{"id":72807,"date":"2011-03-03T05:42:34","date_gmt":"2011-03-03T05:42:34","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2011\/03\/03\/dogfight-pour-une-no-fly-zone-i-pentagone\/"},"modified":"2011-03-03T05:42:34","modified_gmt":"2011-03-03T05:42:34","slug":"dogfight-pour-une-no-fly-zone-i-pentagone","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2011\/03\/03\/dogfight-pour-une-no-fly-zone-i-pentagone\/","title":{"rendered":"Dogfight<\/em> pour une No Fly Zone<\/em> (I \u2013 Pentagone)"},"content":{"rendered":"

La question de savoir s’il y aura une No Fly Zone<\/em> au-dessus de la Libye est une chose, qui semblerait pour l’instant r\u00e9gl\u00e9e, d’ailleurs, dans un sens n\u00e9gatif, dans tous les cas du c\u00f4t\u00e9 am\u00e9ricaniste-occidentaliste, ou qui ne semblerait pas r\u00e9gl\u00e9e, c’est selon, si on se tourne du c\u00f4t\u00e9 des couloirs du quartier-g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de l’OTAN D\u00e9battre pour savoir qui la fera respecter, comme s’il \u00e9tait acquis qu’il y aura une No Fly Zone<\/em>, est une autre chose, qui concerne \u00e9videmment l’USAF et l’U.S. Navy. Pour le Pentagone, en effet, il ne fait aucun doute que, s’il y a une No Fly Zone<\/em> en Libye, ce sont les USA qui se chargeront de la faire respecter. La comp\u00e9tition pour savoir qui disposera de cet honneur et de cette affirmation de puissance se fait essentiellement entre les deux services sp\u00e9cialis\u00e9s dans cette sorte de mission, l’USAF et la Navy, qui en d\u00e9battent comme si le reste du monde (ROW) n’avait qu’\u00e0 attendre le r\u00e9sultat de ces d\u00e9lib\u00e9rations. Ainsi l’unilat\u00e9ralisme psychologique US d\u00e9veloppe-t-il son raisonnement, donnant ainsi une r\u00e9ponse de plus \u00e0 la question de David Oborne<\/a> sur la capacit\u00e9 des USA \u00e0 accepter gracieusement de ne plus jouer le r\u00f4le imp\u00e9rieux de la puissance absolument dominatrice et devant laquelle tous les autres s’inclinent (\u00abThe great question is whether America will take its diminished status gracefully, or whether it will lash out, as empires in trouble are historically prone to do<\/em>\u00bb).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tVoyons maintenant ce qu’en pensent l’USAF et la Navy, et l’on se doute que leurs pens\u00e9es ne rencontrent certainement pas la suggestion implicite du chroniqueur britannique.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Le 1er mars 2011<\/a>, sur le site Ares<\/em> d’Aviation Week & Space Technology<\/em>, David A. Fulghum rapporte les vaticinations de l’USAF sur la possibilit\u00e9, pour elle-m\u00eame, d’assurer cette mission de No Fly Zone<\/em>. En effet, juge l’USAF, ou une de ses courroies de transmission officieuses (un ancien chef d’\u00e9tat-major de cette m\u00eame USAF), la Navy ne pourra remplir cette t\u00e2che parce qu’elle ne peut, contrairement \u00e0 l’USAF bien entendu, \u00eatre partout \u00e0 la fois (\u00abU.S. aircraft carriers are moving to the Western Mediterranean, but operations in Afghanistan will not permit them to maintain a long-term no-fly zone over Libya. That task would fall to the Air Force, he says.<\/em>\u00bb). Le tr\u00e8s grand int\u00e9r\u00eat de l’USAF dans cette affaire concerne la d\u00e9monstration de la valeur de l’avion de combat F-22.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abIf the U.S. decides to establish a no-fly zone over Libya, the effort could be led by F-22s in their first combat assignment. The F-22 and some cyberoperations would be employed in shutting down Libya’s air defense system which is comprised almost exclusively of Russian-built SA-6 surface-to-air missiles, says a former Air Force chief of staff<\/em> []<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbA likely scenario would have shorter-range fighters flying out of Egypt, using facilities like Cairo West where multi-national Bright Star exercises are conducted. We have a great relationship with the Egyptian air force and army and they are the ones in charge of the country, the veteran fighter pilot says. They will not operate from bases in Libya occupied by insurgents because of the danger of shoulder-fired missiles, anti-U.S. protests and sabotage.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbLarger aircraft, such as tankers, E-8 Joint Stars and E-3 AWACS could operate from Oman, Tunisia or Qatar to establish orbits off Libya’s shores. The establishment of a no-fly zone would require a massive SAM roll-back effort, like that imposed on Iraq [during the Northern and Southern Watch operations after the first Iraq conflict in 1991], the former Air Force official says. Every time the Iraqis turned on a radar, we hosed them.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t L’U.S. Navy n’a pas perdu une seconde pour affirmer, de son c\u00f4t\u00e9, sa capacit\u00e9 \u00e9vidente \u00e0 assurer, seule<\/strong>, le fonctionnement efficace, sinon irr\u00e9sistible d’une No Fly Zone<\/em>. C’est le chef d’\u00e9tat-major de la Navy (CNO), l’amiral Gary Roughead, qui l’a dit \u00e0 la presse, le 1er mars 2011<\/a> (sur DoDBuzz<\/em>). <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abChief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead said today that the Navy is prepared to help implement a no-fly zone over Libya should the order come. The capability that we have on our aircraft carriers, they can perform that function, they can perform a variety of functions, said Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead when asked by reporters if the Navy would enforce a no fly zone over Libya after a House Armed Services Committee hearing. We’re ready to perform any taskings we might receive.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbRoughead’s words come as the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise and amphibious assault ship USS Kearsarge are standing by in the nearby Red Sea and Mediterranean.<\/em> [] We have 20 ships in the Central Command area of operations today, we have eight in the Mediterranean and I’m not going to get into any speculation for how we will be using them.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tRien de tr\u00e8s nouveau sous le soleil. Les deux services s’int\u00e9ressent avec passion \u00e0 la mythique No Fly Zone<\/em>, d’abord pour des raisons de politique bureaucratique interne. Du c\u00f4t\u00e9 de l’USAF, il s’agit de d\u00e9montrer une capacit\u00e9 et, notamment, de r\u00e9habiliter le chasseur F-22 abandonn\u00e9 il y a deux ans au 187\u00e8me exemplaire. Pour la Navy, il s’agit de d\u00e9montrer qu’il n’y a pas de meilleur instrument de projection de force que le porte-avions, bien que son prix actuel (pour les grands porte-avions d’attaque) soit \u00e9valu\u00e9 \u00e0 $15 milliards. Dans ces cas, on comprend que les questions de la crise libyenne et de la cha\u00eene crisique, du sort des Libyens et des op\u00e9rations en cours dans ce pays, sont assez secondaires.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 3 mars 2011 \u00e0 05H39<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

La question de savoir s’il y aura une No Fly Zone au-dessus de la Libye est une chose, qui semblerait pour l’instant r\u00e9gl\u00e9e, d’ailleurs, dans un sens n\u00e9gatif, dans tous les cas du c\u00f4t\u00e9 am\u00e9ricaniste-occidentaliste, ou qui ne semblerait pas r\u00e9gl\u00e9e, c’est selon, si on se tourne du c\u00f4t\u00e9 des couloirs du quartier-g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de l’OTAN… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[2623,8514,9550,249,10888,6902,3319,10887,3704,10890,41,3701],"class_list":["post-72807","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-bureaucratie","tag-cno","tag-egypte","tag-f-22","tag-fly","tag-libye","tag-navy","tag-no","tag-porte-avions","tag-roughead","tag-usaf","tag-zone"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/72807","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=72807"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/72807\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=72807"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=72807"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=72807"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}