwilling to deal. But there’s no reason not to sell the F-35 to India: it is the world’s biggest democracy, it has legitimate defensive needs, and with the way China is growing, we are going to need India on our side<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t La parole \u00e0 Goure-Hardy, maintenant, le 18 f\u00e9vrier 2011<\/a>. Goure revient au Japon, dont Loren B. avait parl\u00e9 plus haut en affirmant que seul le F-22 (et pas le F-35, par cons\u00e9quent) permettrait \u00e0 ce pays de relever le d\u00e9fi du J-20, pour laisser entendre, ces gens \u00e9crivent toujours selon un style entre l’allant de soi et le cela va sans dire, en \u00e9vitant d’en \u00e9crire directement pour \u00e9viter la d\u00e9sagr\u00e9able prise en flagrant d\u00e9lit, que le F-35 est l’avion id\u00e9al contre le J-20.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abJapan is looking for a replacement for its aging fleet of U.S.-made F-4 Phantom jets. The mostly likely choice is the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. With China’s unveiling of its new advanced J-20 attack aircraft, Japan’s requirement for improved air defenses is obvious.<\/em><\/strong> The F-35 is currently the centerpiece of an international partner program involving eight close allies that includes collaborative development, production and testing of the aircraft. Adding Japan to the F-35 team makes sense from the perspective of strengthening Japan’s security, alliance relationships and regional stability.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCes quelques p\u00e9r\u00e9grinations n’ont d’autre but que de confirmer que la parole officielle, ou semi-officielle (les experts plus ou moins appoint\u00e9s), est devenue pure publicit\u00e9, lorsqu’il s’agit de domaines \u00e0 la fois aussi importants, aussi incertains dans la description de leur statut, et aussi prot\u00e9g\u00e9s par la technique des interf\u00e9rences morales, que les grands syst\u00e8mes d’arme. (Lorsqu’il s’agit de questions plus politiques, l’interf\u00e9rence morale de l’appr\u00e9ciation conformiste est recommand\u00e9e, pour donner au slogan publicitaire un cachet particulier.) Dans ces conditions, il n’est plus question de se r\u00e9f\u00e9rer \u00e0 une r\u00e9alit\u00e9 quelconque, encore moins \u00e0 la v\u00e9rit\u00e9 \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard. La tournure, l’orientation de la phrase, l’effet recherch\u00e9 suffisent \u00e0 justifier toutes les variations dans l’affirmation, c’est-\u00e0-dire tout et son contraire. La subjectivit\u00e9 est totale dans le discours officiel (et semi-officiel, cela va de soi et de pair).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCes constats nous convainquent d’autant plus de d\u00e9velopper un discours qui \u00e9vite comme la peste la r\u00e9f\u00e9rence au discours officiel. Il s’agit de reconstruire soi-m\u00eame une r\u00e9alit\u00e9 la plus approchante de la v\u00e9rit\u00e9, \u00e0 l’aide d’outils disponibles en sources ouvertes et en abondance. Aujourd’hui, il faut prendre le discours officiel avec la mention pr\u00e9sum\u00e9 faux, ou pr\u00e9sum\u00e9 trompeur, comme on disait d’une personne soup\u00e7onn\u00e9e d’un crime qu’elle \u00e9tait pr\u00e9sum\u00e9e innocente. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 22 f\u00e9vrier 2011 \u00e0 14H43<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Prenons un sujet d’int\u00e9r\u00eat courant et \u00e9lev\u00e9, celui des avions de combat, notamment des avions J-20 chinois, F-22 et JSF (F-35) am\u00e9ricanistes, et de leurs rapports entre eux, et voyons ce qu’il fut \u00e9crit r\u00e9cemment \u00e0 leur propos, selon des sources souvent cit\u00e9es et proclam\u00e9es honorables et s\u00e9rieuses. Nous en tirerons un enseignement non pas… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3109,9859,10294,3984,5708,8334,3473,2702,10855,7973,3411,3474,5193,610],"class_list":["post-72782","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-b","tag-daniel","tag-faux","tag-gates","tag-goure","tag-lexington","tag-loren","tag-mensonge","tag-presume","tag-publicite","tag-stealth","tag-thompson","tag-tromperie","tag-virtualisme"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/72782","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=72782"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/72782\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=72782"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=72782"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=72782"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}