{"id":72846,"date":"2011-03-15T11:27:21","date_gmt":"2011-03-15T11:27:21","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2011\/03\/15\/larabie-envahit-bahrein-tres-tres-vite\/"},"modified":"2011-03-15T11:27:21","modified_gmt":"2011-03-15T11:27:21","slug":"larabie-envahit-bahrein-tres-tres-vite","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2011\/03\/15\/larabie-envahit-bahrein-tres-tres-vite\/","title":{"rendered":"L’Arabie envahit Bahrein, tr\u00e8s, tr\u00e8s vite"},"content":{"rendered":"

Les forces saoudiennes sont entr\u00e9es hier dans le royaume de Bahrein, \u00e0 l’appel de la direction du royaume, du type monarchie absolue. L’intervention \u00e9tait donc annonc\u00e9e<\/a> et elle a eu lieu comme pr\u00e9vu, dans la petite \u00eele abritant Bahrein et reli\u00e9e directement \u00e0 l’Arabie. Les forces saoudiennes comptent un millier d’hommes, des blind\u00e9s divers (entre 150 et 200), et sont accompagn\u00e9s de quelques d\u00e9tachements des autres pays du CCG (Conseil de Coop\u00e9ration du Golfe), tels les EAU, le Kowe\u00eft, Qatar, Oman, de fa\u00e7on \u00e0 pr\u00e9senter l’op\u00e9ration comme collective, et r\u00e9pondant aux imp\u00e9ratifs de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 du principal organisme de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de la r\u00e9gion. On sait bien entendu de quoi il s’agit, venir renforcer les forces de la monarchie qui dirige Bahrein, contre les contestataires qui se manifestent depuis un mois.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCes contestataires, qui sont form\u00e9s de la majorit\u00e9 chiites contre la minorit\u00e9 sunnite qui d\u00e9tient le pouvoir, ont qualifi\u00e9 l’intervention essentiellement saoudienne d’acte de guerre et d’occupation arm\u00e9e. Certains commentateurs dissidents, peu soucieux de l’aspect quantitatif et s’en tenant \u00e0 l’esprit de la chose, comparent effectivement cette action \u00e0 celle du Pacte de Varsovie contre la Tch\u00e9coslovaquie en ao\u00fbt 1968, et l’un d’eux observe : \u00abL’invasion r\u00e9ussit dans un premier temps, mais on conna\u00eet le r\u00e9sultat final. Aujourd’hui, les choses vont infiniment plus vite, et ce qui a pris vingt ans \u00e0 se faire apr\u00e8s l’invasion pourrait bien \u00eatre r\u00e9alis\u00e9 en vingt semaines.<\/em>\u00bb (Ou bien en vingt jours, pourquoi pas ?)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe Independent<\/em> a rappel\u00e9 pour l’affaire Arabie-Bahrein son envoy\u00e9 sp\u00e9cial favori avec Robert Fisk. Il s’agit de David Cockburn, \u00e9galement sp\u00e9cialiste des affaires du Moyen-Orient, notamment dans leur dimension militaro-politique. Cockburn signe un article (ce 15 mars 2011<\/a>) sur la situation au Bahrein, qui donne une appr\u00e9ciation tr\u00e8s int\u00e9ressante de la position des protestataires, en passe de devenir des insurg\u00e9s O\u00f9 l’on s’aper\u00e7oit que leur position actuelle est tr\u00e8s forte, notamment \u00e0 l’int\u00e9rieur de la capitale o\u00f9 ils menacent r\u00e9guli\u00e8rement, et l’investissent par intermittences, le quartier financier o\u00f9 Bahrein concentre l’essentiel de ses activit\u00e9s \u00e9conomiques, ou plut\u00f4t financi\u00e8res et sources de revenus consid\u00e9rables pour la monarchie Cockburn :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abThe Saudi intervention is the first time that any Arab state has acted to quell protests in another since the wave of uprisings began in the region. The Bahraini government had earlier called for support from its neighbours after fighting in the streets of the capital, Manama, on Sunday, in which demonstrators routed riot police.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbOn Sunday morning the police attacked a small camp of pro-democracy protesters with tear gas and rubber bullets, but the raid provoked fighting in which the protesters seized control of much of Manama’s financial district. This led the ruling al-Khalifa family to request a task force from the other five members of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), which also includes Saudi Arabia, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Kuwait.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe Saudi rulers are worried that unrest among the Shias of Bahrain will spread to their own Shia population in the neighbouring Eastern Province. Saudi security forces have been trying to prevent protests in the kingdom from gaining momentum.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe opposition in Bahrain, including the Shia Wefaq party, issued a statement saying: We consider the entry of Saudi Arabia or other Gulf forces into the Kingdom of Bahrain’s air, sea or land territories a blatant occupation. It added that Saudi intervention threatened Bahrainis with an undeclared war by armed troops.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbSo far the Saudi troops, presumed to be accompanied by smaller forces from other GCC states, have not appeared on the streets, where security remains in the hands of the police. Demonstrators have erected barricades blocking the main road leading to the financial district. Police checkpoints have sealed the road to the airport.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe protesters appear to have moved into the business district in order to raise pressure on the government. Businessmen working in Bahrain’s offshore banking hub were forced to walk miles to their offices in high-rise buildings in the centre of Manama. Protesters had gathered earlier outside the Bahrain Financial Harbour, which is owned by the Prime Minister, Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa, who has been accused of corruption. They also moved to the campus of the main university and against the royal palace in Riffa, where they were opposed by police and Sunni civilians wielding swords<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tUn expert ind\u00e9pendant des affaires du Moyen-Orient et du Golfe Persique, Mai Yamani, explique, dans le m\u00eame Inependent<\/em> de ce m\u00eame 15 mars 2011<\/a>, comment l’affaire de Bahrein, qui est n\u00e9e petite, voire innocente, avec des revendications tr\u00e8s mod\u00e9r\u00e9es, au regard dans tous les cas d’un grand chambardement comme celui de l’Egypte, est en train de menacer de devenir un centre majeur d’explosion au Moyen-Orient. Il semble bien que l’explication de cette aggravation, qui \u00e9tait per\u00e7ue, paradoxalement par rapport aux positions respectives des forces en pr\u00e9sence, \u00e0 la fois comme in\u00e9luctable et comme \u00e9vidente d\u00e8s le d\u00e9but des troubles si les dirigeants monarchiques de Bahrein choisissait maladroitement une politique de confrontation brutale, se trouve justement et simplement dans ce choix qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 fait malgr\u00e9 tout. Les dirigeants de Bahrein ne semblent pas avoir envisag\u00e9 une seconde la possibilit\u00e9 d’un compromis, sinon sous la pression des USA deux semaines apr\u00e8s le d\u00e9but des troubles, trop peu, trop tard. Aujourd’hui, la situation \u00e0 Bahrein est ouverte \u00e0 toutes les voies d\u00e9stabilisantes pour les dirigeants du royaume.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abThe reality is that the royal family in Bahrain was never really under threat. People were asking for a constitutional monarchy, and protesters were only radicalised when the authorities used force against them. Now the stakes are higher and there is fear that there will be more bloody confrontations because the Saudi army is much more brutal than in Bahrain. They are outsiders. After confrontations they can go back across the causeway.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe two countries are so closely linked and not just by that strategic causeway. There is a Shia majority in Bahrain and in Saudi Arabia’s eastern province. The Shia have always been marginalised and never properly incorporated into the kingdom, and with no representation in the government. The fear for Saudi Arabia is that the Shia in Bahrain, and those in its east, will form an alliance with Iran.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe region is also crucial for the United States. Disruption of oil production in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia could damage the world economy.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe irony is that the GCC which includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the UAE and Saudi Arabia was established in 1981 after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war to protect the states from outside threats. It was never meant to be used for internal repression of its people or for neighbourly repression.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSimon Tisdall, du Guardian<\/em>, observe ce 14 mars 2011<\/a> la situation d’un point de vue plus large encore, en y incluant les USA et l’Iran. Il cite les d\u00e9clarations de Gates, en visite \u00e0 Bahrein lors du week-end dernier, recommandant aux dirigeants de Bahrein de tenir ferme mais aussi de faire des r\u00e9formes, affirmant que les Iraniens n’ont rien \u00e0 voir avec ces d\u00e9sordres mais qu’ils devraient \u00eatre prompts \u00e0 en profiter, si les d\u00e9sordres devaient aller plus loin, et qu’il a des preuves de cela Tisdall observe que George Friedman, de Stratfor.com<\/em>, partage cette analyse et l’on comprend alors qu’il s’agit non seulement de Bahrein mais aussi de l’Arabie, et de toute la coh\u00e9sion strat\u00e9gique des int\u00e9r\u00eats et de l’influence strat\u00e9giques des USA dans la r\u00e9gion. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab Gates did not say what the clear \u00e9vidence was. But his view is shared by analysts such as Stratfor’s George Friedman. He argued recently that the US withdrawal from Iraq, to be completed in December, and continuing military and institutional weakness in Baghdad, is set to give an enormous boost to Iran’s regional influence.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbEvents across the Gulf could compound Iran’s advantage, Friedman said (writing before the Saudi decision to move into Bahrain). If the Saudis intervened in Bahrain, the Iranians would have grounds to justify their own intervention, covert or overt. Iran might also use any violent Bahraini government suppression of demonstrators to justify more open intervention. In the meantime, the United States, which has about 1,500 military personnel plus embassy staff on the ground in Bahrain, would face the choice of reinforcing or pulling its troops out, he warned.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbIt’s clear from the comments of Shia opposition leaders in Bahrain, who say the Saudi intervention amounts to a declaration of war, that not everyone in the Arab world (to put it mildly) welcomes Riyadh playing the role of regional policeman.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbAnd even as the Saudi regime steps up its efforts to neutralise regional unrest, the fact that it is not immune itself from the contagion was driven home at the weekend when hundreds of family members of people jailed without charge rallied in front of the interior ministry in Riyadh. The highly unusual protest was peaceful. But it followed closely on last Friday’s day of rage, and it was not likely to be the last.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbDespite these unmistakeable portents, the profound lack of understanding among veteran Saudi leaders about what is happening around them was sharply illustrated by remarks by the interior minister, Prince Nayef bin Abdul-Aziz, the king’s half-brother, congratulating the regime on surviving the day of rage. I congratulate King Abdullah and his crown prince Sultan for having these kind and loyal subjects, Nayef said. Some evil people wanted to spread chaos in the kingdom and called for demonstrations that have dishonourable goals. Luckily, he suggested, this deeply nefarious plot had been thwarted.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tDans tout cela, on voit difficilement la moindre organisation, le moindre plan bien \u00e9quilibr\u00e9 et invitant une r\u00e9alisation audacieuse. Tous les acteurs connus et organis\u00e9s de l’affaire (Bahrein, l’Arabie, les USA) semblent enferm\u00e9s dans leurs logiques internes, souvent contradictoires, malgr\u00e9 les encouragements et les professions de foi r\u00e9ciproques. Les USA soutiennent les deux pays du Golfe tout en les avertissant de la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 de faire des r\u00e9formes importantes. M\u00eame si les USA \u00e9taient au courant de l’intervention de l’Arabie, comme d’ailleurs \u00e0 peu pr\u00e8s tout le monde \u00e0 la lecture des articles de presse, m\u00eame s’ils ont donn\u00e9 leur autorisation qu’ils ne pouvaient d’ailleurs pas ne pas donner, ils soutiendront l’Arabie en la critiquant hautement pour cette intervention \u00e0 la limite de la l\u00e9galit\u00e9, et plus encore si un soldat saoudien ouvre le feu sur un manifestant et le tue. (Comme l’\u00e9crit Tisdall : \u00abBut the US continues to try to have it both ways, doggedly pursuing its strategic interests in the region while freely criticising Arab governments that suppress protests that would undercut them.<\/em>\u00bb)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIl n’y a pas de politique dans tout cela, et encore moins de Grand Dessein concert\u00e9. Il y a des int\u00e9r\u00eats particuliers, puisque c’est \u00e0 cela que se r\u00e9sument aujourd’hui les int\u00e9r\u00eats nationaux et les conceptions des dirigeants, que ce soit la monarchie de Bahrein, la maison des princes d’Arabie ou le Pentagone. Chacun s’encourage et renouvelle ses engagements, tandis que chacun suit sa propre politique, avec ses propres int\u00e9r\u00eats, chacun avec un il prioritaire sur sa propre situation int\u00e9rieure. Dans ce d\u00e9sordre, les seuls qui apparaissent finalement presque organis\u00e9s sont ceux qui ne le sont pas ; les protestataires bahre\u00efnis, sortis de rien, charg\u00e9s de revendications modestes, et qui constituent aujourd’hui une force plac\u00e9e de telle fa\u00e7on qu’elle menace, malgr\u00e9 la faiblesse de ses capacit\u00e9s r\u00e9lles, tout l’\u00e9quilibre strat\u00e9gique de la r\u00e9gion.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 15 mars 2011 \u00e0 11H26<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Les forces saoudiennes sont entr\u00e9es hier dans le royaume de Bahrein, \u00e0 l’appel de la direction du royaume, du type monarchie absolue. L’intervention \u00e9tait donc annonc\u00e9e et elle a eu lieu comme pr\u00e9vu, dans la petite \u00eele abritant Bahrein et reli\u00e9e directement \u00e0 l’Arabie. Les forces saoudiennes comptent un millier d’hommes, des blind\u00e9s divers (entre… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[10836,3259,10936,8750,6294,1268,3984,5322,9555],"class_list":["post-72846","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-5eme","tag-arabie","tag-bahrein","tag-ccg","tag-flotte","tag-friedman","tag-gates","tag-gcc","tag-stratfor-com"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/72846","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=72846"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/72846\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=72846"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=72846"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=72846"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}