{"id":72844,"date":"2011-03-15T06:16:21","date_gmt":"2011-03-15T06:16:21","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2011\/03\/15\/a-joint-arab-force-could-better-enforce-a-libya-no-fly-zone\/"},"modified":"2011-03-15T06:16:21","modified_gmt":"2011-03-15T06:16:21","slug":"a-joint-arab-force-could-better-enforce-a-libya-no-fly-zone","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2011\/03\/15\/a-joint-arab-force-could-better-enforce-a-libya-no-fly-zone\/","title":{"rendered":"A Joint Arab Force Could Better Enforce a Libya No-Fly-Zone"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h4>Une <em>No Fly Zone<\/em> arabe en Libye?<\/h4>\n<p>Nous vous pr\u00e9sentons ci-dessous un int\u00e9ressant document provenant de l&rsquo;institut INEGMA,  Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis, \u00e9tabli \u00e0 Douba\u00ef, dans les Emirats Arabes Unis (EAU). Il s&rsquo;agit d&rsquo;une analyse <strong>technique<\/strong> des possibilit\u00e9s pour une coalition arabe (principalement les pays du Golfe et l&rsquo;Egypte) de constituer une flotte a\u00e9rienne capable d&rsquo;\u00e9tablir et de contr\u00f4ler une <em>No Fly Zone<\/em> arabe en Libye. L&rsquo;analyse est faite par Riad Kahwaji, le directeur g\u00e9n\u00e9ral d&rsquo;INEGMA.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tL&rsquo;int\u00e9r\u00eat de cette analyse,  int\u00e9r\u00eat effectivement technique,  est qu&rsquo;elle s&rsquo;appuie sur une r\u00e9elle culture de capacit\u00e9s a\u00e9riennes militaires, fortement pr\u00e9sente dans les forces a\u00e9riennes des EAU (sans doute l&rsquo;une des meilleures forces a\u00e9riennes arabes, du point de vue de l&rsquo;\u00e9quipement autant que du point de vue de la comp\u00e9tence et de l&rsquo;exp\u00e9rience du personnel). Au reste, les t\u00e9moignages et les sources sollicit\u00e9es sont \u00e9videmment proches de ces forces a\u00e9riennes et de l&rsquo;<em>establishment<\/em> militaire des EAU, signifiant que la question est consid\u00e9r\u00e9e s\u00e9rieusement.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLa possibilit\u00e9 ainsi envisag\u00e9e d&rsquo;une intervention arabe, suivant en cela une prise de position de la Ligue Arabe le 12 mars en faveur d&rsquo;une <em>No Fly Zone<\/em>, \u00e9largit consid\u00e9rablement la dimension politique du probl\u00e8me. Il met en cause l&rsquo;habituel r\u00e9flexe am\u00e9ricaniste-occidentaliste, d\u00e9fini presque automatiquement comme celui de la communaut\u00e9 internationale que pr\u00e9tend repr\u00e9senter \u00e0 lui seul ce m\u00eame syst\u00e8me am\u00e9ricaniste-occidentaliste, en signalant que les pays arabes pourraient eux-m\u00eames se charger de l&rsquo;op\u00e9ration. L&rsquo;analyse a \u00e9t\u00e9 rendue publique le <a href=\"http:\/\/www.inegma.com\/?navigation=reports#\" class=\"gen\">11 mars 2011<\/a>, sur le site d&rsquo;INEGMA, et c&rsquo;est effectivement \u00e0 ce site qu&rsquo;il faut se r\u00e9f\u00e9rer principalement \u00e0 ce propos.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<h2 class=\"common-article2\">A Joint Arab Force Could Better Enforce a Libya No-Fly-Zone<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tThe United Nations Security Council and Western powers are debating the feasibility and benefits of enforcing a no-fly zone over Libya to halt air raids by the regime of Moammar Gadhafi on rebel forces and unarmed demonstrators who launched on February 17 a revolution to overthrow the four-decade-long Ghadafi dictatorship.  Rebel forces have taken control of all of the eastern part of the country and several parts of the western side and most of the central area.  Several Libyan army units joined the rebels in a campaign to clear the oil-rich country&rsquo;s towns and cities of Gadhafi elite troops led by the dictator&rsquo;s sons and henchmen.  The rebels&rsquo; onslaught on Gadhafi was halted and sometimes pushed back by the Libyan Air Force, or what is left of it.  Many countries around the world have called for establishing a no-fly zone (NFZ) to protect the Libyan rebels and civilians.  Also many Arab countries, especially members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have called for an NFZ over Libya, and so did the National Transition Council formed by the Libyan rebels to run the country&rsquo;s affairs until a new government replaces Gadhafi&rsquo;s.  However, the United States and European countries have sent mixed signals on the NFZ, which drew criticism from many circles in Middle East and West.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tSome Arab defense experts believe it is time for the Arab States to stand up and take responsibilities in their own hands and come to the aid of the Libyans.  Retired Major General Khaled Al-Bu Ainnain, former commander of the United Arab Emirates Air Force and Air Defense, believes that some GCC states and Egypt can mount a joint operation and successfully enforce an NFZ over Libya. The UAE Air Force can deploy couple of squadrons  one F-16 Block 60 and another Mirage 2000-9  the Saudi Air Force can deploy a couple of F-15S squadrons and Egypt a couple of F-16 squadrons out of Mersi Matrouh Air Base in western Egypt, Al-Bu Ainnain said. This would provide 120 fighters and attack aircrafts that would be backed with airborne early warning planes like Egyptian E-2C Hawkeye or Saudi AWACS, some unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) for reconnaissance, and air-refueling tankers from Saudi Arabia and couple of Egyptian or UAE helicopter squadrons comp osed of Apache Longbow gunships, Blackhawks and Chinook helicopters, for search and rescue missions. Crews and troops needed for the operation could be quickly airlifted to western Egypt, and even Algeria, within hours using a large fleet of UAE and Egyptian C-130 and Qatari C-17 transporters.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tObservers believe the area of operations for any force executing an NFZ over Libya now would be confined to the area between the capital Tripoli and the City of Cert and down south to Sebha in the center.  The rest of the country is under rebel control.  The Libyan Air Force is comprised of aging Cold War-era Soviet supplied fighters like Su-22, MiG-21 and MiG-23 and one remaining operational Mirage F-1 and some 30 Mi-24 Helicopter gunships.  According to reports out of Libya, only few Su-22 and MiG-23 aircrafts were seen involved in the air raids in addition to Mi-24 gunships. As for Air Defense, Gadhafi&rsquo;s forces are believed to be in possession of a few batteries of Soviet-era SAM-2, SAM-3 and SAM-6 surface to air missiles. All of the Libyan Air Defense SAM&rsquo;s and radars can be taken out swiftly by the arsenal of smart weapons and cruise missiles in possession today by GCC and Egyptian Air Forces, Al-Bu Ainnain said. unways can be destroyed with bunker-busters to ground all the jets, and the gunships can be easily destroyed on the ground.  He pointed out that GCC and Egyptian Air Forces have considerably enhanced their joint-operations capabilities as a result of almost annual exercises they have done together along with the U.S. and some EU countries. Issues related to command and control and interoperability would be resolved quickly which would ensure a smooth running of NFZ operations.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tMany analysts believe Libyan rebels and the Arab street would be more welcoming of a joint Arab force enforcing NFZ than a Western one.  Even Arab street reaction to an operation led by Arab countries would reflect favorably on the concerned governments, and reduce mounting frustration amongst Arabs of seeing their governments weak and indecisive in resolving Arab problems.  GCC officials have indicated in their recent statements that a request by the Arab League would be enough to give legitimacy to a NFZ in Libya.  Arab troops would be able to operate more easily and effective on the ground in Libya than Westerners due to issues related to language, culture and geography.  Most analysts agree an Arab joint force would have more success than a Western one in Libya, provided the joint force gets the needed political commitment regionally and internationally.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p>\n<p class=\"signature\">Riad Kahwaji, CEO, INEGMA<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Une No Fly Zone arabe en Libye? Nous vous pr\u00e9sentons ci-dessous un int\u00e9ressant document provenant de l&rsquo;institut INEGMA, Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis, \u00e9tabli \u00e0 Douba\u00ef, dans les Emirats Arabes Unis (EAU). Il s&rsquo;agit d&rsquo;une analyse technique des possibilit\u00e9s pour une coalition arabe (principalement les pays du Golfe et l&rsquo;Egypte) de constituer&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[14],"tags":[6911,3259,5253,5134,9550,10888,6902,10887,3701],"class_list":["post-72844","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-ouverture-libre","tag-arabe","tag-arabie","tag-coalition","tag-eau","tag-egypte","tag-fly","tag-libye","tag-no","tag-zone"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/72844","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=72844"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/72844\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=72844"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=72844"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=72844"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}