{"id":72856,"date":"2011-03-19T14:15:22","date_gmt":"2011-03-19T14:15:22","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2011\/03\/19\/la-coalition-et-lombre-de-bho-hamlet\/"},"modified":"2011-03-19T14:15:22","modified_gmt":"2011-03-19T14:15:22","slug":"la-coalition-et-lombre-de-bho-hamlet","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2011\/03\/19\/la-coalition-et-lombre-de-bho-hamlet\/","title":{"rendered":"La coalition et l&rsquo;ombre de BHO-Hamlet"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>Hier, \u00e0 la Commission europ\u00e9enne, c&rsquo;est-\u00e0-dire dans les couloirs nombreux et tr\u00e8s longs, on se f\u00e9licitait de l&rsquo;incomparable habilet\u00e9 de la partie am\u00e9ricaniste dans cette affaire d&rsquo;intervention en Libye. Ainsi va l&rsquo;interpr\u00e9tation qui procurait des gloussements de plaisir : les interventions anti-interventionnistes du secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense Robert Gates constituaient une manuvre d&rsquo;une supr\u00eame habilet\u00e9 pour contenir les pressions anti-guerres des Chinois et des Russes, alors qu&rsquo;on pr\u00e9parait l&rsquo;intervention, dont les <em>boys<\/em> seraient \u00e9videmment. Gates aurait donc jou\u00e9 \u00e0 \u00eatre l&rsquo;opposant qu&rsquo;il ne serait finalement pas, \u00e0 cette op\u00e9ration contre la Libye avec participation US. Il est toujours surprenant de mesurer l&rsquo;extr\u00eame ignorance de ce qu&rsquo;est la psychologie am\u00e9ricaniste, de la part de tous ces bureaucrates non-US \u00e9perdus d&rsquo;amour depuis bien plus d&rsquo;un demi-si\u00e8cle pour le parrain Sam d&rsquo;Outre-Atlantique. Mais quoi, ne dit-on pas que l&rsquo;amour rend aveugle ?<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tSi un Gates proclame partout qu&rsquo;il est contre tout nouvel <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article-robert_gates_ci-devant_isolationniste_04_03_2011.html\" class=\"gen\">engagement ext\u00e9rieur<\/a>, y compris et particuli\u00e8rement <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article-gates_c_est_non_non_et_non_10_03_2011.html\" class=\"gen\">en Libye<\/a>, s&rsquo;il le dit publiquement et devant les futures \u00e9lites de la nation (les \u00e9l\u00e8ves-officiers de West Point, d&rsquo;Annapolis ou de l&rsquo;Air Force Academy), c&rsquo;est qu&rsquo;il le pense vraiment. On ne plaisante pas avec la formation morale des futures \u00e9lites de la nation, c&rsquo;est-\u00e0-dire qu&rsquo;on ne les floue pas avec des mensonges tactiques. La psychologie am\u00e9ricaniste n&rsquo;a pas l&rsquo;habitude de dissimuler lorsque l&rsquo;image et le statut de la puissance am\u00e9ricaniste sont en jeu ; elle d\u00e9teste le machiav\u00e9lisme d&rsquo;essence europ\u00e9enne, qui a toujours marqu\u00e9 cette politique europ\u00e9enne que l&rsquo;Am\u00e9rique a d\u00e9nonc\u00e9e d\u00e8s son origine.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLes USA pratiquent des politiques cyniques, vicieuses, brutales, sans le moindre souci des convenances et des obligations, mais ils ne s&rsquo;en dissimulent pas, justifiant d&rsquo;ailleurs ces politiques par des buts qu&rsquo;ils jugent \u00e9lev\u00e9s (notamment l&rsquo;instauration de la d\u00e9mocratie, de style US et \u00e0 l&rsquo;avantage des USA) et dans lesquels ils croient. Si Washington avait \u00e9t\u00e9 uni dans sa volont\u00e9 d&rsquo;intervenir en Libye et selon une d\u00e9cision d\u00e9termin\u00e9e depuis un certain temps, il l&rsquo;aurait fait savoir \u00e9galement depuis un certain temps ; Washington (le Pentagone) n&rsquo;aurait pas permis que cette intervention soit envisag\u00e9e hors du cadre OTAN, o\u00f9 elle aurait d\u00fb se couler d\u00e8s le d\u00e9but et d&rsquo;une fa\u00e7on stricte, il aurait exig\u00e9 le commandement visible et proclam\u00e9 de l&rsquo;op\u00e9ration de toutes les fa\u00e7ons, y compris la plus visible par proclamation publique et mondiale.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tAu contraire de ces conditions normales d&rsquo;une intervention US classique, nombre d&rsquo;indications montrent un Obama tr\u00e8s ind\u00e9cis, une administration tr\u00e8s divis\u00e9e, une d\u00e9cision prise tr\u00e8s tardivement et une volont\u00e9 de limiter au maximum l&rsquo;engagement US. La question de la viabilit\u00e9 de l&rsquo;engagement US n&rsquo;est donc pas sollicit\u00e9e, elle se pose tr\u00e8s pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment. Il s&rsquo;agit l\u00e0 d&rsquo;\u00e9l\u00e9ments fondamentaux, qui vont faire peser sur l&rsquo;intervention \u00e9ventuelle une hypoth\u00e8que de taille. Plusieurs textes publi\u00e9s aux USA donnent des indications \u00e0 propos des incertitudes US.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t  On a par exemple ce texte de la publication <em>The Daily<\/em>, du <a href=\"http:\/\/www.thedaily.com\/page\/2011\/03\/17\/031711-news-hillary-1-2\/\" class=\"gen\">17 mars 2011<\/a>, \u00e0 partir d&rsquo;une interview d&rsquo;un officiel du d\u00e9partement d&rsquo;Etat, d\u00e9crivant la frustration d&rsquo;Hillary Clinton vis-\u00e0-vis des h\u00e9sitations de BHO (cela expliquant la d\u00e9cision de Clinton, annonc\u00e9e publiquement, d&rsquo;interrompre son mandat de secr\u00e9taire d&rsquo;Etat \u00e0 la fin du premier terme de la pr\u00e9sidence Obama). Le texte, publi\u00e9 jeudi matin, a \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9dig\u00e9 alors que la d\u00e9cision d&rsquo;intervention des USA n&rsquo;\u00e9tait pas encore prise, semble-t-il, ou dans tous les cas encore inconnue des bureaucraties (selon le texte de <em>Foreign Policy<\/em> qui suit, elle aurait \u00e9t\u00e9 prise mardi soir, \u00e0 l&rsquo;issue d&rsquo;une r\u00e9union \u00e0 la Maison-Blanche).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Fed up with a president who can&rsquo;t make his mind up as Libyan rebels are on the brink of defeat, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is looking to the exits<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>At the tail end of her mission to bolster the Libyan opposition, which has suffered days of losses to Col. Moammar Gadhafi&rsquo;s forces, Clinton announced that she&rsquo;s done with Obama after 2012  even if he wins again Obviously, she&rsquo;s not happy with dealing with a president who can&rsquo;t decide if today is Tuesday or Wednesday, who can&rsquo;t make his mind up, a Clinton insider told The Daily. She&rsquo;s exhausted, tired.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>He went on, If you take a look at what&rsquo;s on her plate as compared with what&rsquo;s on the plates of previous Secretaries of State  there&rsquo;s more going on now at this particular moment, and it&rsquo;s like playing sports with a bunch of amateurs. And she doesn&rsquo;t have any power. She&rsquo;s trying to do what she can to keep things from imploding.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Clinton is said to be especially peeved with the president&rsquo;s waffling over how to encourage the kinds of Arab uprisings that have recently toppled regimes in Egypt and Tunisia, and in particular his refusal to back a no-fly zone over Libya. In the past week, former President Bill Clinton and Hillary Clinton&rsquo;s former top adviser Anne-Marie Slaughter lashed out at Obama for the same reason.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The tension has even spilled over into her dealings with European diplomats, with whom she met early this week. When French president Nicolas Sarkozy urged her to press the White House to take more aggressive action in Libya, Clinton repeatedly replied only, There are difficulties, according to Foreign Policy magazine.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t Le texte du <a href=\"http:\/\/thecable.foreignpolicy.com\/posts\/2011\/03\/18\/how_obama_turned_on_a_dime_toward_war\" class=\"gen\">18 mars 2011<\/a> de <em>Foreign Policy<\/em>, raconte comment Obama a d\u00e9cid\u00e9 de se tourner (mardi soir) vers l&rsquo;engagement. On note l&rsquo;appr\u00e9ciation assez peu optimiste de Steve Clemons, pourtant favorable \u00e0 Obama, d\u00e9crivant un pr\u00e9sident sans strat\u00e9gie, agissant de fa\u00e7on r\u00e9active et nullement de fa\u00e7on strat\u00e9gique Par ailleurs, le texte d\u00e9taille les oppositions \u00e0 l&rsquo;int\u00e9rieur de l&rsquo;administration, dont celle de Gates dont nous avons parl\u00e9 plus haut. Ces oppositions subsistent, certainement toujours anim\u00e9es d&rsquo;une forte conviction, d&rsquo;autant plus r\u00e9elles que la r\u00e9solution d&rsquo;Obama reste, elle, per\u00e7ue comme extr\u00eamement fragile.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>At the start of this week, the consensus around Washington was that military action against Libya was not in the cards. However, in the last several days, the White House completely altered its stance and successfully pushed for the authorization for military intervention against Libyan leader Col. Muammar al-Qaddafi. What changed?<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The key decision was made by President Barack Obama himself at a Tuesday evening senior-level meeting at the White House, which was described by two administration officials as extremely contentious. Inside that meeting, officials presented arguments both for and against attacking Libya. Obama ultimately sided with the interventionists. His overall thinking was described to a group of experts who had been called to the White House to discuss the crisis in Libya only days earlier.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>This is the greatest opportunity to realign our interests and our values, a senior administration official said at the meeting, telling the experts this sentence came from Obama himself. The president was referring to the broader change going on in the Middle East and the need to rebalance U.S. foreign policy toward a greater focus on democracy and human rights. But Obama&rsquo;s stance in Libya differs significantly from his strategy regarding the other Arab revolutions. In Egypt and Tunisia, Obama chose to rebalance the American stance gradually backing away from support for President Hosni Mubarak and Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and allowing the popular movements to run their course. In Yemen and Bahrain, where the uprisings have turned violent, Obama has not even uttered a word in support of armed intervention  instead pressing those regimes to embrace reform on their own. But in deciding to attack Libya, Obama has charted an entirely new strategy, relying on U.S. hard power and the use of force to influence the outcome of Arab events.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>In the case of Libya, they just threw out their playbook, said Steve Clemons, the foreign policy chief at the New America Foundation. The fact that Obama pivoted on a dime shows that the White House is flying without a strategy and that we have a reactive presidency right now and not a strategic one.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t Un texte de <em>CNN.News<\/em> du <a href=\"http:\/\/edition.cnn.com\/2011\/POLITICS\/03\/18\/obama.no.fly\/index.html?hpt=T1\" class=\"gen\">19 mars 2011<\/a> donne des pr\u00e9cisions sur la participation US, \u00e0 partir de sources de la Maison-Blanche. Les d\u00e9tails montrent effectivement une participation limit\u00e9e, de type second rideau et de soutien, notamment sans engagement d&rsquo;avions de combat.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>President Barack Obama is trying to limit the United States&rsquo; role in enforcing a no-fly zone over Libya to support aircraft only and is very reluctant to commit any offensive U.S. firepower, a senior U.S. official familiar with the military planning discussions said Friday. We will provide the unique capabilities that we can bring to bear to stop the violence against civilians, including enabling our European allies and Arab partners to effectively enforce a no-fly zone, the president said in a nationally televised statement about U.S. military action.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The president chose his words deliberately and carefully, and you should be guided by them, the official said. He is very sensitive that this not be a U.S. operation. We are part of it. And of course, we by nature of our superior capabilities have a lead and leadership role to play. But we are part of it and expect a lot from our partners, the official said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Asked about the unique capabilities the president talked about contributing, the official said that at least for now, they would not involve combat fighters or bombers but instead would include AWACS, intelligence-gathering drones and other intelligence assets, and refueling and air traffic control.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Defense officials said, Don&rsquo;t just think of a no-fly zone as American pilots flying American fighter jets. They also emphasized how the U.S. could use radar planes to coordinate air traffic control, to guide fighter jets from other countries to conduct air strikes<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tEffectivement, ces diverses circonstances montrent qu&rsquo;il existe une s\u00e9rieuse hypoth\u00e8que au d\u00e9part de cette coalition. La pr\u00e9sence US est en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral jug\u00e9e comme indispensable, selon le leitmotiv des appr\u00e9ciations am\u00e9ricanistes-occidentalistes ; elle peut devenir un boulet, voir un facteur contre-productif grave, si pour quelque raison que ce soit, la faible r\u00e9solution du pr\u00e9sident Obama se r\u00e9duit encore, ou si les exigences US de direction au sein de la coalition sont trop grandes. Les causes de telles hypoth\u00e8ses sont nombreuses : des difficult\u00e9s dans l&rsquo;op\u00e9ration elle-m\u00eame, des r\u00e9actions mitig\u00e9es dans divers pays, des r\u00e9actions mitig\u00e9es \u00e0 Washington et dans la population US, la poursuite et l&rsquo;aggravation des divisions au sein de l&rsquo;administration, voire des heurts avec les autres membres de la coalition durant l&rsquo;op\u00e9ration.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tCe dernier point, au niveau op\u00e9rationnel, est loin d&rsquo;\u00eatre secondaire. Une op\u00e9ration majeure de cette sorte, \u00e0 laquelle les USA pr\u00eatent certains de leurs moyens mais qu&rsquo;ils ne dirigent pas absolument et compl\u00e8tement, risque fort de faire de ces USA un partenaire tr\u00e8s encombrant et tr\u00e8s revendicatif. Les militaires US, imbus de leur puissance, m\u00eame si cette puissance est partout en lambeaux, accepteraient difficilement de ne pas assurer tous les commandements, et plus encore de recevoir des ordres \u00e9ventuels. (On sent cela dans cette d\u00e9claration de l&rsquo;officiel cit\u00e9 par CNN, empreinte de la proverbiale modestie am\u00e9ricaniste : \u00ab<em>And of course, we by nature of our superior capabilities have a lead and leadership role to play.<\/em>\u00bb) Si le sch\u00e9ma op\u00e9rationnel est bien celui qu&rsquo;on entrevoit, o\u00f9 les USA sont en seconde place tandis que Fran\u00e7ais et Britanniques m\u00e8nent les op\u00e9rations, la porte serait ouverte \u00e0 toutes les dissensions, \u00e0 toutes les interf\u00e9rences. La condition du succ\u00e8s d&rsquo;une coalition est bien entendu l&rsquo;unit\u00e9 du commandement et la coordination sous ce commandement. A premi\u00e8re vue, cette situation id\u00e9ale est loin d&rsquo;\u00eatre constitu\u00e9e.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 19 mars 2011 \u00e0 14H18<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Hier, \u00e0 la Commission europ\u00e9enne, c&rsquo;est-\u00e0-dire dans les couloirs nombreux et tr\u00e8s longs, on se f\u00e9licitait de l&rsquo;incomparable habilet\u00e9 de la partie am\u00e9ricaniste dans cette affaire d&rsquo;intervention en Libye. Ainsi va l&rsquo;interpr\u00e9tation qui procurait des gloussements de plaisir : les interventions anti-interventionnistes du secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense Robert Gates constituaient une manuvre d&rsquo;une supr\u00eame habilet\u00e9&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[8002,6179,934,7911,3984,7578,3278,10891,6902,584],"class_list":["post-72856","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-bho","tag-clemons","tag-clinton","tag-conviction","tag-gates","tag-hamlet","tag-hillary","tag-kadhafi","tag-libye","tag-otan"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/72856","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=72856"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/72856\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=72856"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=72856"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=72856"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}